Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-23-00144-CR
Adam Odell Lenamond, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 77th District Court of Limestone County, Texas Judge Patrick H. Simmons, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 15414-A
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Adam Odell Lenamond was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 60 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL
CODE 21.02(b). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Lenamond’s motion for mistrial and motion for new trial, and because
Lenamond did not preserve his facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
continuous sexual abuse statute, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Lenamond does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction. Thus, we do not discuss the facts of this case.
MISTRIAL
In his first issue, Lenamond complains the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Lenamond’s motion for mistrial based on Lenamond’s
discovery that a member of the gallery in the courtroom was allegedly coaching
the victim, E.H., during her testimony.
During a break in the trial proceedings after E.H.’s testimony,
Lenamond requested a motion for mistrial because a spectator, later identified
as the victim assistance coordinator, was alleged to have coached E.H. during
her testimony. In support of this motion, Lenamond called four witnesses:
Karen Harrison, Dave Hildebrandt, Kim Rumfield, and E.H.
Harrison, who had a prior relationship with Lenamond, testified that a
woman in the courtroom would smile and nod or “smile and slightly shake her
head to the left and right.” Harrison claimed the woman’s head moving was
consistent with E.H.’s answers of “yes” and “no.” Harrison did not see the
woman use her hands at all to signal E.H. Hildebrandt, Lenamond’s bondsman
and counsel’s former son-in-law, testified he saw the same woman nod her head
“yes” during E.H.’s direct testimony when E.H. “would kind of stop for a little
while.” He did not see the nod to any specific question and did not see the
Lenamond v. State Page 2 woman shake her head no. Rumfield, Lenamond’s daughter, also said she
noticed the woman “steadily shaking her head ‘yes/no’ as questions were being
asked [of E.H.].” Rumfield testified it started when E.H. was asked if “she had
to put her mouth on there.” At first, she thought the motion by the woman was
just a nervous tic, but then thought it was more deliberate.
E.H. was the last witness to testify. She did not know why she was being
called back to the stand. She had not been in the courtroom when the motion
for mistrial was made or when the mistrial witnesses had testified. E.H.
testified that the victim assistance coordinator did not help her answer any of
the questions asked of E.H. during her trial testimony. The coordinator had
only signaled E.H. to drink water.
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court noted on the
record that “…from the Court’s perspective, I may be the only one or one of the
few that’s actually staring out into the courtroom and I did not notice
anything.” He then denied the motion for mistrial.
A mistrial is appropriate only in extreme circumstances for a narrow
class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880,
884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699-700 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
Lenamond v. State Page 3 court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of
the ruling. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The
ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Id.
Three of the witnesses called to testify were interested witnesses for
Lenamond. E.H., who did not know why she had been called back into court,
denied any instructions from the victim assistance coordinator except to drink
water. Even the trial court could not see any coaching by the coordinator.
Accordingly, considering the particular facts of this case, we cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
Lenamond’s first issue is overruled.
NEW TRIAL
In his second issue, Lenamond asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant Lenamond’s motion for new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence: a video of the victim assistance coordinator during
E.H.’s testimony. Lenamond contends he should have been granted a new trial
because the video corroborated what witnesses said at the motion for mistrial
hearing.
A new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence
favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial. TEX. CODE CRIM.
Lenamond v. State Page 4 PROC. ANN. art. 40.001. To obtain relief under article 40.001, the defendant
must satisfy the following four-prong test: (1) the newly discovered evidence
was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the
defendant's failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the
defendant's lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not
merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new
evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a
new trial. State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence is controverted, and its ruling will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion, that is, if it is arbitrary or unsupported
by any reasonable view of the evidence. Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 372
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). If the movant fails to establish any one of these
elements, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion
for new trial. Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2007, no pet.); Shafer v. State, 82 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2002, pet. ref'd).
At the motion for new trial hearing, Lenamond introduced a video of a
woman, later identified as the victim assistance coordinator, sitting on the
front row of the courtroom gallery who, arguably, made some slight nodding
Lenamond v. State Page 5 motions. 1 Lenamond’s brother took the video with his cell phone during
Lenamond’s trial. Both parties vigorously argued about whether Lenamond or
his attorney knew of or could have discovered the video at the time of the trial.
Regardless, this video merely corroborated the witnesses’ testimony at
the motion for mistrial hearing. Further, there is no evidence or argument
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Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-23-00144-CR
Adam Odell Lenamond, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
On appeal from the 77th District Court of Limestone County, Texas Judge Patrick H. Simmons, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 15414-A
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Adam Odell Lenamond was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a
child under 14 years of age and sentenced to 60 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL
CODE 21.02(b). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Lenamond’s motion for mistrial and motion for new trial, and because
Lenamond did not preserve his facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
continuous sexual abuse statute, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Lenamond does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction. Thus, we do not discuss the facts of this case.
MISTRIAL
In his first issue, Lenamond complains the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Lenamond’s motion for mistrial based on Lenamond’s
discovery that a member of the gallery in the courtroom was allegedly coaching
the victim, E.H., during her testimony.
