Ackerman v. Dave & Buster's Inc

• Court: District Court, N.D. New York
• Decided: March 28, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00355
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________________________

ASHANI ACKERMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25-CV-355 (DNH/MJK)

DAVE & BUSTER’S, INC., et. al.

Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________

ASHANI ACKERMAN, Plaintiff, pro se

MITCHELL J. KATZ, United States Magistrate Judge

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID N HURD, Senior United States District Court Judge:

ORDER and REPORT-RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff commenced this action on March 20, 2025, by filing a complaint. (Dkt. 1). On March 20, 2025, Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. 2). The Clerk has sent the complaint to this Court for its review.

I. FACTS Plaintiff, a New York resident, alleges that he and his family visited Dave & Buster’s, a Texas corporation, at Crossgate Mall in Albany, NY. (Complaint, Dkt. 2, at 2). While dining there, Plaintiff notified the waiter that neither he nor his family members should be served food which contained pork “due to dietary

restrictions and potential health concerns.” Id. During the food-ordering process, the waiter “recommended a chicken salad option,” called the “Cali Bowl,” to the Plaintiff’s mother and the family shared the

dish. Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff, after consuming some of the bowl, discovered it contained pork. Id. He immediately alerted the waiter, who contacted her manager, and the manager confirmed the dish contained pork. Id. Plaintiff then began suffering “severe physical distress, including jaw

locking, nausea, and vomiting.” Id. Emergency services were provided to Plaintiff on-site and he was later taken to the hospital for further treatment. Id. at 2-3.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff now alleges that Dave & Buster’s was negligent because it failed to “serve food that complied with reasonable safety standards and the explicit dietary instructions provided.” Id. at 3. He seeks the following damages: (1) $2,700 in medical expenses; (2) pain and suffering “in an amount determined at trial”; (3)

emotional distress and mental anguish “in an amount determined at trial”; (4) punitive damages “in an amount sufficient to deter Defendant from future similar misconduct”; and (5) any relief the Court deems just and proper. Id. at 3-4. Below, the Court will address Plaintiff’s IFP status and his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

III. LEGAL STANDARD Plaintiff declares in his IFP application that he is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. 2). After reviewing his application, this Court finds that Plaintiff is financially eligible for IFP status.

In addition to determining whether a plaintiff meets the financial criteria to proceed IFP, the court must also consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Courts shall dismiss a case, at any time, if they determine that the action is (i) frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. When determining whether an action is frivolous, courts must consider

whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process and discourage the waste

of judicial resources. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974). Courts have a duty to show liberality toward pro se litigants and must use extreme caution when ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and has had an opportunity to respond. See Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221

F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000). But courts must still determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See Id. (finding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has

paid the filing fee). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).

Additionally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires pleadings to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it does “demand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Houston v. Collerman, No. 9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB), 2016 WL 6267968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2016) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading that contains allegations that “‘are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them’ is subject to dismissal.” Id. (citing Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)).

IV. DISCUSSION Turning to his claim, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish that the Northern District of New York has subject matter jurisdiction, through diversity, over this case. Thus, this Court recommends that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice and leave to amend should be granted.

A. Legal Standard Diversity jurisdiction exists only “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. . ..” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a); see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). To determine “whether a challenged jurisdictional amount has been met, district courts are

permitted only to assess the allegations in a complaint and not the validity of any defenses asserted.” Ochoa v. Interbrew Am., Inc., 999 F.2d, 626, 629 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts may dismiss a case where “there is a legal certainty” that the

amount-in-controversy requirement cannot be met. Zacharaia v. Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir. 1982). “It is not easy to do this.” GW Holdings Grp., LLC v. U.S. Highland, Inc., 794 F. App'x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Even where the allegations leave grave doubt about the likelihood of

a recovery of the requisite amount, dismissal is not warranted.” Id. But when the legal certainty standard is met, courts may dismiss the complaint for lack of diversity jurisdiction. See e.g. Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp.

3d 153 (D. Conn. 2016). B. Analysis Plaintiff’s claim does not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.

