Adamag Realty Corp. v. Diamante

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Adamag Realty Corp. v. Diamante

254 A.D.2d 413, 678 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11082

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 19, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 254 A.D.2d 413 (Adamag Realty Corp. v. Diamante) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Adamag Realty Corp. v. Diamante, 254 A.D.2d 413, 678 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11082 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, the appeal, as limited by the appellants’ brief, is from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated July 22, 1997, as upon, in effect, denying their motion to dismiss the petition, granted the petition to the extent of permitting the petitioner to file a real property tax assessment complaint nunc pro tunc.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the petitioner permission to file a real property tax assessment complaint with the appellants nunc pro tunc (see, Matter of Adventist Home v Board of Assessors, 83 NY2d 878). Furthermore, we reject the contention that the court should not have granted the relief requested in the petition upon denial of the appellants’ motion to dismiss, without first permitting the appellants to submit an answer to the petition. The facts in this matter were entirely undisputed, and [414]*414the determination involved only questions of law which were argued by the parties on the motion (see, O’Hara v Del Bello, 47 NY2d 363; Briedis v Village of Tuxedo Park, 156 AD2d 744). O’Brien, J. P., Thompson, Sullivan and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

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In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, the appeal, as limited by the appellants’ brief, is from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), dated July 22, 1997, as upon, in effect, denying their motion to dismiss the petition, granted the petition to the extent of permitting the petitioner to file a real property tax assessment complaint nunc pro tunc.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court properly granted the petitioner permission to file a real property tax assessment complaint with the appellants nunc pro tunc (see, Matter of Adventist Home v Board of Assessors, 83 NY2d 878). Furthermore, we reject the contention that the court should not have granted the relief requested in the petition upon denial of the appellants’ motion to dismiss, without first permitting the appellants to submit an answer to the petition. The facts in this matter were entirely undisputed, and [414]*414the determination involved only questions of law which were argued by the parties on the motion (see, O’Hara v Del Bello, 47 NY2d 363; Briedis v Village of Tuxedo Park, 156 AD2d 744). O’Brien, J. P., Thompson, Sullivan and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

254 A.D.2d 413, 678 N.Y.S.2d 740, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 11082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adamag-realty-corp-v-diamante-nyappdiv-1998.

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