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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 A.C.J., CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02486-DGE 11 Petitioner, ORDER ON PETITIONER’S 12 v. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 13 LAURA HERMOSILLO et al., 14 Respondents. 15
16 Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 17 Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Dkt. No. 23.) Respondents oppose Petitioner’s 18 motion on the basis of the amount of fees and costs requested. (Dkt. No. 25 at 1.) As discussed 19 in more detail below, Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 21 The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case. Under the EAJA, 22 the Court must award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action such as this unless it finds 23 the government’s position was “substantially justified” or that “special circumstances make an 24 1 award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA creates a presumption that fees will be 2 awarded to a prevailing party. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1995); Zapon v. U.S. 3 Dep’t of Just., 53 F.3d 283, 284 (9th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has interpreted the term 4 “substantially justified” to mean that a prevailing party is not entitled to recover fees if the
5 government’s position is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. 6 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Attorney fees under EAJA must be reasonable. 28 7 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 8 Because this Court granted Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered her 9 released from custody, Petitioner is a prevailing party. (Dkt. No. 19 at 13); Carbonell v. I.N.S., 10 429 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (holding a litigant is a prevailing party if 11 they both (1) achieve a material alteration in the legal relationship of the parties; and (2) the 12 alteration is judicially sanctioned); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of Health 13 & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001) (holding a prevailing party is one who was awarded at 14 least some relief by the court). Next, the Court found that (1) the government claimed Petitioner
15 was subject to expedited removal proceedings, despite record evidence to the contrary; and (2) 16 the government acknowledged Petitioner was a member of the J.O.P. class yet violated the terms 17 of the settlement agreement by reopening Petitioner’s removal proceedings. (Dkt. No. 19 at 8– 18 11.) Such findings indicate Respondents’ position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, 19 “[i]t is the government’s burden to show that its position was substantially justified.” Meier v. 20 Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). Respondents do not argue that the government’s 21 position was justified. (See Dkt. No. 25.) Therefore, under these circumstances, the Court finds 22 fees should be awarded. 23
24 1 Petitioner is entitled to “reasonable” fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Hourly rates are 2 reasonable where they are “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 3 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 4 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant
5 community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 6 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). The fee applicant bears the burden of proving reasonableness. 28 7 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Hensley, 461 U.S.at 437 (“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of 8 establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly 9 rates.”). 10 Petitioner applies for an award of $12,630.11 in attorney and paralegal fees and an 11 additional $498.47 in various costs, for a total of $13,128.58. (See Dkt. Nos. 23-4, 23-5.) This 12 accounts for compensation for the time Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Nancy Alexander, spent on this 13 matter, totaling 39.8 hours of attorney work. (Dkt. No. 23-4.) Ms. Alexander requests an hourly 14 rate of $308. (Dkt. No. 23-2 at 2.) Thus, Ms. Alexander’s hourly rate exceeds the statutory
15 maximum hourly rate of $258.46 under the EAJA. (Id.); Statutory Maximum Rates Under the 16 Equal Access to Justice Act, https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/criminal-justice-act/statutory- 17 maximum-rates/ (last visited June 16, 2026). 18 Respondents do not object to the award of fees generally but assert Petitioner’s requested 19 amount is “excessive and unreasonable.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 1.) They argue Petitioner has not met 20 her burden to show an enhanced hourly rate is justified in this matter, because Petitioner has not 21 put forth a “declaration articulating any unique or specialized skill beyond ordinary immigration 22 practice,” nor has she attested to the unavailability of counsel at a lower rate or any market- 23 specific data. (Id. at 3–4.) Ms. Alexander declares she possesses specialized knowledge in
