WENDELL L. Griffen, Judge.
Don Acord appeals the judgment of the Johnson County Chancery Court in which the court found that Mark Acord had a life tenancy in certain real property located in Johnson County and that appellant had a remainder interest in the property. The judgment also awarded appellee Merle Acord $41,433.28 as reimbursement for monies spent to improve and pay property taxes on the property that her deceased husband, appellee Elbridge Acord, held in joint life tenancy with Mark Acord. For appeal, appellant argues that the chancellor erroneously awarded appellee the value of the improvements she made as a life tenant and property taxes that were paid. Also appellant contends that the chancellor erred in applying the betterment statute. We hold that the chancellor’s award to appellee for reimbursement of taxes and the value of improvements was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with our decision.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 17, 1986, Joe Acord conveyed land situated in Johnson County, Arkansas, hereinafter referred to as the “Workman Place,” to two of his sons, Harold Wayne Acord and Charley Don Acord.1 The deed contained a reservation that the conveyance was “subject to life estates in favor of Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Elbridge Acord, joint tenants with right of survivorship.”2 The deed was filed for record on May 27, 1986. Joe Acord executed another warranty deed in May 1986 conveying a life estate to Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Acord for the same property. Subsequent to the May 1986 conveyance, Joe Acord executed a Correction Warranty Deed recorded May 31, 1988, to Elbridge and Mark Acord, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, that covered the same land as the deed contained in the deed to Harold and Charley Acord.
After the Corrected Warranty Deed was filed, Elbridge and Mark Acord executed a quitclaim deed, dated June 4, 1997, in favor of Elbridge and appellee Merle Acord, his wife. The couple initially brought an action to partition the land, claiming that they owned an undivided 4/5 interest in it. Appellees later amended their complaint and asked the chancellor to reform the deeds or, alternatively, to reimburse them for money they had spent on improvements and taxes.3
Following a hearing, the chancellor set aside the quitclaim deed dated June 4, 1997, and vested title in the property to Mark Acord for life, with a remainder fee-simple interest to appellant. The chancellor then entered judgment against appellant for $41,433.28, which represented the fair market value of the improvements made by appellee on the land before appellant acquired any interest in it and reimbursement for real property taxes paid. It is from this judgment that appellant appeals.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant raises three arguments. First, he contends that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in awarding appellee the value of improvements made and taxes paid by her and her late spouse as life tenants of the property in question. Second, he argues that the chancellor erred in applying the Arkansas Betterment Statute to the dispute between the parties. Finally, appellant contends that the chancellor erred in calculating the value of the improvements.
Appellee responds that appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the chancellor found that appellee was a life tenant. She creatively asserts that because there was no evidence at trial that she held a life tenancy interest in her own right, the chancellor’s award of improvements and reimbursement of taxes to her should not be considered in a life tenant context. Thus, she concludes that she is entitled to reimbursement for taxes and improvements made on the land. Alternatively, she argues that life tenants may recover for improvements on land, and that the betterment statute applies so long as she had a good-faith belief that she owned the property in question. Appellee states that the chancellor did not err in calculating the amount of the value of the improvements made on the land in question.
Chancery decisions are reviewed de novo on the record. See Bennett v. Hollowell, 31 Ark. App. 209, 213, 792 S.W.2d 338, 341 (1990). This court does not disturb the chancellor’s conclusions of law unless the chancellor’s findings are clearly erroneous. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 52. Chancellors are in the best position to view the evidence presented at trial and assess the credibility of witnesses based on their demeanor and testimony. See Duchac v. City of Hot Springs, 67 Ark. App. 98, 104, 992 S.W.2d 174, 178 (1999). Although this court gives great deference to findings of fact by the chancellor due to the chancellor’s superior position to determine credibility issues, it does not give such deference to matters of law, in that the chancellor stands in no better position to apply the law than this court. See id. at 104, 992 S.W.2d at 178. When we find that the chancellor misapplied the law and that, as a result, an appellant has suffered prejudice, we will reverse the erroneous ruling. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 178.
Improvements and Taxes Paid by Life Tenants
The chancellor awarded appellee a judgment to reimburse her for improvements made to the land as well as taxes paid on the land by appellee and her husband while the couple resided on the land. The chancellor based his decision on the fact that appellee and her husband made substantial improvements to the land, including the construction of a dwelling house, outbuildings, clearing and landscaping. All of this was done with the appellant’s knowledge and tacit consent.
