Ada R. Santos v. Commissioner

2011 T.C. Summary Opinion 108
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedSeptember 12, 2011
Docket23737-10S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2011 T.C. Summary Opinion 108 (Ada R. Santos v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ada R. Santos v. Commissioner, 2011 T.C. Summary Opinion 108 (tax 2011).

Opinion

T.C. Summary Opinion 2011-108

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

ADA R. SANTOS, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 23737-10S. Filed September 12, 2011.

Ada R. Santos, pro se.

Mark H. Howard, for respondent.

SWIFT, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the

provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect

when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the

decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and

1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. - 2 -

this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other

case.

Respondent determined a deficiency of $2,389 in petitioner’s

2009 Federal income tax.

The issues for decision are: (1) Whether petitioner is

entitled to a dependency exemption deduction; (2) whether

petitioner may claim head of household filing status; and (3)

whether petitioner is entitled to an earned income credit of

$3,043. The trial of this case was held on April 4, 2011, in

Salt Lake City, Utah.

Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

In 2009 petitioner lived in North Salt Lake, Utah, with her

adult son Walter Garcia (Walter).

In 2009 Walter received $5,430 in Social Security benefits

and some Medicaid benefits from the Utah Department of Health.

The record does not indicate the amount of Medicaid benefits

Walter received.

During 2009 petitioner made monthly mortgage loan payments

on the home in which she and Walter lived, and she paid related

property taxes, a homeowner’s insurance premium, and food and

household item expenses. Petitioner also paid home utility

expenses for electricity and natural gas and other miscellaneous

items relating to the maintenance of the home. - 3 -

The following table reflects amounts billed to and paid by

petitioner in 2009 relating to the home:

Expense Amount Billed Amount Paid

Mortgage $19,654 $19,654 Property taxes 1,550 1,550 Home insurance 540 540 Food and household items 3,220 3,220 Electricity 699 578 Natural gas 596 593 Other 524 476 Total 26,783 26,611

Walter was born in 1969 and during 2009 qualified as

permanently and totally disabled. See secs. 22(e)(3),

152(c)(3)(B).

On her 2009 Federal income tax return filed with respondent,

petitioner reported $9,804 of income, and she claimed a

dependency exemption deduction with respect to Walter, head of

household filing status, and an earned income tax credit of

$3,043. On audit, respondent disallowed the claimed dependency

exemption deduction, head of household filing status, and earned

income tax credit.

Discussion

Dependency Exemption Deduction

Legislative changes enacted in 20042 relaxed the rules

applicable to dependency exemptions relating to a “qualifying

2 See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108- 311, sec. 201, 118 Stat. 1169. - 4 -

child” of a taxpayer. See sec. 152(c). Respondent’s arguments

and brief do not take into account this less restrictive

dependency exemption applicable to a qualifying child.3

A qualifying child means an individual who: (1) Bears a

qualifying relationship to the taxpayer (e.g., a child of the

taxpayer); (2) has the same principal place of abode as the

taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year; (3) meets

the age requirement of section 152(c)(3);4 (4) has not provided

over one-half of his or her own support for the taxable year; and

(5) has not filed a joint return with his or her spouse, if any.

Sec. 152(c)(1). There is no longer a requirement that a parent

claiming a dependency exemption for a qualifying child have

provided over one-half of the total support for the child.

Generally, in determining the total cost of support, all

sources of support are included. Sec. 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income

Tax Regs. The term “support” includes items such as “food,

shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the

like.” Id. The value of government benefits normally excludable

3 Respondent argues that petitioner must show that she furnished over half of her son’s total support for the year. That rule, however, is applicable only to years before 2005 and, beginning in 2005, only to claimed dependency exemptions that relate to “qualifying relatives” other than a qualifying child. See sec. 152(b), (d). 4 Walter meets the special rule for disabled persons under sec. 152(c)(3)(B) and thus satisfies the age requirement for a qualifying child. - 5 -

from income (e.g., Social Security benefits) may be included in

the term “support”. See Turecamo v. Commissioner, 554 F.2d 564,

569 (2d Cir. 1977), affg. 64 T.C. 720 (1975); sec. 1.152-

1(a)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs.

At trial petitioner credibly testified, and we so find, that

the $26,611 in household-related expenses petitioner paid in 2009

represented expenses of both petitioner and Walter; i.e., that a

portion of petitioner’s 2009 expenses is allocable to or

benefited Walter and, accordingly, represents support petitioner

provided to Walter in 2009.

Respondent argues that the Medicaid benefits Walter received

also need to be included in the computation of Walter’s total

support, and because petitioner has not established that amount,

respondent argues that petitioner has not established the total

amount of Walter’s support.

We, however, have acknowledged that payments received under

Medicaid are not necessarily included in determining the support

of a claimed dependent. In Archer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 963

(1980), Medicaid payments received were held not to involve

ordinary support for the mother of the taxpayer. The Court

noted:

To require that Medicaid payments be included in the support equation * * * means that those individuals whose parents are the neediest will be the least likely to get a dependency exemption for supporting * * * [their parents]. This * * * seems exceedingly unfair - 6 -

and contrary to the basic thrust of the Medicaid program itself.

Id. at 971.

On the limited record before us, we find it appropriate to

exclude Medicaid benefits Walter received in calculating the

total amount of Walter’s 2009 support.

Respondent argues that the proper measure of the housing,

food, and clothing petitioner provided to Walter is the “value”

thereof, which is not necessarily the same as what petitioner

paid therefor. Respondent thus argues that we cannot calculate

the total amount of Walter’s support.5

In determining whether a qualifying child has provided more

than half of his or her own support, the amount of support

provided by the child is compared to the total amount of support

available to the child. However, we have explained that “a

taxpayer is not precluded from being entitled to a dependency

exemption simply because he is not able to prove conclusively the

total cost of the child’s support”. Stafford v. Commissioner, 46

T.C. 515, 517 (1966).

5 Respondent notes that petitioner reported only $9,804 in adjusted gross income on her 2009 Federal income tax return and questions how petitioner could actually have paid the expenses she claims.

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Related

Stafford v. Commissioner
46 T.C. 515 (U.S. Tax Court, 1966)
Turecamo v. Commissioner
64 T.C. 720 (U.S. Tax Court, 1975)
Archer v. Commissioner
73 T.C. 963 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)

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2011 T.C. Summary Opinion 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ada-r-santos-v-commissioner-tax-2011.