24 1 immigration law and provides “direct representation to adults and children in removal 2 proceedings.” (Dkt. Nos. 23-2 at 2; 26-1 at 2.) She explains an enhanced hourly rate reflects her 3 rate through the Equity Corps of Oregon (“ECO”) program, “which recognizes that her over 10 4 years of experience justifies additional compensation.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 11.) Accordingly, she
5 argues an enhanced hourly rate of $308 is proper. 6 1. Petitioner is not entitled to an enhanced hourly rate. 7 Courts may award enhanced hourly rates under the EAJA where “the attorneys possess 8 ‘distinctive knowledge’ and ‘specialized skill’ that was ‘needful to the litigation in question’ and 9 ‘not available elsewhere at the statutory rate.’” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 10 2009) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held that immigration law expertise, on its own, 11 does not justify an award of enhanced hourly rates “without a showing that the attorney[] 12 possess[es] distinctive knowledge or specialized skill necessary to [the] litigation[.]” Id. at 913 13 (citing Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (“‘We 14 decline to adopt counsel’s proposed per se rule that ‘the practice of immigration law should be
15 classified as a specialty similar to practicing patent law.’”)). 16 The Court concludes Petitioner has not met her burden to show Ms. Alexander is entitled 17 to an enhanced rate. Ms. Alexander has been practicing as an immigration attorney since 2015. 18 (Dkt. No. 26-1 at 2.) She declares she provides “direct representation to adults and children in 19 removal proceedings” in both her private practice and through the ECO program. (Id.) Though 20 the Court does not question Ms. Alexander’s credentials and specialized knowledge in the field 21 of immigration broadly speaking, the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that to award an enhanced 22 rate, the requesting party must show the attorney “possess[es] distinctive knowledge or 23 specialized skill necessary to this litigation[.]” Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 913 (emphasis added).
24 1 Aside from describing her representative experience generally, Ms. Alexander has not explained 2 how her skills or knowledge made her uniquely positioned to handle the facts of Petitioner’s 3 particular case.1 Further, this case is one of dozens of habeas petitions in this district and in the 4 Ninth Circuit challenging Respondents’ application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 to cases such as
5 Petitioner’s on Due Process grounds. E.g., Castillo v. ICE Field Off. Dir., Case No. C26-0842- 6 KKE, 2026 WL 1172910, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2026) (quoting Aquino v. LaRose, Case 7 No. 25-cv-2904-RSH-MMP, 2025 WL 3158676, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting 8 cases)) (“‘The overwhelming majority of courts to address the issue have agreed that 9 Section 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies 10 to a noncitizen in Petitioner’s position who has resided in the United States for many years.”). 11 Though every habeas matter is unique in some way, without an explanation of how Ms. 12 Alexander’s specialized skill was necessary to this case, the Court cannot say Ms. Alexander 13 brought experience to this litigation that is not present in other similar habeas matters such that 14 Ms. Alexander is entitled to an enhanced rate. Contra Rahman v. Bondi, Case No. 2:24-cv-
15 02132-JHC-TLF, 2026 WL 323046, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2026) (quoting Nadarajah, 569 16 F.3d at 914) (upholding enhanced rate “in an immigration matter that ‘involved more than 17 established principles of law with which the majority of attorneys are familiar[]’” and citing to 18 19
20 1 Ms. Alexander states her background was necessary because this case “involved complex questions concerning detention authority as applied to an unaccompanied child previously 21 released from the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement.” (Dkt. No. 26 at 3) (citing Dkt. No. 19 at 7–9). But it was Respondents who first acknowledged Petitioner’s membership in the 22 J.O.P. class (see Dkt. No. 12 at 2), not Petitioner. In any case, Petitioner’s class membership was just one of many factors the Court considered in finding a risk of erroneous deprivation in 23 Petitioner’s re-detention (see Dkt. No. 19), so Ms. Alexander’s experience representing unaccompanied minors was not dispositive, or necessary, for this case. 24 1 various declarations from the petitioner’s counsel explaining the issue was one of first 2 impression). 3 Ms. Alexander appears to rely primarily on ECO’s representation guidelines for 4 attorneys, which places an attorney with more than ten years of experience at a rate of $308 per
