NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0775-20
ADAM M. HABER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FAITH N. GERULDSEN,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Argued November 8, 2021 – Decided December 3, 2021
Before Judges Sabatino and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-8549-19.
Jeffrey L. Dashevshy argued the cause for appellant (Dashevsky, Horwitz, Kuhn, Novello & Shorr, attorneys; Jeffrey L. Dashevsky, on the brief).
Christopher W. Ferraro argued the cause for respondent (Cooper, Maren, Nitsberg, Voss & Decoursey, attorneys; Christopher W. Ferraro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Adam M. Haber appeals from an October 16, 2020 order granting
summary judgment to defendant Faith N. Geruldsen, finding plaintiff was
precluded from recovering damages in his personal injury action because he was
culpably uninsured on the date of the accident. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff and defendant were involved in a motor
vehicle accident on March 7, 2019. On that date, plaintiff resided in New Jersey
and his car was principally garaged at his home in New Jersey.
Although he lived in New Jersey and garaged his car in New Jersey,
plaintiff insured the car through a New York insurance policy issued by State
Farm. Plaintiff asserted State Farm knew he relocated to New Jersey in
December 2017. In support of this argument, plaintiff noted State Farm sent
insurance premium bills to his New Jersey address. However, the declaration
page for the State Farm policy expressly indicated the "location used to
determine the rate charged" was plaintiff's New York address. The State Farm
policy also contained an "important notice" regarding the insurance rate charged
to plaintiff. The notice stated, "[t]he amount you pay for automobile insurance
is determined by many factors such as the coverages you have, where you live,
the kind of car you drive, how your car is used, who drives the car, and
information from consumer reports."
A-0775-20 2 In December 2019, plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for
injuries he suffered in the March 2019 accident. Defendant filed an answer and
the parties exchanged discovery.
In September 2020, defendant moved for summary judgment, contending
plaintiff failed to insure his vehicle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, rendering
plaintiff culpably uninsured under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). In opposing summary
judgment, plaintiff argued he was not uninsured. He asserted his State Farm
policy provided Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits sufficient to comport
with the requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.
After reviewing the written submissions and hearing the arguments of
counsel, the judge granted summary judgment, placing her reasons on the record
on October 16, 2020. Based on the undisputed facts, the judge found plaintiff's
car "was continuously and principally garaged in the State of New Jersey, and
despite being garaged for over one year . . . plaintiff did not obtain personal
injury protection insurance coverage, New Jersey PIP insurance, pursuant to
New Jersey statute. Instead, plaintiff obtained coverage through a New York
policy through State Farm Insurance Company." Thus, applying N.J.S.A.
39:6A-4.5, the judge held plaintiff had "no cause of action for recovery of
A-0775-20 3 economic or non-economic [loss] sustained as the result of an accident while
operating an uninsured automobile."
The judge rejected plaintiff's claim his car was fully insured on the date
of the accident because he had a State Farm policy issued in New York. The
judge explained the declaration page of the State Farm policy "recognized and
determined [plaintiff's insurance] rate based on his vehicle being principally
garaged at Piermont Avenue in Piermont, New York." The judge noted
"N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 requires that all owners of vehicles registered or principally
garaged in New Jersey have to maintain a minimum amount of standard, basi c,
or special liability insurance coverage for bodily injury, death and property
damage caused by their vehicle." The judge's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
on summary judgment is consistent with well-established case law, precluding
recovery of economic and non-economic damages for drivers not insured in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the same arguments presented to the motion
judge. He contends the judge erred in granting summary judgment because he
was fully insured on the date of the accident albeit under a policy issued in New
York based on State Farm's belief the car was garaged in New York. We
disagree.
A-0775-20 4 We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).
A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.
4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995).
The parties agree there were no issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment. Thus, we review the judge's legal conclusion that plaintiff
was culpably uninsured on the day of the accident de novo. We owe no special
deference to a motion judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v.
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)).
Plaintiff contends his vehicle was fully insured under a New York
automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm, providing up to $175,000 in
PIP benefits, in accordance with New Jersey law. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 governs
the coverage requirements to be fully insured under New Jersey law. The statute
provides:
A-0775-20 5 Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by section 4 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4), section 4 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-3.1) or section 45 of P.L.2003, c.89 (C.39:6A-3.3) shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).]
In reviewing plaintiff's argument, we consider the policy goals underlying
the Legislature's adoption of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). In enacting no-fault
automobile insurance laws, the Legislature sought to reduce the cost of
automobile insurance for New Jersey residents. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp./Garrison
Lange v. Holger Trucking Corp., 417 N.J. Super. 393, 402 (App. Div. 2011). In
addition to the pressing need to reduce insurance costs for New Jersey drivers,
the Legislature contemplated easing the burden on New Jersey courts inundated
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0775-20
ADAM M. HABER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FAITH N. GERULDSEN,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Argued November 8, 2021 – Decided December 3, 2021
Before Judges Sabatino and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-8549-19.