Plaintiff argues that his damages, for a common law negligence claim, are: (1) $2,700 in medical expenses; (2) pain and suffering “in an amount determined at trial”; (3) emotional distress and mental anguish “in an amount determined at trial”; (4) punitive damages “in an amount sufficient to deter Defendant from

future similar misconduct”; and (5) any relief the Court deems just and proper. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, at 3-4). In short, Plaintiff only alleges $2,700 in harm. That is simply not enough to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. See

e.g. Entretelas Americanas S.A. v. Soler, 840 Fed. App'x 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s common law claims “for failure to sufficiently plead the amount in controversy” where the plaintiff alleged “it has ‘been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial.’”). As a result, this

Court finds that the Plaintiff has not established subject matter jurisdiction, through diversity, because the amount-in-controversy requirement has not been met. V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND Generally, before the court dismisses a pro se complaint or any part of the complaint sua sponte, the court should afford a plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; however, leave to re-plead may be denied where any amendment

would be futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed, in its entirety, without prejudice but with leave to amend. WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED, that the complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE but WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiff’s pending IFP Application (Dkt. 2) be GRANTED, and it is further ORDERED, that while Plaintiff may file objections to this Order and Report-Recommendation, before Plaintiff submits any amended pleading, he should wait for the District Court to rule on the above Orders and Recommendations, and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order and

Report-Recommendation on plaintiff by regular mail.1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO

1 The Clerk shall also provide plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.

Dated: March 28, 2025

U.S. Magistrate Judge

2016 WL 6267968 Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, N.D. New York. Eddie HOUSTON, Plaintiff, v. COLLERMAN, et. al., Defendants. 9:16-CV-1009 (BKS/ATB) | Signed 10/26/2016 Attorneys and Law Firms EDDIE HOUSTON, 08-A-3122, Mid-State Correctional Facility, P.O. Box 2500, Marcy, New York 13403, Plaintiff, pro se. AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER1 BRENDA K. SANNES, United States District Judge I. Introduction *1 The Clerk has sent to the Court for review a civil rights action filed by pro se plaintiff Eddie Houston. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff has not paid the statutory filing fee for this action and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2 (“IFP Application”). II. IFP Application “28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in a federal court without prepayment of the filing fee that would ordinarily be charged.” Cash v. Bernstein, No. 09-CV-1922, 2010 W L 5185047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010). Upon review of plaintiff's IFP Application, the Court finds that plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient economic need and filed the inmate authorization form required in the Northern District of New York. Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is granted.2 III. Initial Screening Having found that plaintiff meets the financial criteria for commencing this action in forma pauperis, and because plaintiff seeks relief from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, the Court must consider the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint in light of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Section 1915(e) of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that – ... (B) the action ... (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).3 Similarly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court must review any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint ... is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or ... seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (noting that Section 1915A applies to all actions brought by prisoners against government officials even when plaintiff paid the filing fee). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 8 “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 CIV. 4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, No. 95-CV-0063 (TJM), 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 1995) (other citations omitted)). A court should not dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- me accusation.” Id. Thus, a pleading that contains only allegations which “are so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” is subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 Fed.Appx. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009). IV. Summary of the Complaint4 Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a cause of action for “ ‘the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)) (footnote omitted); see also Myers v. Wollowitz, No. 6:95-CV-0272 (TJM/RWS), 1995 WL 236245, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1995) (stating that “§ 1983 is the vehicle by which individuals may seek redress for alleged violations of their constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights, [but] ... only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The Court will construe the allegations in plaintiff's complaint with the utmost leniency. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (holding that a pro se litigant's complaint is to be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). *3 Plaintiff, an inmate currently being held at Mid-State Correctional Facility (“Mid-State C.F.”), asserts claims arising out of his confinement in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”). The incidents that form the foundation for this complaint occurred while plaintiff was confined at Elmira Correctional Facility (“Elmira C.F.”). See Compl., generally. On July 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a grievance claiming that defendants Officer Copestick (“Copestick”) and Officer Schieber (“Schieber”) harassed him, on more than one occasion, about his medication. See id. at 6; see Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3-5. On August 5, 2013, after an investigation into the allegations, the Superintendent of Elmira C.F. denied plaintiff's grievance. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5. On September 30, 2013, plaintiff was on his way to the masjid to participate in Ramadan when he was stopped by Copestick and Schieber and directed to the wall for a pat-frisk. See Compl. at 5. While plaintiff's hands were on the wall, Schieber “violently kicked” his legs from underneath him. See id. Schieber “stomped” on plaintiff's ankles while Copestick attempted to choke plaintiff. See id. During the assault, the officers yelled racial slurs. See id. Defendant Sergeant Collerman (“Collerman”) watched the officers beat plaintiff. See Compl. at 5. As a result of the attack, plaintiff's eyeglasses were broken, his ankle was swollen, and he could not walk. See id. at 5, 9. At approximately 5:00 p.m., plaintiff received medical treatment for complaints of pain in his right big toe and swelling in his right foot. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19. Plaintiff received Motrin and was advised to follow with sick call requests, if needed. See id. A “use of force/inmate injury” report was compiled.5 See id. At approximately 7:15 p.m., plaintiff, a diabetic, told a medical plaintiff on a daily basis. See id. On October 1, 2013, plaintiff received a misbehavior report charging him with assault on staff and with refusing a direct order and search.6 See Compl. at 5. On the same day, plaintiff was placed in confinement in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”). See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19. On October 3, 2013, plaintiff attended a Hearing regarding the misbehavior report.7 See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10. On November 3, 2013, plaintiff received a copy of the hearing disposition dismissing all charges. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 11; Dkt. No. 1 at 5. On November 3, 2013, plaintiff was released from the SHU. See Compl. at 5. While plaintiff was in the SHU, he was unable to participate in Ramadan, denied religious meals, denied parole, and excluded from mental health programs. See id. Construed liberally, the complaint contains the following claims: (1) Copestick and Schieber violated plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights with use of excessive force (Fifth, Fifteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Second Causes of Action); (2) Collerman failed to protect plaintiff from the assault in violation of plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights (Fifteenth Cause of Action); (3) defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Sixth, Seventh, and Fifteenth Causes of Action); (4) Copestick and Schieber retaliated against plaintiff in violation of plaintiff's First Amendment rights (Twenty-First Cause of Action); (5) plaintiff's First Amendment rights to religious freedom were violated (Fourth Cause of Action); (6) plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated (First, Second, Third, Sixth, Sixteenth, and Eighteenth Causes of Action); (7) defendants failed to investigate plaintiff's complaints and follow grievance procedures (Tenth and Thirteenth Causes of Action); (8) perjury claims against officers who filed the misbehavior report (Eleventh and Seventeenth Causes of Action); and (9) supervisory claims against DOCCS (Eighth, Ninth, Twelfth, Fourteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty Sixth Causes of Action). See Compl., generally. