REIORT\’l and AFFIRM; Opinion issued November 14. 2012.
In The Qituirt iii 411ra1s ifth Iistrirt tif ULXw3 at Ja11&ui No. 05-I 1-01266-CR
LASHUNDRA ADAMS, Appellant
V.
TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court l)allas Count, Texas i Court Cause No. F0S-533 15-V rf
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Fitz(ierald and Lang-Miers Opinion By Justice O’Neill
Appellant Lashundra Adams appeals her jurY conviction fbr aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, in three issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support her
conviction and the judgment should be reformed to retlect the proper trial attorneys. For the
following reasons, we reform the judgment and affirm the trial court’s judgment as reformed.
Appellant wis charged with stabbing the victim Meishea Pruitt with a screwdriver or “an
unknown sharp object.” The evidence at trial showed that appellant and Pruitt were romantically
involved with the same man, Romall Scott. Before the offense, the two women had numerous
arguments over the phone about Scott. Shortly before the offense, Scott married Pruitt, who was also
the mother of his child. Scott however continued his relationship with appellant. Pruitt initially testified that on the day ofthe offense, she called Scott on his cell phone. She
said Scott was with appellant and appellant took Scott’s phone and started arguing with Pruitt. She
said when Scott got his phone back, he told Pruitt to meet him at his mother’s house. Pruitt testified
that when she got to Scott’s mother’s house, she got out of her car and started to get her daughter out
ofthe back seat. As she leaned down, appellant stabbed her in the back two or three times, and then
walked away. Pruitt testified the object she was stabbed with looked like a pocket knife. After she
was stabbed, an ambulance arrived and she went to the hospital. On cross-examination, Pruitt
testified that after reviewing the police report, she was mistaken about the events leading to her.
going to Scott’s mother’s house. She said she and Scott had been at a gas station that day, got into
an argument, and she drove offleaving him at the gas station. She then went to appellant’s mother’s
house.
Scott testified that on the day of the offense, he and Pruitt were at a gas station. Pruitt was
on his cell phone arguing with appellant. Pruitt started yelling at Scott, while continuing to argue
with appellant. Scoff got out ofthe car and started walking toward his mother’s nearby house. Pruitt
drove off in the same direction. As Scott walked toward his mother’s house, he saw appellant
coming from the direction of the house. She told Scott, “yeah, I got yo’ bitch.” He said she had a
“shiny” object in her hand that looked like a flat-head screwdriver, or some kind of “ice pick or
something like that.” When he got to the house, he saw Pruitt hunched over, going toward his
mother’s door, yelling “she stabbed me, she stabbed me.” Scoff called police.
Officers Paul James and Ben Avala responded to the call. When they arrived at the scene,
Pruitt was in the ambulance being treated for puncture wounds. She and Scott were screaming at
each other. According to the officers, both Pruitt and Scott reported the stabbing had occurred at the
doorway ofthe house. After talking to Pruitt and Scott, they went to appellant’s house to question
—2-- her. Appellant claimcd she knew nothing about the stabbing and allowed the officers to look for a
screwdriver.
Appellant testified that Scott would often come over and spend the night at her house. She
knewPruittwasthemotherofScott’schild,butshesaiditdidnotseemasthoughtheywerea
“couple.” She said before the incident, she and Pruitt had argued on the phone and Pmitt had
threatened to shoot her. She said on the day ofthe offense, Pniitt called her and told her to stay away
from Scott and to stop calling him. Appellant responded she would only stop seeing and calling
Scott if Scoff told her to, and she was planning to call him right then. When she got off the phone,
appellant called Scott but he did not answer. She then walked to Scott’s mother’s house who lived
nearby. She took a kitchen knife with her because it was a very violent neighborhood.’ When she
got to Scoff’s mother’s house, Pruitt was there and started yelling and cussing at appellant telling her
to stay away from Scott. Appellant again told Pruitt she would only stay away from Scott if Scott
told her to. Pruitt then went to her trunk “aggressively.” When Pruitt began to open the trunk,
appellant thought Pruitt was going for a gun. She feared for her safety and swung at Pruitt with her
knife.
Appellant admitted that when she was questioned bypolice later that day, she denied stabbing
Pruitt. She also testified that despite the State’s photograph of Pruitt’s injuries showing three stab
wounds, she only swung at Pruitt one time.
After hearing the evidence, thejury found appellant guilty ofaggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. In her first point oferror, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to disprove
her claim ofself-defense. When reviewing legal sufficiency ofthe evidence to support a verdict, we
t T he police offices acknowledged dial, In that area, it would be prudent to cariy a weapon for pnitcction.