Life tenants hold a limited, restricted interest in the estate. Although life tenants are required to keep the property in repair, they are not required to permanently improve it. See Frazier v. Hanes, 220 Ark. 765, 769, 249 S.W.2d 842, 845 (1952). Indeed, life tenants ordinarily are not compensated by remaindermen when they permanently improve the estate. See Kelley v. Acker, 216 Ark. 867, 871, 228 S.W.2d 49, 52 (1950). Therefore, a life tenant who makes improvements to the property, notwithstanding her knowledge of her interest in the property, does so at her own risk. See Graves v. Bean, 200 Ark. 863, 868-69, 141 S.W.2d 50, 53 (1940) (holding that because the life tenant was aware of the title she held, she could not make improvements that would impair the interest of the title in fee simple).
Section 26-35-301 of the Arkansas Code Annotated mandates that everyone is liable and has a duty to pay taxes on land “seized for life” every year. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-301 (a)-(b) (Repl. 1997). This includes life tenants, who are charged with the responsibility of paying taxes on land. See Hutchison v. Sheppard, 225 Ark. 14, 17, 279 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1955). It also includes persons who live with a life tenant, rent free. See Kelley v. Acker, 216 Ark.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
WENDELL L. Griffen, Judge.
Don Acord appeals the judgment of the Johnson County Chancery Court in which the court found that Mark Acord had a life tenancy in certain real property located in Johnson County and that appellant had a remainder interest in the property. The judgment also awarded appellee Merle Acord $41,433.28 as reimbursement for monies spent to improve and pay property taxes on the property that her deceased husband, appellee Elbridge Acord, held in joint life tenancy with Mark Acord. For appeal, appellant argues that the chancellor erroneously awarded appellee the value of the improvements she made as a life tenant and property taxes that were paid. Also appellant contends that the chancellor erred in applying the betterment statute. We hold that the chancellor’s award to appellee for reimbursement of taxes and the value of improvements was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with our decision.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 17, 1986, Joe Acord conveyed land situated in Johnson County, Arkansas, hereinafter referred to as the “Workman Place,” to two of his sons, Harold Wayne Acord and Charley Don Acord.1 The deed contained a reservation that the conveyance was “subject to life estates in favor of Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Elbridge Acord, joint tenants with right of survivorship.”2 The deed was filed for record on May 27, 1986. Joe Acord executed another warranty deed in May 1986 conveying a life estate to Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Acord for the same property. Subsequent to the May 1986 conveyance, Joe Acord executed a Correction Warranty Deed recorded May 31, 1988, to Elbridge and Mark Acord, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, that covered the same land as the deed contained in the deed to Harold and Charley Acord.
After the Corrected Warranty Deed was filed, Elbridge and Mark Acord executed a quitclaim deed, dated June 4, 1997, in favor of Elbridge and appellee Merle Acord, his wife. The couple initially brought an action to partition the land, claiming that they owned an undivided 4/5 interest in it. Appellees later amended their complaint and asked the chancellor to reform the deeds or, alternatively, to reimburse them for money they had spent on improvements and taxes.3
Following a hearing, the chancellor set aside the quitclaim deed dated June 4, 1997, and vested title in the property to Mark Acord for life, with a remainder fee-simple interest to appellant. The chancellor then entered judgment against appellant for $41,433.28, which represented the fair market value of the improvements made by appellee on the land before appellant acquired any interest in it and reimbursement for real property taxes paid. It is from this judgment that appellant appeals.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant raises three arguments. First, he contends that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in awarding appellee the value of improvements made and taxes paid by her and her late spouse as life tenants of the property in question. Second, he argues that the chancellor erred in applying the Arkansas Betterment Statute to the dispute between the parties. Finally, appellant contends that the chancellor erred in calculating the value of the improvements.
Appellee responds that appellant is incorrect in his assertion that the chancellor found that appellee was a life tenant. She creatively asserts that because there was no evidence at trial that she held a life tenancy interest in her own right, the chancellor’s award of improvements and reimbursement of taxes to her should not be considered in a life tenant context. Thus, she concludes that she is entitled to reimbursement for taxes and improvements made on the land. Alternatively, she argues that life tenants may recover for improvements on land, and that the betterment statute applies so long as she had a good-faith belief that she owned the property in question. Appellee states that the chancellor did not err in calculating the amount of the value of the improvements made on the land in question.