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and criminal charges against defendants (Eleventh and Seventeenth Causes of Action). See Compl. at 9-13. V. Analysis A. Eleventh Amendment *4 The Eleventh Amendment has long been construed as barring a citizen from bringing a suit against his or her own state in federal court, under the fundamental principle of “sovereign immunity.” U.S. Const. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-21 (1890); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity is lost only if Congress unequivocally abrogates states' immunity or a state expressly consents to suit. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2009). It is well-settled that Congress did not abrogate states' immunity through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979), and that New York State has not waived its immunity from suit on the claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint. See generally Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977); Dawkins v. State of New York, No. 93-CV-1298 (RSP/GJD), 1996 W L 156764 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). Here, insofar as plaintiff seeks an award of money damages pursuant to Section 1983 against DOCCS, those claims are dismissed as plaintiff seeks relief from a defendant immune from suit under section 1983. See LeGrand v. Evan, 702 F.2d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1983); see Meehan v. Kenville, 555 Fed.Appx. 116 (2d Cir. 2014); see Simmons v. Gowanda Corr. Facility, No. 13-CV-0647, 2013 WL 3340646, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (“the New York State Department of Corrections and [the named correctional facility] enjoy the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as enjoyed by the state itself”) (quoting Posr. v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1999)). B. Eighth Amendment 1. Excessive Force Claims The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from “cruel and unusual punishment” at the hands of prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment encompasses the use of excessive force against an inmate, who must prove two components: (1) subjectively, that the defendant acted wantonly and in bad faith, and (2) objectively, that the defendant's actions violated “contemporary standards of decency.” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). The key inquiry into a claim of excessive force is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986)); see also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (“[t]he Supreme Court has emphasized that the nature of the force applied is the core judicial inquiry in excessive force cases—not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained.”). “Accordingly, when considering the subjective element of the governing Eighth Amendment test, a court must be mindful that the absence of serious injury, though relevant, does not necessarily negate a finding of wantonness.” Wynter v. Ramey, No. 11- CV-0257 (DNH/DEP), 2013 W L 5465343, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has identified the time, location and individuals involved in the alleged assault. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Copestick and Schieber survive sua sponte review and require a response. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 2. Failure To Intervene *5 The failure of corrections officers to employ reasonable measures to protect an inmate from violence by others may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 1985). Moreover, allegations that an officer failed to intervene and prevent assaults are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. See Rogers v. Artus, No. 13-CV-21, 2013 WL 5175570, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013). To establish liability under a failure to intervene theory, a plaintiff must prove the use of excessive force by someone other than the individual and that the defendant under consideration: 1) possessed actual knowledge of the use by another of excessive force; 2) had a realistic opportunity to intervene and prevent the harm from occurring; and 3) nonetheless disregarded that risk by intentionally refusing or failing to take reasonable measures to end the use of excessive force. Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). In order to succeed on a claim of failure to protect, the inmate “must establish both that a substantial risk to his safety actually existed and that the offending [defendant] knew of and consciously disregarded that risk.” See Walsh v. Goord, No. 07-CV-0246, 2007 WL 1572146, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. May 23, 2007) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970)). In addition, a failure- to-protect claim requires a showing that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate's safety. Morales v. New York State Dep't of Corr., 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988). At this early stage of the proceeding, plaintiff has alleged enough to require a response from Collerman to plaintiff's claim that he failed to protect plaintiff from the assault by Copestick and Schieber. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 3. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs indifferent to a serious medical need. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective component of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference medical claim “requires that the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the subjective element, medical mistreatment rises to the level of deliberate indifference only when it “involves culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act ... that evinces ‘a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.’ ” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F. 3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553). “Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). To assert a claim for deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege that (1) a prison medical care provider was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that the inmate had a serious medical need; and (2) the medical care provider actually drew that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Chance, 143 F.3d at 702. The inmate must also demonstrate that the provider consciously and intentionally disregarded or ignored that serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. An “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” does not constitute “deliberate indifference.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. In this instance, even assuming plaintiff's injuries were sufficiently serious, plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate that defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 553. Plaintiff claims that his medical treatment was inadequate because his ankle was not x-rayed until he was transferred to “his next facility,” two months after the alleged incident. See Compl. at 10. “When the basis of a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim is a temporary delay or interruption in the provision of otherwise adequate medical treatment, it is appropriate to focus on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner's underlying medical condition alone in analyzing whether the alleged deprivation is, in ‘objective terms, sufficiently serious,’ to support an Eighth Amendment claim.” Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Chance, 143 F.3d at 702). “Although a delay in providing necessary medical care may in some cases constitute deliberate indifference, this Court has reserved such a classification for cases in which, for example, officials deliberately delayed care as a form of punishment, ignored a ‘life-threatening and fast-degenerating’ condition for three days; or delayed major surgery for over two years.” Demata v. New York State Corr. Dep't of Health Servs., 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). *6 Here, the complaint is void of any facts establishing that any defendant deliberately delayed plaintiff's medical treatment. On the day of the alleged attack, plaintiff received medical attention and prescription medication. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 19. Plaintiff was treated on three other occasions in October 2013 for foot pain before undergoing x-rays on November 14, 2013. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 20-21. During those visits, plaintiff received ice packs, Motrin, and refused Ibuprofen. See id. Plaintiff does not allege that his condition deteriorated during that time. See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 802 F.Supp. 477, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff did not establish that his condition worsened as a result of a delay between his request and receipt of medical attention). Plaintiff does not allege that he sought and was refused medical treatment during this two month time period. See Kee v. Hasty, No. 01 Civ. 2123, 2004 W L 807071, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 2004) (holding that the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims were overly conclusory because the inmate failed to specify the dates on which he was denied proper treatment, the nature of his needs on those dates, and the nature of the treatment that was purportedly denied by the defendants). The complaint lacks any facts to plausibly suggest that any defendant knew of the severity of plaintiff's injury and the risk posed by any delay in his treatment. Plaintiff, a diabetic, also claims that he was unable to read or see for over one year because his eye glasses were not replaced until over a year after the assault. See Compl. at 10. The complaint does not contain any facts suggesting that plaintiff made any complaints or sick call requests to any defendant related to his eyeglasses. Plaintiff also failed to assert facts suggesting that he made any defendant “aware of the serious harm could occur” if he was not provided with his glasses. See Myrie v. Calvo/Calvoba, 591 F.Supp.2d 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the complaint did not suggest that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's vision problems). the part of any defendant. It is well settled in this Circuit that “personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)). Thus, “a Section 1983 plaintiff must ‘allege a tangible connection between the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.’ ” Austin v. Pappas, No. 04-CV-7263, 2008 W L 857528, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (quoting Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986)) (other citation omitted). The complaint lacks any facts suggesting that Copestick, Schieber, or Collerman were involved in plaintiff's medical treatment or refused to allow plaintiff to receive medical attention. In the absence of factual allegations sufficient to plausibly suggest that any defendant was personally involved, the complaint fails to state a cognizable claim against him. Consequently, plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. C. First Amendment 1. Retaliation Plaintiff alleges that Copestick and Schieber assaulted him in retaliation for plaintiff's grievance against them. See Compl. at 6,13. To state a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting the following: (1) the speech or conduct at issue was “protected;” (2) the defendants took “adverse action” against the plaintiff – namely, action that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action – in other words, that the protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the defendant’s decision to take action against the plaintiff. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Second Circuit has stated that courts must approach prisoner retaliation claims “with skepticism and particular care,” since “virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official – even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation – can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Dawes, 239 F.3d at 491, overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1988). *7 It is well-settled that filing a grievance is constitutionally protected conduct. Johnson v. Eggersdorf, 8 Fed.Appx. 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2001); Graham v. R.J. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996). A plaintiff can establish a causal connection that suggests retaliatory intent by showing that his protected activity was close in time to the complained-of adverse action. Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). While there is no “bright line” defining the limits of the temporal relationship, courts in the Circuit have held that an adverse action taken within three months after a protected activity can reasonably be perceived as retaliatory. See Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extn. of Schenectady Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Ashok v. Barnhart, No. 01-CV-1311, 289 F.Supp.2d 305, 314 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2003) (the interval between a protected activity and an adverse action that results in a finding of retaliation is generally no more than several months). At this juncture, the Court finds that plaintiff's retaliation claims against Copestick and Schieber survive sua sponte review and require a response. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 2. Religious Claims Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his religious rights because he was unable to participate in Ramadan and denied his religious meals as a direct result of the false misbehavior report. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6. Free Exercise Clause. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). “Balanced against the constitutional protections afforded prison inmates, including the right to free exercise of religion, [however,] are the interests of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from administration of the penal system.” Id. (citing Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990)). To state a First Amendment Free Exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the practice asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and that the belief is sincerely held; (2) the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers some legitimate penological objective. Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A prisoner “must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Ford, 352 F.3d at 591).8 A religious belief is “sincerely held” when the plaintiff subjectively, sincerely holds a particular belief that is religious in nature. Ford, 352 F.3d at 590. A prisoner's sincerely held religious belief is “substantially burdened” where “the state puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 476–77 (2d Cir. 1996). Once a plaintiff establishes that a sincerely held religious belief has been substantially burdened, “[t]he defendants then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct; the burden remains with the prisoner to show that these articulated concerns were irrational.