-3- view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, asking whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319(1979); Brookv r. State, 323 S.W.3d 893.899,912 Ucx. Crim. App.
20l0); Wesbrookv. State, 29 S.W.3d 103,111 (Tex. Crim. App.2000). When adefrndantchallenges
the legal sufficiency of evidence to support rejection of a defense such as self-defense, we examine
all of the evidence in the light most thvorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe offense and also could have found against the
defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt Sexton i’. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Self-defense is an issue of fact for the jury to determine. Sexton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. In a
sufficiency review, we do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of thi evidence, and we defer
to the jury’s determinations of credibility. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (rex. Crim.
App. 2008); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742,750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A jury may believe
all, some, or none ofany witness’s testimony. Sharp v. Stat4 707 S.W.2d 611,614 (TeL Crim. App.
1986). We presume that the jury resolved all inconsistencies in the evidence in favor ofthe verdict.
See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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REIORT\’l and AFFIRM; Opinion issued November 14. 2012.
In The Qituirt iii 411ra1s ifth Iistrirt tif ULXw3 at Ja11&ui No. 05-I 1-01266-CR
LASHUNDRA ADAMS, Appellant
V.
TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court l)allas Count, Texas i Court Cause No. F0S-533 15-V rf
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices O’Neill, Fitz(ierald and Lang-Miers Opinion By Justice O’Neill
Appellant Lashundra Adams appeals her jurY conviction fbr aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon, in three issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support her
conviction and the judgment should be reformed to retlect the proper trial attorneys. For the
following reasons, we reform the judgment and affirm the trial court’s judgment as reformed.
Appellant wis charged with stabbing the victim Meishea Pruitt with a screwdriver or “an
unknown sharp object.” The evidence at trial showed that appellant and Pruitt were romantically
involved with the same man, Romall Scott. Before the offense, the two women had numerous
arguments over the phone about Scott. Shortly before the offense, Scott married Pruitt, who was also
the mother of his child. Scott however continued his relationship with appellant. Pruitt initially testified that on the day ofthe offense, she called Scott on his cell phone. She
said Scott was with appellant and appellant took Scott’s phone and started arguing with Pruitt. She
said when Scott got his phone back, he told Pruitt to meet him at his mother’s house. Pruitt testified
that when she got to Scott’s mother’s house, she got out of her car and started to get her daughter out
ofthe back seat. As she leaned down, appellant stabbed her in the back two or three times, and then
walked away. Pruitt testified the object she was stabbed with looked like a pocket knife. After she
was stabbed, an ambulance arrived and she went to the hospital. On cross-examination, Pruitt
testified that after reviewing the police report, she was mistaken about the events leading to her.
going to Scott’s mother’s house. She said she and Scott had been at a gas station that day, got into
an argument, and she drove offleaving him at the gas station. She then went to appellant’s mother’s
house.
Scott testified that on the day of the offense, he and Pruitt were at a gas station. Pruitt was
on his cell phone arguing with appellant. Pruitt started yelling at Scott, while continuing to argue
with appellant. Scoff got out ofthe car and started walking toward his mother’s nearby house. Pruitt
drove off in the same direction. As Scott walked toward his mother’s house, he saw appellant
coming from the direction of the house. She told Scott, “yeah, I got yo’ bitch.” He said she had a
“shiny” object in her hand that looked like a flat-head screwdriver, or some kind of “ice pick or
something like that.” When he got to the house, he saw Pruitt hunched over, going toward his
mother’s door, yelling “she stabbed me, she stabbed me.” Scoff called police.
Officers Paul James and Ben Avala responded to the call. When they arrived at the scene,
Pruitt was in the ambulance being treated for puncture wounds. She and Scott were screaming at
each other. According to the officers, both Pruitt and Scott reported the stabbing had occurred at the
doorway ofthe house. After talking to Pruitt and Scott, they went to appellant’s house to question
—2-- her. Appellant claimcd she knew nothing about the stabbing and allowed the officers to look for a
screwdriver.
