Adams v. Board of Public Education

585 F. Supp. 215, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17816
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedApril 6, 1984
DocketCiv. A. 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 585 F. Supp. 215 (Adams v. Board of Public Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. Board of Public Education, 585 F. Supp. 215, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17816 (M.D. Ga. 1984).

Opinion

ORDER

OWENS, Chief Judge.

Congress, in its wisdom, made United States District Courts the guardians of the constitutional rights of all citizens by giving United States District Courts jurisdiction of and the responsibility of deciding lawsuits alleging deprivation of constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Pursuant to that jurisdiction this court, since this lawsuit began in 1963, has been determining whether or not the public schools of Bibb County are being operated in the constitutional, non-discriminatory manner mandated by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal.

When this lawsuit began on September 14, 1963, the Bibb County public schools— *216 like public schools throughout the United States — were operated on a racially discriminatory basis — some 41 of 61 public schools were just for white students and some 20 of 61 public schools were just for black students. Approximately 35,000 students were attending the public schools; by race about 59% were white and 41% were black. By the beginning of the 1970-71 school year, as the result of many hearings, orders, and appellate directives, the high schools and junior high schools had been integrated by division into complexes —Northeast, Central, and Southwest — and the grammar schools had been merged using the neighborhood school concept. That concept contemplated the continued existence of some racially identifiable elementary schools. The effects of court ordered integration were being felt. The school board's October 1, 1970, report shows 32,-759 total students — 17,903 or 55% white and 14,865 or 45% black, a decrease of 3,321 white students (4%) and an increase of 134 black students since October 1,1968.

On May 3, 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit directed that the plaintiffs’ motion for the elimination of four all-black, thirteen predominantly black, and several all-white elementary schools be considered, 460 F.2d 430. In obedience to that directive this court heard from the parties in writing and in open court over a considerable period of time. In the course of doing so new black students and parents were substituted for' those who began this litigation but were no longer attending these schools, and a group of white students and parents were added as representatives of an additional plaintiff class of white students and parents. This freed the defendant school board of the public misconception that its members were partial to the interests of white students and parents and the representatives of their interests in court.

After lengthy negotiations the representatives of the black students and parents, the white students and parents, and the defendant Board of Education agreed to settle the remaining issues, all of which concerned the elementary schools. On June 30, 1978, they presented their settlement agreement in the form of a consent decree to the court. Notice of the proposed settlement was given and a hearing to determine whether or not the settlement was fair was held. On September 5, 1978, the consent decree was approved subject to the resolution of three issues, one of which was whether or not to rebuild the burned L.H. Williams School. In that order the court stated:

“On June 30, 1978, the parties — plaintiff black parents and students, plaintiff white parents and students, and the defendant Board of Education — presented a proposed agreed upon order settling this class action school desegregation suit. The proposed settlement in essence approves the neighborhood school concept for the kindergarten and elementary grades of the Bibb County schools as being constitutionally sufficient even though some of those schools because of the racial composition of the neighborhood are and will likely remain predominantly of one race; makes certain changes in the geographical area served by certain schools; provides for closing some schools; and leaves to the defendant Board of Education the responsibility of continuing to operate the public schools in accordance with the present Northeast, Central, and Southwest complex concept for junior and senior high students and the neighborhood school complex for elementary and kindergarten students.
As required by Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered that notice of this proposed class action settlement be given, provided for objections to be voiced in writing and provided for a hearing at which objections could be voiced and the proposed settlement would be considered. That hearing was ultimately held on Friday, August 4, 1978.
Between June 30 and the date first specified for the Rule 23 hearing, objections were voiced (a) by some of the representatives of the plaintiff black par *217 ents and students to the provision of the plan which calls for the area heretofore served by L.H. Williams School — which burned in 1977 and under the proposal is not to be rebuilt — to be included in the Green Street School area, both schools having a predominantly black student body; (b) by parents of both plaintiff classes who objected to the alteration of lines of the zones in which they resided or to the closing of a particular school. No parent wrote or voiced an objection, however, to the neighborhood school concept being utilized for the kindergarten and elementary grades even though some of Bibb County’s elementary schools are and will likely continue to be predominantly of one race.
At the August 4 hearing a large number of persons were present. Thomas M. Jackson, Esquire, moved to be permitted to withdraw the consent executed by him for the plaintiff class of black parents and students. In giving reasons Mr. Jackson said in effect that before June 30 he was led to believe that the settlement represented the wishes of the plaintiff black parents and students but that thereafter he discovered from the objections of a large number of class representatives now represented by Robert Steele, Esquire, that the settlement does not really represent their wishes. Mr. Steele was present and explained that the objections voiced by the black parents and students now represented by him centered on their concern over the proposal to not rebuild L.H. Williams School. Mr. Steele further indicated that the school board’s suggestion that the court delay a decision on the question of whether or not L.H. Williams should be rebuilt until such time as the facts can be presented and considered, satisfies all the objections of the some twenty (20) representatives of the class of black parents and children that he represents.

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Related

Lucas v. Townsend
967 F.2d 549 (Eleventh Circuit, 1992)
Lucas v. Townsend
783 F. Supp. 605 (M.D. Georgia, 1992)
Julius C. Adams v. The Board of Public Education
770 F.2d 1562 (Eleventh Circuit, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
585 F. Supp. 215, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17816, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-board-of-public-education-gamd-1984.