Acuna-Martinez v. C.O.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 10, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-01390
StatusUnknown

This text of Acuna-Martinez v. C.O. (Acuna-Martinez v. C.O.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acuna-Martinez v. C.O., (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 JOVANNY ACUNA-MARTINEZ, Case No. 2:23-cv-01390-ART-MDC 3 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER ON 4 v. FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

5 MASON, et al., (ECF No. 18)

6 Defendants.

7 8 Plaintiff, who is no longer incarcerated, has submitted a first amended civil 9 rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“FAC”), and has filed an 10 application to proceed in forma pauperis for inmates, a motion to file an amended 11 complaint, and a motion for pro se litigant to file electronically. (ECF Nos. 4, 18, 12 19, 20). The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 13 19) and finds that the FAC (ECF No. 18) is the operative complaint in this case. 14 The Court denies the application to proceed in forma pauperis for inmates (ECF 15 No. 4) as moot and directs Plaintiff to file a non-prisoner application to proceed 16 in forma pauperis or pay the full filing fee for a civil action. The Court now screens 17 Plaintiff’s FAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and addresses the remaining motion.1 18 SCREENING STANDARD 19 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which 20 an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 21 employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the 22 court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are 23 frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 24

25 1 The Court screens the FAC under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) because Plaintiff was still incarcerated when he filed the FAC. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 26 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that “28 U.S.C. § 1915A applies . . . to claims brought by individuals incarcerated at the time they file their complaints”). 27 1 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. 2 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. 3 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a 4 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 5 (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 6 States, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under 7 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 8 In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, pursuant to the 9 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a federal court must dismiss an 10 incarcerated person’s claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action 11 “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 12 or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 13 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 14 which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing 16 the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses 17 a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the 18 complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the 19 face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. 20 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See 22 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for 23 failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove 24 any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle them to relief. See 25 Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this 26 determination, the court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in 27 the complaint, and the court construes them in the light most favorable to the 1 plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). 2 Allegations of a pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than 3 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). 4 While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual 5 allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell 6 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the 7 elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 8 A reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, 9 because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the 10 assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal 11 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported 12 with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a 13 court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly 14 give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states 15 a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the 16 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 17 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may 18 therefore be dismissed sua sponte if the claims lack an arguable basis either in 19 law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable 20 (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of 21 infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims 22 based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See 23 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 24 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 25 SCREENING OF FAC 26 In the FAC, Plaintiff sues Defendants Correctional Officers (“C/O”) Mason 27 and Reese for events that took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Southern 1 Desert Correctional Center (“SDCC”). (ECF No. 18 at 1). Plaintiff brings two 2 claims and seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 4, 6).

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Acuna-Martinez v. C.O., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/acuna-martinez-v-co-nvd-2025.