Jeffrey L. Dashevshy argued the cause for appellant (Dashevsky, Horwitz, Kuhn, Novello & Shorr, attorneys; Jeffrey L. Dashevsky, on the brief).
Christopher W. Ferraro argued the cause for respondent (Cooper, Maren, Nitsberg, Voss & Decoursey, attorneys; Christopher W. Ferraro, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Adam M. Haber appeals from an October 16, 2020 order granting
summary judgment to defendant Faith N. Geruldsen, finding plaintiff was
precluded from recovering damages in his personal injury action because he was
culpably uninsured on the date of the accident. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff and defendant were involved in a motor
vehicle accident on March 7, 2019. On that date, plaintiff resided in New Jersey
and his car was principally garaged at his home in New Jersey.
Although he lived in New Jersey and garaged his car in New Jersey,
plaintiff insured the car through a New York insurance policy issued by State
Farm. Plaintiff asserted State Farm knew he relocated to New Jersey in
December 2017. In support of this argument, plaintiff noted State Farm sent
insurance premium bills to his New Jersey address. However, the declaration
page for the State Farm policy expressly indicated the "location used to
determine the rate charged" was plaintiff's New York address. The State Farm
policy also contained an "important notice" regarding the insurance rate charged
to plaintiff. The notice stated, "[t]he amount you pay for automobile insurance
is determined by many factors such as the coverages you have, where you live,
the kind of car you drive, how your car is used, who drives the car, and
information from consumer reports."
A-0775-20 2 In December 2019, plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages for
injuries he suffered in the March 2019 accident. Defendant filed an answer and
the parties exchanged discovery.
In September 2020, defendant moved for summary judgment, contending
plaintiff failed to insure his vehicle pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4, rendering
plaintiff culpably uninsured under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). In opposing summary
judgment, plaintiff argued he was not uninsured. He asserted his State Farm
policy provided Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits sufficient to comport
with the requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.
After reviewing the written submissions and hearing the arguments of
counsel, the judge granted summary judgment, placing her reasons on the record
on October 16, 2020. Based on the undisputed facts, the judge found plaintiff's
car "was continuously and principally garaged in the State of New Jersey, and
despite being garaged for over one year . . . plaintiff did not obtain personal
injury protection insurance coverage, New Jersey PIP insurance, pursuant to
New Jersey statute. Instead, plaintiff obtained coverage through a New York
policy through State Farm Insurance Company." Thus, applying N.J.S.A.
39:6A-4.5, the judge held plaintiff had "no cause of action for recovery of
A-0775-20 3 economic or non-economic [loss] sustained as the result of an accident while
operating an uninsured automobile."
The judge rejected plaintiff's claim his car was fully insured on the date
of the accident because he had a State Farm policy issued in New York. The
judge explained the declaration page of the State Farm policy "recognized and
determined [plaintiff's insurance] rate based on his vehicle being principally
garaged at Piermont Avenue in Piermont, New York." The judge noted
"N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 requires that all owners of vehicles registered or principally
garaged in New Jersey have to maintain a minimum amount of standard, basi c,
or special liability insurance coverage for bodily injury, death and property
damage caused by their vehicle." The judge's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
on summary judgment is consistent with well-established case law, precluding
recovery of economic and non-economic damages for drivers not insured in
accordance with N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the same arguments presented to the motion
judge. He contends the judge erred in granting summary judgment because he
was fully insured on the date of the accident albeit under a policy issued in New
York based on State Farm's belief the car was garaged in New York. We
disagree.
A-0775-20 4 We review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).
A motion for summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.
4:46-2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995).
The parties agree there were no issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment. Thus, we review the judge's legal conclusion that plaintiff
was culpably uninsured on the day of the accident de novo. We owe no special
deference to a motion judge's legal analysis. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (quoting Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v.
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)).
Plaintiff contends his vehicle was fully insured under a New York
automobile insurance policy issued by State Farm, providing up to $175,000 in
PIP benefits, in accordance with New Jersey law. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5 governs
the coverage requirements to be fully insured under New Jersey law. The statute
provides:
A-0775-20 5 Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by section 4 of P.L.1972, c.70 (C.39:6A-4), section 4 of P.L.1998, c.21 (C.39:6A-3.1) or section 45 of P.L.2003, c.89 (C.39:6A-3.3) shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile.
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a).]
In reviewing plaintiff's argument, we consider the policy goals underlying
the Legislature's adoption of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). In enacting no-fault
automobile insurance laws, the Legislature sought to reduce the cost of
automobile insurance for New Jersey residents. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp./Garrison
Lange v. Holger Trucking Corp., 417 N.J. Super. 393, 402 (App. Div. 2011). In
addition to the pressing need to reduce insurance costs for New Jersey drivers,
the Legislature contemplated easing the burden on New Jersey courts inundated
with automobile personal injury actions. See Perelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193,
203 (2011) (quoting Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 477 (2004))
("The Legislature reasoned that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) would 'produce greater
compliance with compulsory insurance laws and, in turn, reduce litigation, and
result in savings to insurance carriers and ultimately the public' by reduced
premiums."). With passage of the statute, "the Legislature wanted to ensure that
A-0775-20 6 'an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim
insurance funds to which he [or she] did not contribute.'" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 471). The statute, as enacted by the
Legislature, provided the failure of a New Jersey resident driver to purchase
automobile liability insurance coverage that contributes to New Jersey's
insurance pool bars his or her recovery for economic and non-economic
damages. See Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 471.