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275 (quoting Ford, 352 F.3d at 595) (punctuation omitted). *8 In this case, plaintiff has not alleged who issued the misbehavior report and it is not attached to the complaint. An inmate “has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997). While a false misbehavior report may give rise to a claim under § 1983 “when done in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right,” Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2015), here there is no such allegation. While the deprivation of religious meals in SHU may be sufficient to state a claim, see Williams v. Does, 639 Fed.Appx. 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2016); Skates v. Shusda, No. 9:14-CV-1092 (TJM/DEP), 2016 WL 3882530, at **4-5 (N.D.N.Y. May 31, 2016), here there is no indication that the defendants had any personal involvement in that conduct. The allegations, without more, fail to plausibly suggest that any defendant burdened plaintiff's right to freely practice his religion. Thus, plaintiff's First Amendment claims against are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. D. Fourteenth Amendment 1. Equal Protection/Discrimination Plaintiff claims that the September 30, 2013 assault was racially motivated. See Compl. at 6, 12. “When verbal harassment and simultaneous physical abuse ... are considered together, [courts] have little doubt concluding that plaintiff's allegations [are] sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for discrimination on the basis of race. Cole v. Fischer, 379 Fed.Appx. 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2010). “Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, a plaintiff may be able to recover for a physical assault that would not meet the objective threshold for Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, if the defendant's conduct was motivated by racial or religious discrimination.” Bhuiyan v. Wright, No. 9:06-CV-409 ATB, 2011 WL 1870235, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011) (citation omitted). At this juncture, plaintiff has sufficiently plead a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim to warrant a response from Copestick and Schieber. In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether these claims can withstand a properly filed motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 2. Due Process 10. Plaintiff also asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he was improperly confined to the SHU without a hearing as a result of a false misbehavior report. See id. at 10. During his SHU confinement, was allegedly unable to participate in Ramadan, denied his religious meals, denied parole, and excluded from mental health programs. See id. a. Property Claim The Supreme Court has held that the negligent or intentional deprivation of prisoner's property may not be the basis for constitutional claims if sufficient post deprivation remedies are available to address the claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531 (1984) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)); Davis v. New York, 311 Fed.Appx. 397, 400 (2d Cir. 2009) (An alleged loss of property, “whether intentional or negligent – will not support a due process claim redressable under § 1983 if ‘adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available.’ ”) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. 533). “New York in fact affords an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of, inter alia, a Court of Claims action.” Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2001). Because plaintiff has access to adequate state law remedies, he has not been deprived of property without due process of law and therefore cannot state a claim for relief pursuant to Section 1983. See Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 360, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim that defendants destroyed his eyeglasses in violation of his due process rights). Thus, plaintiff's due process claims related to his eyeglasses are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. b. SHU Confinement *9 To establish a due process claim, plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he possessed a liberty interest and (2) that the defendant(s) deprived him of that interest as a result of insufficient process.” Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case plaintiff alleges that the false misbehavior report resulted in a SHU sentence.9 A prisoner “has a liberty interest that is implicated by SHU confinement if it ‘imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ” J.S. v. T'Kach, 714 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, (1995)); see also Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004). In making this determination courts are to consider, “among other things, the duration and conditions of confinement.” J.S., 714 F.3d at 106; Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009). The conditions of confinement are to be considered “in comparison to the hardships endured by prisoners in general population, as well as prisoners in administrative and protective confinement, assuming such confinements are imposed in the ordinary course of prison administration.” Davis, 576 F.3d at 134; Palmer, 364 F.3d at 66 n.4. Although the Second Circuit has “explicitly avoided” creating “a bright line rule that a certain period of SHU confinement automatically fails to implicate due process rights,” the Court has established guidelines. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65. W here the plaintiff is confined for “an intermediate duration –between 101 and 305 days – ‘development of a detailed record’ of the conditions of the confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions is required.’ ” Id. (quoting Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 2000)). While confinements for less than 101 days “under normal SHU conditions may not implicate a prisoner's liberty interest,” such confinements “could constitute atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more severe than the normal SHU conditions of Sealy or a more fully developed record showed that even relatively brief confinements under normal SHU conditions were, in fact, atypical.” Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65; see Davis, 576 F.3d at 133.10 *10 In this case, the duration of the confinement, 30 to 60 days, “was not long enough to constitute an atypical and significant deprivation by itself,” and the Court therefore must “look to the conditions of confinement.” Palmer, 364 F.3d at 66; see also his religious meals, denied parole, and excluded from his mental health program. See Compl. at 5, 10; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 1. It is well established that prisoners do not have a constitutional right to parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). “Where a state has created a statutory scheme for parole, the Due Process Clause protects prisoners insofar as they ‘have a legitimate expectancy of release that is grounded in the state's statutory scheme.’ ” Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11–13). “New York's parole scheme is not one that creates in any prisoner a legitimate expectancy of release.” Barna, 239 F.3d at 171. Plaintiff has also failed to plead that his inability to participate in mental health programs impacted a protected liberty interest. See Nieves v. Prack, No. 6:15-CV-6101, 2016 W L 1165820, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. March 24, 2016) (“[Plaintiff's] claim that his inability ... to participate in various educational, vocational, rehabilitative or self-help programs might have hindered his ability to receive an early parole or release is ... speculative and fails to allege interference with a protected liberty interest.”) (citations omitted). Here, the complaint lacks facts establishing when, how many times, and who deprived plaintiff of the right to attend his mental health program. With respect to plaintiff's religious claims, courts have found that the deprivation of communal religious services does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship. See Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 336 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that eighteen days in administrative segregation, including loss of exercise and access to religious services, did not constitute atypical and significant hardship); Holland v. Goord, No. 05-CV-6295, 2006 WL 1983382, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006) (holding the inability to attend Muslim services and celebrate the end of Ramadan while confined in the SHU for seventy-seven days is not an atypical hardship). Even assuming that plaintiff had pled facts sufficient to show that his confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship, however, and therefore pled the existence of a valid liberty interest, the complaint fails to state a claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment and due process. It is well settled that “a prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986)). In this case, a hearing regarding the charges was held within two days of plaintiff's receipt of the misbehavior report. Plaintiff does not allege that he was denied any procedural due process during that hearing. Moreover, the complaint lacks facts suggesting that any named defendant issued the misbehavior report or presided over the disciplinary hearings. Based upon the aforementioned, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Livingston v. Kelly, 561 F.Supp.2d 329, 332 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff's false-report claims because the plaintiff failed to allege that the disciplinary hearings on the reports did not meet constitutional due process standards). E. Failure to Respond to Grievances and Failure to Investigate *11 Plaintiff also claims that his constitutional rights were violated because the facility grievance program is “never followed.” See Compl. at 11. There is no constitutional right of access to the established inmate grievance program. Davis v. Buffardi, No. 9:01-CV-0285 (PAM/GJD), 2005 WL 1174088, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2005) (“[p]articipation in an inmate grievance process is not a constitutionally protected right”); Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F.Supp.2d 362, 369-70 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[i]nmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures does not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim”); Cancel v. Goord, No. 00. Civ. 2042, 2001 WL 303713, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) (“inmate grievance procedures are not required by the Constitution and therefore a violation of such procedures does not give rise to a claim under § 1983”); Mimms v. Carr, No. 09-CV-5740, 2011 W L 2360059, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011) (“It is well-established that prison grievance procedures do not create a due-process-protected liberty interest.”) (citing cases). Simply stated, there is no underlying constitutional obligation to afford an inmate meaningful access to the internal grievance procedure, or to investigate and properly determine any such grievance. To the extent that plaintiff attempts to assert a separate constitutional claim based upon the Inspector General's failure to investigate, the law is also clear that inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to an investigation of any kind by government officials. Bernstein v. New York, 591 F.Supp.2d 448, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases); Torres v. Mazzuca, 246 F.Supp.2d aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual); Pine v. Seally, No. 9:09-CV-1198, 2011 W L 856426, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011) (“the law is ... clear that inmates do not enjoy a constitutional right to an investigation of any kind by government officials”) (citing Bernstein, 591 F.Supp.2d at 460). In this regard, plaintiff's claims do not involve a constitutional violation and are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. F. Cause of Action for Criminal Charges/Perjury “New York does not recognize a common law cause of action for [...] perjury.” Harris v. Summers, No. 5:14-CV-0013 (LEK/ DEP), 2014 W L 1340032, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2014) (citing Carvel v. Ross, No. 12-CV-0722, 2011 W L 856283, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff's perjury claim because “there [is] no private right of action” for perjury)). Moreover, plaintiff's claim is not actionable because it is well-settled that a private citizen does not have a constitutional right to bring a criminal complaint against another individual. Harper v. New York Child Welfare Comm'rs, No. 3:12-CV-0646 (NAM/DEP), 2012 WL 3115975, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). Consequently, plaintiff's request to charge defendants with “perjury” is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). G. Injunctive Relief Against DOCCS Plaintiff demands injunctive relief directing DOCCS to require “each officer” to wear body cameras to prevent future assaults and other related injunctive relief. See Compl. at 10-12. Plaintiff is presently confined at Mid-State C.F. and therefore, plaintiff's request for injunctive relief involving changes to the operation of security at Elmira C.F., is dismissed as moot. See Edwards v. Horn, No. 10 Civ. 6194, 2012 WL 760172, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief because the plaintiff had been released from prison). *12 Even assuming plaintiff's request is broader and intended to encompass all DOCCS facilities, the request is nonetheless improper and subject to dismissal. The PLRA provides “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of the particular plaintiff.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (1)(A). “[A] proposed order directing the installation of securities cameras – is beyond the narrow scope permitted by the PLRA.” Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief seeking an order directing Green Haven to install security cameras as overly broad and unnecessary to correct the alleged past violations of his rights). Accordingly, plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is dismissed. VI. Conclusion ORDERED that plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED;11 and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk provide the Superintendent of the facility, designated by plaintiff as his current location, with a copy of plaintiff's authorization form, and notify the official that this action has been filed and that plaintiff is required to pay the entire statutory filing fee of $350.00 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court provide a copy of plaintiff's inmate authorization form to the Financial Deputy of the Clerk's Office; and it is further ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: (1) plaintiff's § 1983 claims for monetary damages against DOCCS; (2) constitutional claims based upon the failure to adhere to the grievance policy and investigate; and (3) ORDERED that the following claims are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted: (1) Eighth Amendment claims against defendants for deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical needs; (2) First Amendment freedom of religion claims; (3) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; and (4) claims for injunctive relief against DOCCS12; and it is further ORDERED that DOCCS is DISMISSED as a defendant herein; and it is further ORDERED that the following claims survive the Court's sua sponte review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and require a response: (1) the Eighth Amendment use of excessive force claims against defendants Copestick and Schieber; (2) the Eighth Amendment failure-to-intervene claim against defendant Collerman; (3) the First Amendment retaliation claims against defendants Copestick and Schieber; and (3) the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims against Copestick and Schieber; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk shall issue summons and forward them, along with copies of the Complaint, to the United States Marshal for service upon the remaining defendants. The Clerk shall forward a copy of the Summons and Complaint to the Office of the New York State Attorney General, together with a copy of this Decision and Order; and it is further *13 ORDERED, that a response to the complaint be filed by the remaining defendants, or their counsel, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; ORDERED, that all pleadings, motions and other documents relating to this action must bear the case number assigned to this action and be filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, 7th Floor, Federal Building, 100 S. Clinton St., Syracuse, New York 13261-7367. Any paper sent by a party to the Court or the Clerk must be accompanied by a certificate showing that a true and correct copy of same was served on all opposing parties or their counsel. Any document received by the Clerk or the Court which does not include a proper certificate of service will be stricken from the docket. Plaintiff must comply with any requests by the Clerk’s Office for any documents that are necessary to maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of New York in filing motions. Plaintiff is also required to promptly notify the Clerk’s Office and all parties or their counsel, in writing, of any change in his address; their failure to do so will result in the dismissal of his action; and it is further ORDERED, in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009), the Clerk of the Court is directed to provide plaintiff with copies of opinions from Westlaw and the Federal Appendix cited in this Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order on plaintiff in accordance with the Local Rules. Dated: October 26, 2016. All Citations Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2016 WL 6267968 Footnotes This Amended Decision and Order is issued to correct clerical errors in the Conclusion of the Order. 2 Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis where, absent a showing of “imminent danger of serious physical injury,” a prisoner has filed three or more actions or appeals that were subsequently dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Based upon the Court's review of plaintiff's litigation history on the Federal Judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) Service, it does not appear that plaintiff has accumulated three strikes for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 4 Plaintiff annexed exhibits to the complaint. Dkt. No. 1-1. To the extent that the exhibits are relevant to the incidents described in the complaint, the Court will consider the complaint as well as any documents attached as exhibits. See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference). 5 The Use of Force report was not annexed as an exhibit to the complaint. 6 The name of the officer who served the misbehavior report is not clearly legible on the Hearing Disposition annexed as an exhibit. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10. Plaintiff does not allege that Copestick, Schieber, or Collerman delivered the report. The disposition form indicates that the charges were reported by Schieber. Id. The misbehavior report was not annexed as an exhibit to the complaint. 7 The officer who presided over the hearing was a Captain at Elmira C.F. However, the name of the hearing officer is not clearly legible. See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 10-11. 8 The Second Circuit has yet to decide whether the “substantial burden” test survived the Supreme Court's decision in Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S 872, 887 (1990), in which the Court suggested that application of the test “puts courts in ‘the unacceptable business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.’ ” Ford, 352 F.3d at 592 (quoting Emp't Div., 494 U.S. at 887); see also Williams v. Does, 639 Fed.Appx. 55, 56 (2d Cir. May 6, 2016) (“We have not yet decided whether a prisoner asserting a free-exercise claim must, as a threshold requirement, show that the disputed conduct substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs.”); Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2014) (declining to decide whether a prisoner must show, as a threshold matter, that the defendants' conduct substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs in connection with a First Amendment free exercise claim). In the absence of any controlling precedent to the contrary, I have applied the substantial-burden test in this matter. 9 The complaint contains conflicting factual allegations related to the length of plaintiff's SHU confinement. Plaintiff claims that after “one month of being housed in SHU,” he was released. See Compl. at 5. In the Third Cause of Action, plaintiff claims that he served “over 60 days in SHU.” See id. at 9. 10 The Second Circuit has noted that “[i]n the absence of a detailed factual record, we have affirmed dismissal of due process claims only in cases where the period of time spent in SHU was exceedingly short –less than the 30 days that the Sandin plaintiff spent in SHU—and there was no indication that the plaintiff endured unusual SHU conditions.” Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65-66; see Davis, 576 F.3d at 133. Absent allegations in the complaint that the conditions of confinement were in some way atypical, however, many courts in this Circuit have granted motions to dismiss claims by plaintiffs with confinement exceeding thirty days when the plaintiffs failed to allege that the conditions of confinement were in some way atypical. See, e.g., Acevedo v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-6866, 2014 WL 5015470 at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (citing cases involving confinements of between forty and fifty days which were dismissed for failure to allege a protected liberty interest because there were no allegations of unusual confinement). required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees. 12 If plaintiff wishes to pursue any claim dismissed without prejudice, he is advised to that, if accepted for filing, any amended complaint will entirely replace the original complaint and incorporation of prior claims is not permitted. End of Document © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.