During a break in the trial proceedings after E.H.’s testimony,
Lenamond requested a motion for mistrial because a spectator, later identified
as the victim assistance coordinator, was alleged to have coached E.H. during
her testimony. In support of this motion, Lenamond called four witnesses:
Karen Harrison, Dave Hildebrandt, Kim Rumfield, and E.H.
Harrison, who had a prior relationship with Lenamond, testified that a
woman in the courtroom would smile and nod or “smile and slightly shake her
head to the left and right.” Harrison claimed the woman’s head moving was
consistent with E.H.’s answers of “yes” and “no.” Harrison did not see the
woman use her hands at all to signal E.H. Hildebrandt, Lenamond’s bondsman
and counsel’s former son-in-law, testified he saw the same woman nod her head
“yes” during E.H.’s direct testimony when E.H. “would kind of stop for a little
while.” He did not see the nod to any specific question and did not see the
Lenamond v. State Page 2 woman shake her head no. Rumfield, Lenamond’s daughter, also said she
noticed the woman “steadily shaking her head ‘yes/no’ as questions were being
asked [of E.H.].” Rumfield testified it started when E.H. was asked if “she had
to put her mouth on there.” At first, she thought the motion by the woman was
just a nervous tic, but then thought it was more deliberate.
E.H. was the last witness to testify. She did not know why she was being
called back to the stand. She had not been in the courtroom when the motion
for mistrial was made or when the mistrial witnesses had testified. E.H.
testified that the victim assistance coordinator did not help her answer any of
the questions asked of E.H. during her trial testimony. The coordinator had
only signaled E.H. to drink water.
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court noted on the
record that “…from the Court’s perspective, I may be the only one or one of the
few that’s actually staring out into the courtroom and I did not notice
anything.” He then denied the motion for mistrial.
A mistrial is appropriate only in extreme circumstances for a narrow
class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880,
884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699-700 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
Lenamond v. State Page 3 court's ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of
the ruling. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The
ruling must be upheld if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Id.
Three of the witnesses called to testify were interested witnesses for
Lenamond. E.H., who did not know why she had been called back into court,
denied any instructions from the victim assistance coordinator except to drink
water. Even the trial court could not see any coaching by the coordinator.
Accordingly, considering the particular facts of this case, we cannot say the
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
Lenamond’s first issue is overruled.
NEW TRIAL
In his second issue, Lenamond asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to grant Lenamond’s motion for new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence: a video of the victim assistance coordinator during
E.H.’s testimony. Lenamond contends he should have been granted a new trial
because the video corroborated what witnesses said at the motion for mistrial
hearing.
A new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence
favorable to the accused has been discovered since trial. TEX. CODE CRIM.
Lenamond v. State Page 4 PROC. ANN. art. 40.001. To obtain relief under article 40.001, the defendant
must satisfy the following four-prong test: (1) the newly discovered evidence
was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the
defendant's failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the
defendant's lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not
merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new
evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a
new trial. State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence is controverted, and its ruling will be
reversed only for an abuse of discretion, that is, if it is arbitrary or unsupported
by any reasonable view of the evidence. Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 372
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). If the movant fails to establish any one of these
elements, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the motion
for new trial. Jones v. State, 234 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2007, no pet.); Shafer v. State, 82 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2002, pet. ref'd).
At the motion for new trial hearing, Lenamond introduced a video of a
woman, later identified as the victim assistance coordinator, sitting on the
front row of the courtroom gallery who, arguably, made some slight nodding
Lenamond v. State Page 5 motions. 1 Lenamond’s brother took the video with his cell phone during
Lenamond’s trial. Both parties vigorously argued about whether Lenamond or
his attorney knew of or could have discovered the video at the time of the trial.
Regardless, this video merely corroborated the witnesses’ testimony at
the motion for mistrial hearing. Further, there is no evidence or argument
that the video would probably bring about a different result in a new trial. On
appeal, Lenamond asserts that the video would probably bring about a
different result in the previously denied motion for mistrial. That is not a
factor in our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial. As the
State argued to the trial court, “This is not a hearing to supplemental [sic] his
Motion for Mistrial. This is a hearing where he is arguing he wants a new trial
to be able to present this evidence to a jury.” Lenamond requested a new trial.
There was nothing presented at trial or on appeal that this video would
probably bring about a different result in a new trial.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial, and Lenamond’s second issue is overruled.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE
In his third and final issue, Lenamond asserts that Texas Penal Code
Section 21.02, the continuous sexual abuse statute, is facially unconstitutional.
1 The video also showed the woman making drinking motions which corroborated E.H.’s testimony during the motion for mistrial regarding the only signals the woman made to her.
Lenamond v. State Page 6 Lenamond concedes that he did not preserve this issue by objecting at trial and
that this Court cannot properly address it. 2 See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d
428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute may not be raised for the first time on appeal). Lenamond’s third issue
is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Lenamond’s issues on appeal, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
LEE HARRIS Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: May 8, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish [CRPM]
2 Lenamond raises this issue to preserve the error for potential review in the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Lenamond v. State Page 7