Chancery decisions are reviewed de novo on the record. See Bennett v. Hollowell, 31 Ark. App. 209, 213, 792 S.W.2d 338, 341 (1990). This court does not disturb the chancellor’s conclusions of law unless the chancellor’s findings are clearly erroneous. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 52. Chancellors are in the best position to view the evidence presented at trial and assess the credibility of witnesses based on their demeanor and testimony. See Duchac v. City of Hot Springs, 67 Ark. App. 98, 104, 992 S.W.2d 174, 178 (1999). Although this court gives great deference to findings of fact by the chancellor due to the chancellor’s superior position to determine credibility issues, it does not give such deference to matters of law, in that the chancellor stands in no better position to apply the law than this court. See id. at 104, 992 S.W.2d at 178. When we find that the chancellor misapplied the law and that, as a result, an appellant has suffered prejudice, we will reverse the erroneous ruling. See id., 992 S.W.2d at 178.
Improvements and Taxes Paid by Life Tenants
The chancellor awarded appellee a judgment to reimburse her for improvements made to the land as well as taxes paid on the land by appellee and her husband while the couple resided on the land. The chancellor based his decision on the fact that appellee and her husband made substantial improvements to the land, including the construction of a dwelling house, outbuildings, clearing and landscaping. All of this was done with the appellant’s knowledge and tacit consent.
Life tenants hold a limited, restricted interest in the estate. Although life tenants are required to keep the property in repair, they are not required to permanently improve it. See Frazier v. Hanes, 220 Ark. 765, 769, 249 S.W.2d 842, 845 (1952). Indeed, life tenants ordinarily are not compensated by remaindermen when they permanently improve the estate. See Kelley v. Acker, 216 Ark. 867, 871, 228 S.W.2d 49, 52 (1950). Therefore, a life tenant who makes improvements to the property, notwithstanding her knowledge of her interest in the property, does so at her own risk. See Graves v. Bean, 200 Ark. 863, 868-69, 141 S.W.2d 50, 53 (1940) (holding that because the life tenant was aware of the title she held, she could not make improvements that would impair the interest of the title in fee simple).
Section 26-35-301 of the Arkansas Code Annotated mandates that everyone is liable and has a duty to pay taxes on land “seized for life” every year. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-301 (a)-(b) (Repl. 1997). This includes life tenants, who are charged with the responsibility of paying taxes on land. See Hutchison v. Sheppard, 225 Ark. 14, 17, 279 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1955). It also includes persons who live with a life tenant, rent free. See Kelley v. Acker, 216 Ark. 867, 872, 228 S.W.2d 49, 53 (1950). These persons are not entitled for reimbursement of taxes paid, and monies paid by them to discharge the obligations of the life tenant are considered gifts to the life tenant. See id., 228 S.W.2d at 53.
There is no dispute that Elbridge Acord and his son Mark were originally granted a life tenancy with right of survivorship in 1986. The 1986 deed states on its face that the deed was “for their natural lives,” and includes a clause stating as follows:
Limitations: It is the purpose of this conveyance to convey a life estate unto both Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Elbridge Acord, for and during their natural lives. This conveyance is made on the condition that neither Elbridge A.J. Acord nor Mark Elbridge Acord, shall have the right to transfer, alienate, encumber or convey the hereinabove described lands.
The Correction Warranty Deed, recorded on May 31, 1988, purported to convey to Elbridge A.J. Acord and Mark Elbridge Acord and unto their heirs and assigns forever the same land involved in this appeal. However, the Correction Warranty Deed included the following limitation clause:
this conveyance is made on the condition that neither Elbridge A.J. Acord nor Mark Elbridge Acord shall have the right to transfer, alienate, encumber or convey the hereinabove described lands.
During the trial, appellee testified as to her understanding of the interest that she and her husband held in the Workman Place. Appellee testified that she and her husband received copies of the two 1986 deeds along with a letter from Joe Acord’s attorney. In addition, appellee testified, “[W]e understood Joe intended for us to just have the right to live there. We were having trouble signing the deed. I said, ‘[D]on’t put my name on it and Joe will sign it.’ ”
Appellee also testified that “we knew that all we had was the right to five there for Elbridge’s and Mark’s lifetime when we sold our property in Missouri.” She testified that she thought a life estate meant that once her father-in-law died, the property would belong to her and her husband.
