ACT Education Corp. v. Hildebrandt

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedOctober 27, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00703
StatusUnknown

This text of ACT Education Corp. v. Hildebrandt (ACT Education Corp. v. Hildebrandt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ACT Education Corp. v. Hildebrandt, (D. Utah 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

ACT EDUCATION CORP., MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: DISCOVERY MOTIONS Plaintiff, [26][29][32]

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-00703-JNP-CMR HILDEBRANDT,

Defendant. District Judge Jill N. Parrish

Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero

Before the court is a Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures (Motion to Compel) (ECF 26) filed by Defendant Hildebrandt (Defendant). Also before the court is a Short Form Discovery Motion and Request for Status Conference (Discovery Motion) (ECF 29) and a Motion for Amended Scheduling Order (Scheduling Motion) (ECF 32) filed by Plaintiff ACT Education Corp. (Plaintiff). Having carefully considered the relevant filings and case law, the court finds that oral argument is not necessary and decides this matter on the written memoranda. See DUCivR 7-1(g). For the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order. I. DISCUSSION A. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures (ECF 26) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s initial disclosures are inadequate under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requests the court to compel Plaintiff to amend its initial disclosures to comply with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) (ECF 26). Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Compel and gives two independent reasons for which the Motion to Compel should be denied: (1) the Motion to Compel is procedurally flawed due to Defendant’s failure to comply with the meet and confer requirements of DUCivR 37-1; and (2) Defendant incorrectly contends that Plaintiff’s initial disclosures are inadequate under Rule 26(a)(1) (ECF 27). 1. The Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures is procedurally flawed. DUCivR 37-1(a) requires that the parties in a case “make reasonable effort to resolve a

discovery dispute. . . before seeking court assistance. At a minimum, those efforts must include a prompt written communication sent to the opposing party.” If the discovery dispute persists despite reasonable efforts, a Short Form Discovery Motion may be filed to resolve it. Id. 37-1(b). The motion must be less than 500 words and must include a certification stating that the parties made reasonable efforts to reach an agreement, including, among other requirements, the date, time, and method of the reasonable efforts. Id. Here, Defendant has provided no certification that the meet and confer requirement of DUCivR 37-1 was met before filing the Motion to Compel. Furthermore, the Motion to Compel exceeds the 500-word requirement. Defendant correctly indicates that, because he is pro se, his motions are to be held at a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (ECF 26 at 4). However, Defendant

misunderstands the scope of this leniency. This “less stringent standard” for pro se parties primarily applies to allowances regarding “failure to cite proper legal authority, [] confusion of various legal theories, [] poor syntax and sentence construction, or [] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). But pro se status does not grant a pro se party the ability to avoid court procedures entirely. The Tenth Circuit “has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (quoting Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994)). Thus, while Defendant’s pro se status may require the court to review his pleadings at a less stringent standard, Defendant’s pleadings must comply with the court’s procedural requirements. While the court will nonetheless consider the merits of Defendant’s Motion to Compel, the court reminds Defendant of his obligation to abide by the rules of this court. 2. Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures comply with Rule 26(a)(1).

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s initial disclosures are inadequate for three reasons. First, Defendant argues that the disclosures “focus on Defendant’s actions without providing any of [Plaintiff’s] internal evidence, such as the April 2024 acquisition process, financial motives, or market impact” (ECF 26 at 2). Defendant misunderstands the scope and purpose of Rule 26(a)(1). Rule 26(a)(1) requires that parties identify witnesses and documents “that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” “Use” has been defined to include “any use at a pretrial conference, to support a motion, or at trial,” as well as material intended to be used in discovery, to question a witness, or any document a party intends to use if “the need arises.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 2000 amend. By submitting its initial disclosures, Plaintiff has disclosed all the material it may use or

intends to use at this time. While Defendant may be unhappy with Plaintiff’s initial disclosures, Defendant cannot compel Plaintiff to disclose material it does not intend to use. If there are materials in Plaintiff’s possession which Defendant wishes to use to support his case, he must serve discovery requests to seek that material. That said, as more information becomes available through discovery, each party is expected to supplement their initial disclosures when required under Rule 26(e). Second, Defendant argues that the disclosures “fail to address Defendant’s defenses in his Answer” (ECF 26 at 2). Defendant again misunderstands the scope of initial disclosures. Because initial disclosures are limited to material the disclosing party may use, disclosures are not “tied to particularized allegations in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 2000 amend. Initial disclosures are not intended to be a comprehensive discovery tool as they only require parties to provide, “without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 1993 amend. Thus, Plaintiff’s initial disclosures are not required to address Defendant’s defenses. Third, Defendant argues that the disclosures fail to offer any “harm evidence” to support Plaintiff’s claim for statutory damages (ECF 26 at 3). Under Rule 26(a)(1), parties are required to disclose “a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party.” In its initial disclosures, Plaintiff states that it is not seeking actual damages, but rather, statutory damages as permitted by 17 U.S.C. § 504 (ECF 26-1 at 4). The 1993 advisory committee notes to Rule 26 explain, “a party would not be expected to provide a calculation of damages which, as in many patent infringement actions, depends on information in the possession of another party or person.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes, 1993 amend. Although this is a copyright

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Related

Raiser v. Utah County
409 F.3d 1243 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer
425 F.3d 836 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Deborah D. Bergemann v. United States
820 F.2d 1117 (Tenth Circuit, 1987)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Nielsen v. Price
17 F.3d 1276 (Tenth Circuit, 1994)
Bernard v. Group Publishing, Inc.
970 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Colorado, 2013)

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ACT Education Corp. v. Hildebrandt, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/act-education-corp-v-hildebrandt-utd-2025.