NUMBER 13-24-00541-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ADAM DAVE ABELAR, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 23RD DISTRICT COURT OF WHARTON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Adam Dave Abelar was convicted of intentionally or knowingly causing
serious bodily injury to a child, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years’
incarceration. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e). By three issues, appellant contends
that the evidence is insufficient, and the trial court allowed improper testimony from two
witnesses. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
At trial, Robert,1 who was fourteen years’ old at the time of the trial, testified that
appellant, his father, hit him with a belt on the face and choked him. The trial court
admitted a video of Robert’s statement to police on the night of the incident, which showed
that Robert had a raspy voice. Robert stated that when he returned home from a trip to
Walmart, appellant “pull[ed]” him out of a car and “kick[ed]” him. Robert said, “And then
he was like throwing me around and then . . . he was choking me and I threw up and then
my mom . . . said stop, but he stopped.” Marks are visible on Robert’s neck.
Matt Machart, a sergeant with the Wharton County Sheriff’s Office, testified that
Robert “mentioned that he was choked which impeded his breath” and that he vomited
“during the choking.” The State asked Sergeant Machart to point to Robert’s injuries on
several pictures. Sergeant Machart said that there were injuries “[a]bove his right eye on
his forehead . . . [h]is lip, his upper, a little bit of the bottom, and there’s some marks on
his right side under his ear.” Sergeant Machart stated that another picture showed “a
mark . . . on the neck” that he believed “to be from the belt.” Sergeant Machart testified
vomiting and having a raspy voice are both signs of being choked.
Brenda Huerta, Robert’s mother, testified that when Robert was eleven years old,
he was disrespectful to her while they were at Walmart, so she called appellant, who was
waiting for them with a belt when they arrived home. According to Huerta, appellant
“grabbed [Robert,] and he started to spank him. And then he grabbed him by his collar
1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the child victim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3) (requiring redaction of sensitive data, which includes “the name of any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed”).
2 and then he took him inside” to his room. Huerta did not witness what appellant did in
Robert’s room. The State asked her to describe what she heard. Huerta said, “Just that
[appellant] was yelling at [Robert], like telling him that he shouldn’t have done what he did
and [Robert] was crying . . . the belt whipping him and [Robert] screaming.” Robert and
appellant came out of Robert’s room after about three to five minutes, and Robert “threw
up in the living room and [appellant] made him pick the throw-up up and he told him to be
quiet.” Robert then called Huerta’s “oldest daughter on the phone and told [her] that
[appellant] choked him, that he spanked him.” Huerta’s daughter “called the authorities
and they showed up.” Huerta said that appellant “had a feeling that the cops were called,”
and “[h]e left the property.” Huerta thought Robert vomited because he was “choked or
that he was crying so much that he threw up.” Huerta saw marks on Robert’s body,
forehead, and neck.
Tim Arriaga, a corporal with the Wharton County Sheriff’s Office, testified that on
the date of the incident, he observed that Robert “had injuries to his mouth, his neck, and
his face,” which did not appear to be accidental. According to Corporal Arriaga, the
pictures admitted into evidence did not “show the full extent of the injuries.” The State
asked, “What did [Robert] say as an excited utterance to you?” Corporal Arriaga replied
that Robert told him that when they arrived home from Walmart, appellant “pulled him out
of the car and grabbed him around his neck,” and appellant “walked him” to his room “by
holding his neck and also grabbing his hair.” Robert told Corporal Arriaga that appellant
“grabbed him around his neck, choking him to the point where he could not breathe. Once
he released his neck, he threw up.” Corporal Arriaga testified that Robert told him that
3 appellant “struck him several times [with his belt], which was . . . indicative of the injury to
his neck and to his face.” According to Corporal Arriaga, “[Robert] stated that there were
several metal . . . pendants along the belt” that Corporal Arriaga believed caused
“imprints” that could be seen in pictures of Robert’s face.
The jury convicted appellant, and this appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
4 restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d
at 240). As charged in this case appellant committed the offense of injury to a child if he
intentionally or knowingly caused Robert, a child younger than fourteen years of age,
serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (a)(1), (e).
B. Discussion
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that appellant
impeded Robert’s breath by choking him with his hands and caused injuries to Robert’s
face and neck by hitting him with the metal portion of a belt. See id. From evidence that
appellant was angry with Robert because he was disrespectful to his mother, dragged
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NUMBER 13-24-00541-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
ADAM DAVE ABELAR, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 23RD DISTRICT COURT OF WHARTON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina
Appellant Adam Dave Abelar was convicted of intentionally or knowingly causing
serious bodily injury to a child, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years’
incarceration. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e). By three issues, appellant contends
that the evidence is insufficient, and the trial court allowed improper testimony from two
witnesses. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND
At trial, Robert,1 who was fourteen years’ old at the time of the trial, testified that
appellant, his father, hit him with a belt on the face and choked him. The trial court
admitted a video of Robert’s statement to police on the night of the incident, which showed
that Robert had a raspy voice. Robert stated that when he returned home from a trip to
Walmart, appellant “pull[ed]” him out of a car and “kick[ed]” him. Robert said, “And then
he was like throwing me around and then . . . he was choking me and I threw up and then
my mom . . . said stop, but he stopped.” Marks are visible on Robert’s neck.
