Acyole Campos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-468
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIELLE ACYOLE CAMPOS, et al., No. 24-468 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A220-642-240 A220-642-241 v.

PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM* Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 5, 2024** San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and WU, District Judge***

Danielle Acyole Campos and her minor son (“Petitioners”), natives and

citizens of Brazil, petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable George H. Wu, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 1 decision affirming the order of an Immigration Judge denying an application for

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”).1 They also seek review of the BIA’s denial of their motion to

remand to the Immigration Judge. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and

we deny the petition.

We review administrative findings of fact for substantial evidence. See

Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016). That means we uphold

factual findings by the agency “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. A motion to remand before the BIA is subject to the same substantive

requirements as a motion to reopen. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471

(BIA 1992). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

See Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). We therefore leave

the agency’s decision in place unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

Valeriano v. Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Singh v. INS, 295

F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002)). As part of our review, we presume that the BIA

reviewed the entire record. Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 770–71 (9th Cir.

1 Acyole Campos filed one Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, on behalf of herself with her child as a derivative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). Therefore, her child is not eligible for statutory withholding of removal. See Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013). 2 2022). Further, the BIA need only “announce its decision in terms sufficient to

enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely

reacted.” Id. at 768 (quoting Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir.

2010)). Finally, we must confine our review to the documents contained in the

administrative record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).

As the BIA correctly noted, an applicant must make a prima facie showing of

eligibility for relief to succeed on a motion to reopen. See Fonseca-Fonseca v.

Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2023). The BIA noted that the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services had not yet issued a decision approving the I-

130, Petition for Alien Relative, which Acyole Campos’s husband filed on her

behalf, and that it was speculative whether the visa petition would be approved. It

also observed that DHS had not joined in the motion to remand. We cannot say that

this reasoning is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” See Valeriano, 474 F.3d

at 672 (quoting Singh, 295 F.3d at 1039). So we deny the petition regarding the

motion to remand.

2. A petitioner seeking asylum must prove that she has suffered past

persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A) & (B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). The petitioner

must also show that the persecution was or would be “committed by the government,

or by forces that the government was [or would be] unable or unwilling to control.”

3 Rodriguez-Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2021). Similarly,

statutory withholding of removal requires a showing of persecution “inflicted either

by the government or by persons or organizations which the government is unable

or unwilling to control.” Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1997)). An asylum

applicant “may meet her burden with evidence that the government was unable or

unwilling to control the persecution in the applicant’s home city or area.” Meza Diaz

v. Garland, 118 F.4th 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383

F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The record does not compel the conclusion that the Brazilian government was

or would be unwilling or unable to control violence against Acyole Campos by her

ex-boyfriend. The agency properly noted that when Acyole Campos went to the

Brazilian police after being physically assaulted by her ex-boyfriend during a trip to

Paraguay, the police were responsive to her complaint. Officers documented her

account of the incident, conducted a forensic medical examination, photographed

her injuries, and requested protective measures on her behalf. And although Acyole

Campos points to country-condition evidence that some women have been killed by

their abusers even after making reports to the police, other evidence shows that the

Brazilian government has made great strides in combatting violence against women.

That evidence includes laws criminalizing violence against women, laws requiring

4 reporting of violence against women, and special police stations and other resources

established for the benefit of female victims of violence. Substantial evidence

therefore supports the agency’s finding that the Brazilian government is not

unwilling or unable to protect Acyole Campos from her ex-boyfriend. “And because

withholding of removal also turns on this factor, substantial evidence likewise

supports the agency’s denial of that claim.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d

1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020).2

3. Finally, Acyole Campos did not raise her CAT claim on appeal to the BIA

or in her opening brief before this court. The claim is thus unexhausted and waived

here. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding

that unexhausted argument is not properly before the court of appeals for review);

Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that issues not raised

in petitioner’s opening brief are waived).

PETITION DENIED.

2 Because the lack of government acquiescence is dispositive of Acyole Campos’s asylum claim, we do not reach her challenge to the agency’s determination that it was safe for her to relocate within Brazil. 5