Adams v. City of St Paul

CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedMay 2, 2023
Docket0:22-cv-01902
StatusUnknown

This text of Adams v. City of St Paul (Adams v. City of St Paul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. City of St Paul, (mnd 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

Frankie Edward Adams, File No. 22-cv-1902 (ECT/LIB)

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

City of St. Paul,

Defendant. ________________________________________________________________________ Plaintiff Frankie Edward Adams objects to Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois’s Order and Report and Recommendation dated February 9, 2023.1 In the Order and Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 34], Magistrate Judge Brisbois denied as moot several non- dispositive motions Mr. Adams filed [ECF Nos. 23, 27, 28, and 32] and recommended the with-prejudice dismissal of Mr. Adams’s Complaint. That part of the Order and Report and Recommendation suggesting dismissal of Mr. Adams’s Complaint will be reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) and D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). That part denying Mr. Adams’s non-dispositive motions will be reviewed to determine whether it is in any respect “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. §

1 Any objections to the Order and Report and Recommendation were due to be filed and served “within 14 days after [Adams was] served with a copy[.]” D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(1), (b)(1). Mr. Adams’s objections were filed on March 1, 2023. ECF No. 36. The record does not show when Mr. Adams was served with the Order and Report and Recommendation, meaning we do not know whether Mr. Adams’s objections are timely. The objections will be considered without regard to their timeliness. Defendant does not argue that Mr. Adams’s objections are untimely. Any delay would have been insignificant and non-prejudicial. And the fact that Mr. Adams is prosecuting this action pro se while incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia weighs in favor of leniency. 636(b)(1)(A); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(3). This order presumes familiarity with the Order and Report and Recommendation. I

Mr. Adams points out that he did not consent to a magistrate judge making rulings in his case. ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 1–7. Mr. Adams is factually correct, but that doesn’t mean Magistrate Judge Brisbois lacked legal authority to issue the Order and Report and Recommendation. Whether a litigant consents or not, the law gives magistrate judges the power to decide non-dispositive pretrial matters and to recommend disposition of

dispositive matters in cases where a district judge designates the magistrate judge to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); D. Minn. LR 72.1, 72.2. Here, Magistrate Judge Brisbois possessed authority to address Mr. Adams’s non-dispositive motions in the first instance, and the fact that Mr. Adams’s non-dispositive motions were intertwined with the Defendant’s dismissal motion prompted me to designate Magistrate Judge Brisbois to recommend disposition of

the dismissal motion. In other words, Magistrate Judge Brisbois had authority to do what he did even though Mr. Adams did not consent. II When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings, but it may

consider ‘some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint[.]’” Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1999)). Magistrate Judge Brisbois properly relied on publicly available court records and filings in considering Defendants’ motion. Mr. Adams objects to Magistrate Judge Brisbois’s recommendation that the

Complaint be dismissed under Minnesota’s claim preclusion doctrine.2 ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 12– 15, 23. Magistrate Judge Brisbois recommended finding that Mr. Adams is “substantively barred” from raising claims in his federal complaint, because he raised the same claims in his previous state court complaint, and those claims were dismissed with prejudice by operation of Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(a). ECF No. 34 at 15. Mr. Adams argues that claim

preclusion does not apply because his previous state-court complaint and his complaint in this case involve different parties and different facts. ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 12–15, 23. A later claim is barred under Minnesota law “where ‘(1) the earlier claim involved the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the estopped party had a full

and fair opportunity to litigate the matter.’” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 539 F.3d 809, 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004)); see also Aaron Carlson Corp. v. Cohen, 933 N.W.2d 63, 72 (Minn. 2019) (same). The elements of res judicata to which Mr. Adams objects clearly are met here.

2 Some of Mr. Adams’s arguments concern collateral estoppel, a different preclusion doctrine. ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 17–18, 22, 24. The confusion is understandable. Regardless, Magistrate Judge Brisbois did not find or recommend finding that collateral estoppel applies in this case. (1) The factual circumstances in both cases are the same. Both the state and federal complaints are comprised of allegations against the City of St. Paul—namely, that between 2010 and 2018, the City’s law enforcement officers, Parking Enforcement officers, and

Zoning Department repeatedly harassed Mr. Adams and illegally confiscated his property. ECF No. 1 at 4–7; ECF No. 17-2 at 80–88. Both contain allegations that the City raided Mr. Adams’s property (ECF No. 17-2 at 81; ECF No. 1 ¶ 3); marked his vehicles (ECF No. 17-2 at 88; ECF No. 1 ¶ 9); destroyed his mailbox (ECF No. 17-2 at 84; ECF No. 1 ¶ 10); and illegally removed a snowblower, lawnmower, weed whacker, and truck from his

property (ECF No. 17-2 at 84; ECF No. 1 ¶ 8). Notably, the federal complaint does not allege any actions that took place after the state complaint was served.3 (2) The parties are identical across both suits. Mr. Adams is the only plaintiff in each case. See ECF No. 17-2 at 87; ECF No. 1 at 1, 4. The City of St. Paul is the only defendant in each case. Though Mr. Adams identified other defendants in the caption of

the state court complaint (ECF No. 17-2 at 78), the City of St. Paul appears to have been the only defendant served with that complaint. ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 9, 11, 26. Likewise, here, Mr. Adams listed “City of St Paul et. al. and unknown agents” as the defendants in the case caption. ECF No. 1 at 1. However, he lists only “City of St. Paul” in his form complaint. Id. at 4. Mr. Adams alleges that different police officers harassed him at different times.

3 In his objections, Mr. Adams seems to acknowledge that the complaints are substantially the same. After discussing the 2018 state-court complaint, he notes, “I never attempt[ed] fileing [sic] of the [2018 state-court] complaint again until the 7-29-22 federal court house.” ECF No. 36 ¶ 11. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 23. However, he admits that all officers are from the same police department (Id. ¶¶ 16, 23), and he is suing the City, not individual officers. (3) Mr.

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Related

Porous Media Corporation v. Pall Corporation
186 F.3d 1077 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)
Hauschildt v. Beckingham
686 N.W.2d 829 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 2004)

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