Acorin v. Wells Fargo, N.A.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedNovember 29, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00034
StatusUnknown

This text of Acorin v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (Acorin v. Wells Fargo, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acorin v. Wells Fargo, N.A., (S.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 Case No.: 24CV34-AJB(BLM) 10 IVY ACORIN,

11 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS 12 v. INC.’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND STAY OF DISCOVERY AND 13 WELLS FARGO, N.A., et al., SCHEDULING ORDER DEADLINES 14 Defendant. PENDING RESOLUTION OF EXPERIAN'S MOTION TO COMPEL 15 ARBITRATION

16 [ECF NO. 41] 17 18 19 Currently before the Court is Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s November 20 15, 2024 Motion for Protective Order and Stay of Discovery and Scheduling Order Deadlines 21 Pending Resolution of Experian's Motion to Compel Arbitration [ECF No. 41-1 ("Mot.")] and 22 Plaintiff's November 25, 2024 opposition to the motion [ECF No. 43 ("Oppo.")]. For the reasons 23 set forth below, Experian's motion is DENIED. 24 DEFENDANT EXPERIAN’S POSITION 25 Experian seeks an order from the Court "suspending all further discovery obligations and 26 a stay of all further discovery and Scheduling Order deadlines pending this Court’s resolution of 27 Experian’s Arbitration Motion." Mot. at 13. Experian argues that a protective order and stay is 1 the arbitrator has the authority to control discovery over the dispute, and discovery in federal 2 court would "deprive the parties of the benefit of their bargain and vitiate the terms of the 3 parties’ agreement." Id. at 2. Experian further argues that it satisfies the two-factor test for 4 granting its motion because the pending motion to compel arbitration is a case dispositive motion 5 and can be decided without further discovery. Id. at 5-6. Experian argues that a preliminary 6 peek at the pending motion to compel arbitration "reveals that there is a reasonable possibility 7 or probability the Court will compel arbitration in this case" and notes that this Court recently 8 granted a motion to compel arbitration in another case involving the same arbitration 9 agreement. Id. at 7 (citing Ben-Avi v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2024 WL 3610972 (S.D. Cal. 10 July 31, 2024)). Finally, Experian argues that it will be prejudiced if the matter is not stayed 11 and that a stay will promote justice and efficiency. Id. at 9-12. 12 PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 13 Plaintiff contends that Experian’s motion should be denied as Experian has waived its 14 right to arbitration by participating heavily in the instant matter, including in the discovery 15 process. Oppo. at 6. Plaintiff also contends that she would be irreparably harmed and 16 prejudiced if discovery was stayed as she has (1) participated in the discovery process and yet 17 to receive any responses (due December 18, 2024) or receive any available dates for Experian's 18 30(b)(6) deposition, (2) scheduled the 30(b)(6) depositions of the related Defendants, and (3) 19 scheduled her own deposition. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff notes that a stay would not promote 20 justice and efficiency and would in fact slow the case down while unfairly burdening Plaintiff. 21 Id. at 11-14. Plaintiff further notes that Experian will not suffer prejudice if the stay is denied 22 as it has already participated in the discovery it seeks to avoid through arbitration. Id. at 15- 23 16. 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not automatically stay discovery when a 26 potentially dispositive motion is pending. See Optronic Technologies, Inc. v. Ningbo Sunny 27 Electronic Co., Ltd., 2018 WL 1569811, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2018) (quoting Skellerup Indus. 1 a particular and specific need for the protective order, as opposed to making stereotyped or 2 conclusory statements.”); see also Federal Housing Finance Agency v. GR Investments, LLC, 3 2019 WL 2527563, at *1 (D. Nev., June 18, 2019) (“[b]ut the Rules do not provide for an 4 automatic stay of discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending. Thus, a pending 5 dispositive motion “is not ordinarily a situation that in and of itself would warrant a stay of 6 discovery.”) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Tracinda Corp., 175 F.R.D. 554, 556 (D. Nev. 7 1997)); Ocean Garden Products Incorporated v. Blessings Inc., 2020 WL 4284383, at *3 (D. 8 Ariz., July 27, 2020) (“[d]iscovery stays are not automatic.”) (quoting Optronic Techs., 2018 WL 9 1569811, at *1). A motion to stay discovery must be supported by good cause and a “strong 10 showing.” See United States v. Dynamic Medical Systems, LLC, 2020 WL 3035219, at *3 (E.D. 11 Cal., June 5, 2020) (quoting Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)). 12 When deciding whether to grant a stay of discovery, the court must consider the objectives of 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 to ensure a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” 14 Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2019 WL 2527563, at *1 (quoting Tradebay, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 15 278 F.R.D. 597, 602-603 (D. Nev. 2011)). District courts have “wide discretion in controlling 16 discovery” and that discretion extends to staying discovery upon a showing of “good cause.” 17 Onn v. Carnival Corp., 2021 WL 1267264, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Apr. 6, 2021) (quoting Little v. City 18 of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also Cellwitch, Inc. v. Tile, Inc., 2019 WL 19 5394848, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 22, 2019) (“The Court has discretion to stay discovery pending 20 the resolution of dispositive motions, including motions to dismiss”). 21 The Ninth Circuit has not established a clear standard for deciding whether to stay 22 discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending but many federal district courts in 23 California have utilized a two-part test. Mlejnecky v. Olympus Imaging Am., Inc., 2011 WL 24 489743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011); see also PC Specialists, Inc. v. Micros Systems, Inc., 25 2011 WL 3475369, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (“Defendant fail[ed] to address the factors the 26 Court must consider in determining whether to . . . stay discovery, e.g., Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 27 489743, at *5-6.”). “First, the pending motion must be potentially dispositive of the entire case, 1 determine whether the pending, potentially dispositive motion can be decided absent additional 2 discovery.” Mlejnecky, 2011 WL 489743, at *6. If either part of the test is not met, discovery 3 should proceed. Id. This two-factor test “requires the court to take a ‘preliminary peek’ at the 4 merits of the pending, potentially dispositive motion to determine whether a stay is granted.” 5 Cellwitch, Inc., 2019 WL 5394848, at *1 (citing Tradebay, 278 F.R.D. at 602). 6 “Other courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied a more lenient standard in determining 7 whether a motion to stay should be granted pending a resolution of a potentially dispositive 8 motion.” Tradebay, 278 F.R.D. at 602 (citing GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 9 284, 286 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (stating the court should “take a preliminary peek at the merits of the 10 allegedly dispositive motion to see if on its face there appears to be an immediate and clear 11 possibility that it will be granted.” (quoting Feldman v. Flood, 176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 12 1997) (emphasis in original))).

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