Acosta v. Wellfleet Communications

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedDecember 12, 2019
Docket2:16-cv-02353
StatusUnknown

This text of Acosta v. Wellfleet Communications (Acosta v. Wellfleet Communications) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acosta v. Wellfleet Communications, (D. Nev. 2019).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, Secretary of ) 4 Labor, United States Department of Labor, ) ) Case No.: 2:16-cv-02353-GMN-EJY 5 Plaintiff, ) vs. ) ORDER 6 ) 7 WELLFLEET COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, et ) al., ) 8 ) Defendants. ) 9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff R. Alexander Acosta’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Motion for 11 Entry of Judgment, (ECF No. 177). Defendants Allen Roach and Wellfleet Communications 12 (“Defendants”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 178). Plaintiff filed a Reply, (ECF No. 180). For 13 the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Judgment is DENIED. 14 I. BACKGROUND 15 This case arises from Defendants’ failure to compensate their call-center employees at 16 the minimum wage or provide them with overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 17 Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). On July 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 18 Summary Judgment seeking injunctive relief, back wages, and liquidated damages on behalf of 19 Defendants’ employees. (Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”), ECF No. 152). The Motion 20 sought monetary relief for the employees dating back to August 30, 2009. (Id. 30:17–23). 21 Plaintiff calculated Defendants’ liability for back wages by assuming that each at-issue 22 employee worked at least thirty hours per week. (Id. 30:19–20). Prior to Plaintiff filing his 23 Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants filed competing motions to dismiss and motions 24 for summary judgment. (See ECF Nos. 64, 71, 148, 149). 25 1 On September 29, 2018, the Court denied Defendants’ dispositive motions and granted 2 in part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Order (“MSJ Order”), ECF No. 170). In the 3 Order, the Court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor regarding Defendants’ liability for the FLSA claims. 4 (Id. 9:1–18:22, 20:10–27:9). The Court also concluded that Plaintiff reasonably used a thirty- 5 hour work week to calculate Defendants’ liability for back wages.1 (Id. 21:16–21). However, 6 because the Court concluded that equitable tolling did not apply, Plaintiff could only recover 7 back wages for employees dating back to October 7, 2013. (Id. 18:23–21:9; 21:21–24). The 8 Court ordered Plaintiff to file supplemental briefing demonstrating the employees’ lost wages 9 between 2013 and 2016 by using the same calculation method employed in the Motion for 10 Summary Judgment. (Id. 21:21–24, 28:12–13). With respect to injunctive relief, the Court 11 found an injunction appropriate but ordered Plaintiff to propose a prospective injunction using 12 specific and enforceable terms. (Id. 26:9–27:9, 28:12–15). 13 Plaintiff accordingly filed supplemental briefing. (Supp. Brief, ECF No. 172). Several 14 months thereafter, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend or Correct the First Amended 15 Complaint. (Order (“Amendment Order”), ECF No. 176). The Order allowed Plaintiff to 16 amend the Complaint to add 324 additional employees to the list of individuals for whom 17 Plaintiff seeks back wages. (Id. 1:24–25, 6:9–10). Given that the Court’s Order came after the 18 close of discovery, the Court provided Defendants an additional twenty-one days to file a 19 limited motion to reopen discovery with respect to the newly added employees. (Id. 5:23–6:2, 20

21 1 Defendants attempt to relitigate how the Court should calculate the employees’ lost wages. (See Defs.’ Resp. to 22 Pl.’s Supp. Brief, ECF No. 173); (Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s MSJ, ECF No. 178). The Court has already held that Plaintiff’s calculation, based upon the assumption that each employee worked an average of thirty hours per 23 week, is reasonable. (See MSJ Order 21:15–24) (“Here, Plaintiff has satisfied its initial burden to provide a reasonable inference of the hours worked by Defendants’ call center workers. . . . Defendants do not dispute this 24 calculation in their Responses. The problem with Plaintiff’s calculation, however, is that it provides a total amount of back wages dating back to . . . 2009. . . . Plaintiff must provide a sufficient calculation of damages 25 within the statute of limitations applicable to this case.”) (internal citations omitted). The holding is the law of the case, and the Court will not allow the issue to be relitigated at trial. Defendants had the opportunity to raise their arguments in response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and failed to do so. 1 6:11–12). The Court noted, “[s]hould the Defendants forego this motion, the parties will have 2 twenty-one days thereafter to file supplemental motions for summary judgment as to the at- 3 issue employees and damages.” (Id. 6:2–4). Defendants did not seek discovery. 4 Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion for Judgment. (Mot. for Judgment (“MFJ”), ECF 5 No. 177). In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that the Court may enter judgment pursuant to Federal 6 Rule of Civil Procedure 58 because the factual record before the Court is unchanged from when 7 Plaintiff prevailed in part on his Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. 2:3–10). 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 requires the clerk to enter judgment in a separate 10 document after the court reaches a final decision on the merits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). Rule 11 58 provides two ways for the court to enter judgment. Either, the clerk may enter judgment 12 without the court’s direction if “(A) the jury returns a general verdict; (B) the court awards only 13 costs or a sum certain; or (C) the court denies all relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1). Or, the clerk 14 may enter judgment at the direction of the court, “[s]ubject to the requirements of Rule 54(b),” 15 if the jury returns a special verdict or a verdict with answers to written questions, or, as in this 16 case, the court grants other relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2). 17 Rule 54(b) allows the court to enter partial final judgment “as to one or more, but fewer 18 than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for 19 delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). If the amount of damages to be awarded has not been resolved 20 with respect to the claim at issue, then Rule 54(b) relief is not appropriate. See Linde v. Arab 21 Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2018) (“A grant of ‘partial summary judgment limited 22 to the issue of liability, which reserves the issue of damages and other relief is not ‘final’ within

23 the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,’ and, therefore, ‘not certifiable pursuant to Rule 54(b).’” 24 (quoting Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1978)). 25 1 Rule 58(b) thus provides a mechanism for a court to decree that a claim has been finally 2 adjudged to the extent that it may be appealed, but it does not provide a mechanism for the 3 court to make a factual determination that disposes of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b) 4 (explaining that the court must approve the judgment form, “[s]ubject to Rue 54(b),” if the 5 court grants a form of relief other than that enumerated in Rule 58(b)); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Related

Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC
882 F.3d 314 (Second Circuit, 2018)
Acha v. Beame
570 F.2d 57 (Second Circuit, 1978)

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Acosta v. Wellfleet Communications, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/acosta-v-wellfleet-communications-nvd-2019.