Adam Harper v. Department of the Air Force

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 25, 2024
DocketPH-0752-19-0191-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Adam Harper v. Department of the Air Force (Adam Harper v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adam Harper v. Department of the Air Force, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ADAM C. HARPER, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-19-0191-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: January 25, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Neil C. Bonney , Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

William B. Dorsey , Esquire, Charleston, West Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed the appellant’s separation. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the petition for review, GRANT the cross petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND The agency employed the appellant pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 709(a) as an Aircraft Mechanic for the 130th Maintenance Group in Charleston, West Virginia. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 7 at 26, 34. In the position, the appellant was required to meet the following conditions of employment: (1) be a dual status military technician as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a); (2) be a member of the National Guard; (3) hold the military grade specified by the Secretary concerned for that position; and (4) wear the appropriate military uniform while performing duties as a dual status military technician. 32 U.S.C. § 709(b); Dyer v. Department of the Air Force , 971 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The appellant was a member of the West Virginia Air National Guard (WVANG). The appellant’s military chain of command submitted a recommendation to the Air National Guard Selective Retention Review Board (SRRB) that he be non-retained because (1) he had been a Master Sergeant for a number of years and failed to meet the military requirement for promotion to the next higher grade; (2) he was holding up other unit members for promotion; (3) he failed to maintain Air Force physical fitness standards; (4) his failure to meet military standards would likely cause him to lose rank; and (5) his failure to maintain standards had become a poor example to peers and subordinates. IAF, Tab 7 at 36-37. The SRRB met and did not approve the appellant’s retention in the WVANG. Id. at 41. The Adjutant General notified the appellant that, as a consequence of the SRRB’s decision, he would be separated from the WVANG effective December 31, 2018. Id. at 41. The appellant requested that the Adjutant General reconsider the decision. Id. at 46. The Adjutant General considered the appellant’s request and upheld the SRRB’s decision not to retain him. Id. at 47-48, 51. The WVANG separated the appellant effective December 31, 2018. Id. at 51, 53. On February 7, 2019, a Human Resources Officer in the Adjutant General’s office notified the appellant that, as a 3

consequence of his separation from the WVANG, he would be separated from his dual status military technician employment, due to the loss of his military membership, 30 days from his receipt of the letter. Id. at 43-44. The agency separated the appellant effective March 8, 2019. Id. at 34. The appellant filed the instant appeal. IAF, Tab 1. He withdrew his request for a hearing. IAF, Tab 3 at 3. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the appellant filed a response. IAF, Tabs 7-8. The administrative judge subsequently issued a close of record order, and the parties made their final submissions. IAF, Tabs 9-11. On the written record, the administrative judge found that pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA for 2017), the appellant was a 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 employee, and thus, the Board had jurisdiction over his separation. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-5. He determined that the appellant was separated based on a charge of failure to meet a condition of employment—in this case, the maintenance of his military status. ID at 4. The administrative judge found that he was precluded from reviewing the merits of the agency’s determination regarding the appellant’s loss of military membership but not whether the appellant, as a covered employee, was denied constitutional due process. ID at 4, 6. He found that the agency did not deny the appellant due process because the deciding official considered the appellant’s written reply to the proposed removal in reaching his decision. ID at 5-6. The administrative judge further found that the agency’s procedural error in failing to afford the appellant an oral reply was harmless because the appellant failed to prove that the agency would not have separated him if he had provided an oral reply. ID at 5-6. As a result, he affirmed the separation. ID at 5-6 (citing 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(1)). In his petition for review, the appellant reargues his due process claim, alleging that the deciding official failed to afford him an oral reply and failed to consider his written reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-9. The 4

agency has filed a response to the appellant’s petition for review and a cross petition for review in which it argues, in pertinent part, that the administrative judge erred in finding jurisdiction over the appeal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-14. The appellant filed a reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review and a response to the agency’s cross petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 6-7. 2

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 709 because it concerns the appellant’s fitness for duty in the reserve components. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant has the burden of establishing jurisdiction over his appeal by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). The sum and substance of the agency’s argument in its cross petition for review is that the administrative judge erred in not dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal concerned the appellant’s fitness for duty in a reserve component. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6-14. After the administrative judge issued his initial decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Dyer, 971 F.3d 1377.

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Adam Harper v. Department of the Air Force, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adam-harper-v-department-of-the-air-force-mspb-2024.