Matt Machart, a sergeant with the Wharton County Sheriff’s Office, testified that
Robert “mentioned that he was choked which impeded his breath” and that he vomited
“during the choking.” The State asked Sergeant Machart to point to Robert’s injuries on
several pictures. Sergeant Machart said that there were injuries “[a]bove his right eye on
his forehead . . . [h]is lip, his upper, a little bit of the bottom, and there’s some marks on
his right side under his ear.” Sergeant Machart stated that another picture showed “a
mark . . . on the neck” that he believed “to be from the belt.” Sergeant Machart testified
vomiting and having a raspy voice are both signs of being choked.
Brenda Huerta, Robert’s mother, testified that when Robert was eleven years old,
he was disrespectful to her while they were at Walmart, so she called appellant, who was
waiting for them with a belt when they arrived home. According to Huerta, appellant
“grabbed [Robert,] and he started to spank him. And then he grabbed him by his collar
1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the child victim. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3) (requiring redaction of sensitive data, which includes “the name of any person who was a minor at the time the offense was committed”).
2 and then he took him inside” to his room. Huerta did not witness what appellant did in
Robert’s room. The State asked her to describe what she heard. Huerta said, “Just that
[appellant] was yelling at [Robert], like telling him that he shouldn’t have done what he did
and [Robert] was crying . . . the belt whipping him and [Robert] screaming.” Robert and
appellant came out of Robert’s room after about three to five minutes, and Robert “threw
up in the living room and [appellant] made him pick the throw-up up and he told him to be
quiet.” Robert then called Huerta’s “oldest daughter on the phone and told [her] that
[appellant] choked him, that he spanked him.” Huerta’s daughter “called the authorities
and they showed up.” Huerta said that appellant “had a feeling that the cops were called,”
and “[h]e left the property.” Huerta thought Robert vomited because he was “choked or
that he was crying so much that he threw up.” Huerta saw marks on Robert’s body,
forehead, and neck.
Tim Arriaga, a corporal with the Wharton County Sheriff’s Office, testified that on
the date of the incident, he observed that Robert “had injuries to his mouth, his neck, and
his face,” which did not appear to be accidental. According to Corporal Arriaga, the
pictures admitted into evidence did not “show the full extent of the injuries.” The State
asked, “What did [Robert] say as an excited utterance to you?” Corporal Arriaga replied
that Robert told him that when they arrived home from Walmart, appellant “pulled him out
of the car and grabbed him around his neck,” and appellant “walked him” to his room “by
holding his neck and also grabbing his hair.” Robert told Corporal Arriaga that appellant
“grabbed him around his neck, choking him to the point where he could not breathe. Once
he released his neck, he threw up.” Corporal Arriaga testified that Robert told him that
3 appellant “struck him several times [with his belt], which was . . . indicative of the injury to
his neck and to his face.” According to Corporal Arriaga, “[Robert] stated that there were
several metal . . . pendants along the belt” that Corporal Arriaga believed caused
“imprints” that could be seen in pictures of Robert’s face.
The jury convicted appellant, and this appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable
inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.
2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).
Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable
based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most
favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The
fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d
321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
4 restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for
which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d
at 240). As charged in this case appellant committed the offense of injury to a child if he
intentionally or knowingly caused Robert, a child younger than fourteen years of age,
serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (a)(1), (e).
B. Discussion
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that appellant
impeded Robert’s breath by choking him with his hands and caused injuries to Robert’s
face and neck by hitting him with the metal portion of a belt. See id. From evidence that
appellant was angry with Robert because he was disrespectful to his mother, dragged
Robert by his hair to his bedroom while shouting and scolding Robert, hit Robert with the
metal portion of the belt, and choked Robert until he vomited, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the bodily injury to
Robert. See id.; see also Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. Moreover,
from evidence that appellant left the property when he learned that police had been
notified, the jury could have reasonably inferred appellant’s consciousness of guilt. See
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“We have recognized that
a factfinder may draw an inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight.”); see also
Jones v. State, No. 01-23-00621-CR, 2025 WL 1759020, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] June 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining
“evidence of appellant’s flight was probative of his consciousness of guilt”). Accordingly,
we conclude that a rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the
5 crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d
at 898–99. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
III. IMPROPER TESTIMONY
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if
not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1);
Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Golliday v. State, 560
S.W.3d 664, 669 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A party’s failure to object to the admission
of evidence at trial, even if the complaint concerns an alleged violation of a constitutional
right, forfeits any complaints on appeal concerning admissibility of the evidence. Saldano
v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Preservation is a ‘systemic
requirement[,]’ meaning that when an issue isn’t ‘preserved for appeal, neither the court
of appeals nor [the Court of Criminal Appeals] should address the merits of that issue.’”
Guevara v. State, 667 S.W.3d 422, 443 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, pet. ref’d) (quoting
Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).
By his second issue, appellant argues that most of Corporal Arriaga’s testimony
“was irrelevant and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” However, at trial, appellant did not object to any of Officer Arriaga’s
testimony on any basis. Therefore, this issue is not preserved. See TEX. R. APP. P.
33.1(a)(1); Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d at 822; Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at 669 n.16. We
overrule appellant’s second issue. See Guevara, 667 S.W.3d at 443.
By his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
6 allowing Tammy Garcia, an employee of the Matagorda-Wharton Women’s Crisis Center,
“to testify and speculate having no personal knowledge of this case.” At trial, appellant
did not object on any basis to Garcia’s testimony. Therefore, this issue is not preserved.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo, 623 S.W.3d at 822; Golliday, 560 S.W.3d at
669 n.16. We overrule appellant’s third issue. See Guevara, 667 S.W.3d at 443.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed on the 14th day of August, 2025.