Appellant testified that Scott would often come over and spend the night at her house. She
knewPruittwasthemotherofScott’schild,butshesaiditdidnotseemasthoughtheywerea
“couple.” She said before the incident, she and Pruitt had argued on the phone and Pmitt had
threatened to shoot her. She said on the day ofthe offense, Pniitt called her and told her to stay away
from Scott and to stop calling him. Appellant responded she would only stop seeing and calling
Scott if Scoff told her to, and she was planning to call him right then. When she got off the phone,
appellant called Scott but he did not answer. She then walked to Scott’s mother’s house who lived
nearby. She took a kitchen knife with her because it was a very violent neighborhood.’ When she
got to Scoff’s mother’s house, Pruitt was there and started yelling and cussing at appellant telling her
to stay away from Scott. Appellant again told Pruitt she would only stay away from Scott if Scott
told her to. Pruitt then went to her trunk “aggressively.” When Pruitt began to open the trunk,
appellant thought Pruitt was going for a gun. She feared for her safety and swung at Pruitt with her
knife.
Appellant admitted that when she was questioned bypolice later that day, she denied stabbing
Pruitt. She also testified that despite the State’s photograph of Pruitt’s injuries showing three stab
wounds, she only swung at Pruitt one time.
After hearing the evidence, thejury found appellant guilty ofaggravated assault with a deadly
weapon. In her first point oferror, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to disprove
her claim ofself-defense. When reviewing legal sufficiency ofthe evidence to support a verdict, we
t T he police offices acknowledged dial, In that area, it would be prudent to cariy a weapon for pnitcction.
-3- view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, asking whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319(1979); Brookv r. State, 323 S.W.3d 893.899,912 Ucx. Crim. App.
20l0); Wesbrookv. State, 29 S.W.3d 103,111 (Tex. Crim. App.2000). When adefrndantchallenges
the legal sufficiency of evidence to support rejection of a defense such as self-defense, we examine
all of the evidence in the light most thvorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements ofthe offense and also could have found against the
defendant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt Sexton i’. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Self-defense is an issue of fact for the jury to determine. Sexton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. In a
sufficiency review, we do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of thi evidence, and we defer
to the jury’s determinations of credibility. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (rex. Crim.
App. 2008); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742,750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A jury may believe
all, some, or none ofany witness’s testimony. Sharp v. Stat4 707 S.W.2d 611,614 (TeL Crim. App.
1986). We presume that the jury resolved all inconsistencies in the evidence in favor ofthe verdict.
See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Pruitt testified that appellant stabbed her as she was getting her child out ofthe back seat of
her car. The evidence also showed that Pruitt suffered three stab wounds to her back Appellant
nevertheless asserts the evidence is insufficient to show she did not stab Pruitt in self-defense. She
relies on her own testimony and discrepancies in Pruitt’s testimony, and concludes thejury could not
have rationally believed Pruitt. However, it is the jury’s responsibility to resolve discrepancies in
the testimony and may believe all, some or none of any witness’s testimony. We conclude the
evidence is legally sufficient to disprove appellant’s claim ofself-defense. We resolve the first issue
-4- aeainst appellant.
In her second issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the deadly
weapon lindin as alleged in the indictment. The indictment in this case, as amended by the trial
court, alleged appellant used a “screw driver and an unknown sharp object.” 2 According to
appellant, the evidence is insufficient to prove this allegation because the Only credible evidence in
the record shows the weapon she used was a knife. However, Scott testified he thought the weapon
appellant had was a screwdriver, or an ice pick, or “something like that.” Pruitt testified appellant
stabbed her with what “looked like” a pocket knife. Although appellant testified she used a kitchen
knife, the weapon she used was never recovered. We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to
show appellant used an unknown sharp object, We resolve the second issue against appellant.
In her third issue, appellant contends the judgment should be reformed to reflect the correct
names of the trial attorneys. The judgment reflects the “Attorney Ibr State” was Glen Fitzmartin and
the “Attorney for Defendant” was Paul Johnson. However, the record reflects Doug Millican was
the State’s attorney and Mark Watson was appellant’s attorney. The State concedes error.
Consequently, we reform the judgment to show the correct names of the trial attorneys. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment, as reformed, ii 1 i/
[‘JUSTICE Do Not Publish / TFx. R. Ape. P. 47
11 1266F.U05
2 i\ppellant does not challenge the vali(hty olthe amendment. (!tuirt nf \p1ca[13 Fift1! 1iztrirt nf ixa at Ia11a JUDGMENT LASHUNDRA ADAMS, Appellant Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court ol Dallas County, Texas. (TrCt.No. No. 051 U0l266CR V F0S533 I 5V). Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill, TI IL ST ATE OFT EXAS. Appellee Justices FitzGerald and Lanu—Miers participating.
Based on the Courts opinion of this date, the judgment ol the trial court is REFORMED to show the “Attorney for State” at trial was Doug Millican and the “Attorney for Defendant’ at trial was Mark Watson .As reLwmed. the jwlgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered November 14. 2012.
••/
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