In Aronberg v. Tolbert, 207 N.J. 587, 598-99 (2011), the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized
if an uninsured motorist, while operating a vehicle, is injured by another driver who runs a red light, the uninsured motorist has no cause of action under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). That harsh result is mandated by the statute. The statute's self-evident purpose is not to immunize a negligent driver from a civil action, but to give the maximum incentive to all motorists to comply with this State's compulsory no-fault insurance laws.
As the Court wrote in Aronberg:
[N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a)] advanced two important objectives underlying New Jersey's no-fault automobile insurance laws. First, it "gives the uninsured driver a very powerful incentive to comply with the compulsory insurance laws: obtain automobile liability insurance or lose the right to maintain a suit for both economic and noneconomic injuries." Second, it supports the statutory "policy of cost containment by ensuring that
A-0775-20 7 an injured, uninsured driver does not draw on the pool of accident-victim insurance funds to which he did not contribute." Thus, the present version of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) is animated by deterrence and cost- containment rationales.
[Id. at 601 (citations omitted) (Caviglia, 178 N.J. at 471).]
Plaintiff argues allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability for the happening
of the accident and denying him the right to recover for his injuries "would be
an injustice and an unintended outcome of our state legislatures' aforethought
when drafting the applicable law." However, plaintiff's argument is belied by
our case law. Our Supreme Court acknowledged the result of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-
4.5 was "harsh," but upheld the Legislature's statutory goal of providing a strong
incentive to all motorists to comply with this State's compulsory no -fault
insurance laws and ensure contribution to New Jersey's pool of accident victim
insurance funds. Id. at 598-599. Plaintiff's New York policy fails to meet New
Jersey's statutory automobile insurance requirements because his insurance
premiums funded the insurance pool in New York rather than New Jersey.
Contrary to plaintiff's position, there is no statutory provision allowing a
New Jersey resident with a vehicle principally garaged in New Jersey to procure
"equivalent" insurance from another state. To accept plaintiff's contention
would invite potential insurance fraud and encourage drivers residing in New
A-0775-20 8 Jersey to obtain insurance policies from other states offering lower insurance
rates despite the policy holder having no connection with the state issuing the
insurance policy. As State Farm noted in the policy issued to plaintiff, insurance
rates are determined based on many factors, including where the driver lives,
how the car is used, and demographic information relevant to the number of
motor vehicles on the roadways and accident rates in a specific locality.
A closer review of plaintiff's New York automobile insurance policy
reveals various coverage differences from New Jersey's automobile insurance
laws. For example, plaintiff's New York policy states medical expenses are not
subject to a time limitation "provided that, within one year after the date of the
accident, it is ascertainable that further medical expenses may be sustained as a
result of the injury." New Jersey's statute has no such requirement or limitation.
Additionally, the dollar amount of death benefits recoverable under plaintiff's
New York policy is less than the dollar amount allowable under New Jersey
statute. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4(b). Because plaintiff is subject to various
coverage provisions under the State Farm policy issued in New York that are
not authorized in this State, he cannot rely on purchasing "equivalent" insurance
to allow him to pursue claims for economic and non-economic damages in New
Jersey.
A-0775-20 9 We also reject plaintiff's argument that the Deemer statute, N.J.S.A.
17:28-1.4, allows plaintiff to recover for his injuries. The Deemer statute
applies only to out-of-state residents. On the date of the accident, plaintiff
admits he was a New Jersey resident. As such, he was required to maintain
automobile insurance in New Jersey with "provisions approved by the [New
Jersey] Commissioner of Banking and Insurance." N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1.
Here, plaintiff does not deny his car was insured under a policy issued in
New York. He also admits his car was principally garaged in New Jersey.
However, his automobile insurance premiums were calculated based on his
address in Piermont, New York and reflected demographic information relevant
to a car garaged in New York. There is no evidence plaintiff's New York issued
State Farm policy contained provisions approved by New Jersey's
Commissioner of Banking and Insurance. Additionally, plaintiff's automobile
insurance premiums funded a New York insurance pool. He never contributed
to the New Jersey automobile liability insurance pool.
To allow plaintiff to recover for economic and non-economic injuries
under these circumstances would be contrary to the Legislature's stated purpose
in enacting automobile insurance laws designed specifically to reduce insurance
costs to New Jersey's drivers and alleviate the burden on New Jersey's courts.
A-0775-20 10 Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the motion judge correctly
concluded plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a),
rendering plaintiff culpably uninsured and requiring dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint on summary judgment.
Affirmed.
A-0775-20 11