Appellee further testified that although she thought in 1987 that she and her husband had a life estate interest in the Workman Place, once the correction deed was recorded in 1988 she thought that she and her husband owned the land. Appellant testified she was in possession of the 1986 deed and the 1988 correction deed. She stated that she and her husband began constructing their home in 1991.
In addition to the testimony of appellee, the chancellor also heard the testimony of Don Acord and Jeffrey Levin. Both men testified that it was Joe Acord’s intent to keep the property in the family to prevent it from being sold. Levin, the attorney who prepared the life estate conveyance testified that Joe Acord intended to avoid the selling of the property as a result of any marital problems that developed between Elbridge and appellee. Levin testified that he told Joe Acord that the only way to keep the property from being sold was to create a series of life estates, first in Elbridge Acord and then in Mark Acord. He stated that he sent a memo to Merle and Elbridge Acord dated May 5, 1986, which contained copies of the two 1986 deeds.
Appellee’s name is absent on the 1986 and 1988 deeds. In fact, it is not until 1997 that appellee’s name first appears on an instrument involving the property. This occurred when Elbridge and Mark Acord purportedly quitclaimed the property to Elbridge and Merle Acord.4 During the trial, appellee testified that the purpose of the 1997 deed was for her to have a place to live.
As life tenants of the Workman Place, Elbridge and Mark Acord were required to pay taxes on the property. It is undisputed that appellee lived on the land with her husband, and received the benefit of living on the land rent-free. Thus, appellee is not entitled to reimbursement for taxes. As mentioned previously, life tenants ordinarily do not receive reimbursement from remaindermen when improvements are made to the estate. Life tenants who improve property notwithstanding the uncertainty of reimbursement assume the risk they will not be reimbursed. Appellee and her husband took this risk when they sold their home in Missouri, relocated to Arkansas, and built a home on the property knowing that Joe Acord only intended for them to live there for Elbridge and Mark Acord’s natural lives.
Application of the Betterment Statute
A person may recover for improvements made to another’s land under the Arkansas Betterment Statute, if she 1) believes herself to be the owner of the property; and 2) holds under color of title.5 See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-213(a) (1987). A life estate interest does not confer color of title, and a deed that purports to be only convey a life estate is not sufficient color of title. See Perry v. Rye, 223 Ark. 594, 597, 267 S.W.2d 507, 509 (1954). In addition, a person may not recover for improvements that were made before color of title was acquired. See Anderson v. Williams, 59 Ark. 144, 146, 26 S.W. 818, 819 (1894).
Appellee testified that she knew at the time she moved from Missouri in 1986 that she and her husband only had a right to live on the Workman Place for the life of her husband and son. Her testimony that she thought she and her husband owned the place in 1988 contradicted her testimony that the purpose of the purported 1997 quitclaim deed was for her to have a place to live.
Even if appellee thought she owned the property, she still had to hold the property under color of title. The 1986 deed conveyed by Joe Acord to Elbridge and Mark Acord stated on its face that it was a life estate with a limitation that neither Elbridge nor Mark had the right to transfer, alienate, encumber or convey the land. The 1988 Correction Warranty Deed, also conveyed by Joe Acord to Elbridge and Mark Acord, contained language that limited the grantees from transferring, alternating, encumbering, or conveying the Workman Place. The limiting language in both conveyances prevented creation of a fee simple interest.
Appellee was not a grantee in the 1986 deed or 1988 Correction Warranty deed, and her name does not appear on any instrument of conveyance until June 1997. Based on the absence of appellee’s name from both the 1986 and 1988 deeds, appellee had no basis for a good-faith belief that she held the property under color of title at the time the improvements were made in 1991. Therefore, the chancellor erred in applying the betterment statute to appellee. Because the betterment statute is inapplicable to appellee, we need not reach the merits of appellant’s argument that the chancellor’s reliance on an appraisal was misplaced under the betterment statute.
The chancellor misapplied the law in awarding appellee a judgment against appellant. We reverse and remand for entry of an order consistent with this decision.
Reversed and remanded.
Robbins, C.J., Stroud and Neal, JJ., agree. Koonce and Bird, JJ., dissent.