Adam Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co.

123 F. App'x 476
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedFebruary 2, 2005
Docket04-1306
StatusUnpublished

This text of 123 F. App'x 476 (Adam Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adam Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 123 F. App'x 476 (3d Cir. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Adam Technologies, Inc. (“ATI”) 1 appeals the District Court’s order dismissing its complaint against Hewlett-Packard Company (“Hewlett-Packard”) and Compaq Computer Corporation (“Compaq Computer,” together with Hewlett-Packard, “Compaq”) 2 on the basis that the claims were time barred. ATI contends that the complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations because the agreement was governed by a six-year, rather *477 than a four-year, limitations period. Alternatively, ATI asserts that its claims accrued within four years of filing the complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Compaq manufactures computers, hardware, and peripheral devices. Instead of manufacturing all of the component parts for its computers, Compaq hires “third-party integrators” to assemble machines pursuant to Compaq’s specifications, using parts from suppliers approved by Compaq. IEC Electronics (“IEC”), not a party in this action, was one of Compaq’s third-party integrators.

ATI is in the business of manufacturing and selling devices known as “connectors,” which connect computer hardware equipment. ATI entered into an agreement with IEC (the “IEC Agreement”) whereby ATI would supply IEC with 225,000 connectors for use in Compaq computers. After ATI had supplied over 100,000 connectors pursuant to the IEC Agreement, Compaq and IEC discovered that the specifications they had provided ATI for the connectors were flawed. In order to remedy the situation, ATI agreed to issue IEC a credit for $200,000 and cancel the IEC Agreement. In exchange, Compaq, who was not a party to the IEC Agreement, entered into an agreement with ATI (the “Compaq Agreement”) on September 18, 1998.

The Compaq Agreement provides that Compaq’s third-party integrators (including, but not limited to IEC) would purchase specified percentages of their future allocations of two types of connectors from ATI, subject to certain conditions. As stated in the agreement:

Compaq will issue 60% ongoing allocation of Compaq P/N 241379-001 and 50% ongoing allocation of Compaq P/N 122721-002.

This entire Agreement is contingent upon Compaq’s approval of the attached Rev. A of [ATI] Drawing ... (Compaq P/N 241379-001), and Compaq’s acceptance of a control lot production run.... The 50% allocation of 122721-002 is dependent upon Compaq’s acceptance of first article samples provided by [ATI], for the life of the component on those products currently approved for use of such component as long as [ATI] meets the quality, reliability and capacity requirements of Compaq.

(Appellant’s App. at 74.)

In February 1999, Compaq advised ATI that it was being placed on “disqualified/restricted status” because its manufacturing facility was deficient. (Id. at 78.) Compaq explained that it was instructing its integrators not to purchase any connectors from ATI, unless and until these deficiencies were remedied. Discussions concerning a subsequent inspection of the ATI facility continued through October, 1999.

On January 20, 2000, Compaq sent ATI an e-mail explaining that it did not receive any of the allocations for the first quarter of 2000. It further stated that “these products will now be bid on yearly.” (Id. at 97.) At a meeting held that same day, Compaq allegedly indicated it was unilaterally abandoning the qualification process, and was thereby rescinding the Compaq Agreement.

On July 22, 2003, ATI filed a complaint, in the district court under diversity jurisdiction, alleging two causes of action for breach of contract. Compaq filed a preanswer motion for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgement pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 on the following grounds: (1) the complaint was time-barred; (2) ATI failed to meet a condition precedent to the agreement; and (3) ATI had taken incon *478 sistent legal positions in serial litigation. The District Court granted the motion on the grounds that the complaint was time-barred and did not reach the alternative theories supporting dismissal.

We review de novo the District Court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, see Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir.2003), or motion for summary judgment, see Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 679 (3d Cir.2003). Dismissal on a preanswer motion is only appropriate if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Worldcom, Inc., 343 F.3d at 653. Here, the District Court considered the motion under the standards set forth in both Rule 12b(6) and Rule 56 because the parties relied on evidence outside of the pleadings.

On this appeal, we limit our analysis to the accrual of the cause of action and make no findings as to the nature of the contractual relationship or the ultimate merits of the complaint. If ATI’s claims accrued after July 22, 1999, then the complaint would be timely regardless of whether a four or a six year limitations period were applicable.

As the legislature has not defined when a cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued, the matter has been left to “judicial interpretation and administration”. Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169, 172 (1968). Under New Jersey law, a cause of action accrues so that the applicable statute of limitations commences to run, “when the potential plaintiff knows of his or her injuries and of facts sufficient to attribute those injuries to the fault of another.” Windsor Card Shops, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 957 F.Supp. 562, 566 (D.N.J.1997) (quoting Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 503 A.2d 296, 300 (1986)). In other words, a claim accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, when the plaintiff has an enforceable right to institute and maintain an action. See Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain As socs., 139 N.J. 532, 655 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1995).

Here, Compaq contends and the District Court found that ATI’s claims accrued in February 1999, when Compaq first notified ATI that it would be placed on “disqualified/restricted status.” The District Court concluded, “there is no question but that the Plaintiff was on notice as of February 1999 of the alleged breach.” (Appellant’s App. at 117.) We disagree.

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Related

Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc.
343 F.3d 651 (Third Circuit, 2003)
Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Associates
655 A.2d 1379 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1995)
Windsor Card Shops, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.
957 F. Supp. 562 (D. New Jersey, 1997)
Viviano v. CBS, INC.
503 A.2d 296 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1986)
Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick and Gamon Meter Co.
238 A.2d 169 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1968)
Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick
238 A.2d 169 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
123 F. App'x 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adam-technologies-inc-v-hewlett-packard-co-ca3-2005.