5 hour. (Dkt. No. 23-3 at 17.) She states that because her rate in her private practice is $350 an 6 hour, she would have been unable to take Petitioner’s case at the statutory rate, and further, 7 because of the current increased need for immigration counsel, she does not believe Petitioner 8 would have been able to find an attorney to represent her in her habeas petition at the statutory 9 rate. (Dkt. No. 26-1 at 3.) Respondents assert these statements are insufficient without 10 “affidavits from other practitioners attesting to unavailability of counsel at $258.46 per hour, and 11 no market data specific to this district.” (Dkt. No. 25 at 4.) Though “no one expects the 12 plaintiffs to conduct statistical surveys,” Rahman, 2026 WL 323046, at *4 (citation, quotation 13 marks, and alterations omitted), Ms. Alexander has not provided enough information to show the 14 unavailability of counsel at a lower rate within the relevant legal market. Her reference to the
15 ECO guidelines and her own rate in private practice are immaterial; what ECO believes is a 16 reasonable rate, and what Ms. Alexander actually charges, have no bearing on whether other 17 counsel could have been available to Petitioner at the statutory rate elsewhere. Cf. Hassine v. 18 Johnson, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1307 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted) (explaining that the rate 19 requested must be calculated in line with the prevailing market rate for similar legal services in 20 the relevant legal community, defined as the forum district). The Court appreciates and is well 21 aware of the current need for immigration counsel nationwide. But that fact alone does not 22 necessarily mean no other counsel was available at a lower rate in the relevant legal community, 23
24 1 and Ms. Alexander’s lone statement that she “[does] not believe” an attorney would have 2 represented Petitioner at the statutory rate is insufficient. (Dkt. No. 26-1 at 3.) 3 Separately, Petitioner requests a paralegal rate of $133 per hour, based again on the ECO 4 guidelines. (Dkt. Nos. 23-2 at 2; 23-3 at 17.) Respondents challenge this rate and request the
5 Court apply a $125 per hour rate to the paralegal work in this matter. (Dkt. No. 25 at 2.) The 6 EAJA permits compensation for paralegals that are in line with rates “in the community for 7 similar services by paralegals of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 8 Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 918 (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Aside from 9 referring to the ECO guidelines, Petitioner has provided no such evidence to support the 10 reasonableness of her requested paralegal rate, despite the fact it is her burden to do so. See 11 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983) (“The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence 12 supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.”). Respondents do not explain why they believe 13 $125 per hour is more reasonable than $133. (See Dkt. No. 26.) Because neither party has 14 provided legal or factual authority to support their requested rate (other than the ECO
15 guidelines), the Court will take the difference between the two and finds a paralegal rate of $129 16 per hour to be reasonable in this matter. 17 2. Petitioner is entitled to $9,126.88 in attorney fees. 18 The party seeking fees must submit “an itemized statement . . . stating the actual time 19 expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed.” 28 U.S.C. 20 § 2412(d)(1)(B). The appropriate number of hours includes all time “reasonably expended in 21 pursuit of the ultimate result achieved[.]” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431 (citation omitted). However, 22 “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours should be excluded from the fee 23
24 1 award. Id. at 434. Where billing records are lacking in detail, a court may reduce the fee to a 2 reasonable amount. Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948–949 (9th Cir. 2007). 3 Respondents argue the number of hours billed were excessive considering the “limited 4 scope” of the litigation in this case, and that some of Ms. Alexander’s time entries were vague or
5 redundant. (Dkt. No. 25 at 5–6.) For example, they point to several time entries for “file 6 management” or “review case status/consider next steps[,]” which they argue do not allow the 7 Court to determine whether the time was reasonably expended on substantive work. (Id. at 6.) 8 They argue several entries are duplicative, including overlapping drafting sessions for the 9 traverse and multiple client phone calls. (Id.) Finally, some of the time entries contain 10 administrative or clerical tasks such as file management, service coordination, pro hac vice 11 filing, and other tasks, which Respondents argue should not be properly billed at full attorney 12 rates. (Id.) In her reply, Petitioner argues Ms. Alexander’s hours were reasonable and on par 13 with recent habeas cases in this district. (Dkt. No. 26 at 6.) 14 The Court agrees with Respondents in part. First, the Court finds that some of Ms.
15 Alexander’s time entries are vague. This includes seven entries titled “File Management” with 16 no further description of what task the attorney (in this case, Local Counsel Shara Svendsen) was 17 engaged in, and three different entries for 1.444 hours, 2.209 hours, and 0.318 hours to “Work on 18 Habeas.” (Dkt. No. 23-4 at 2.) Additionally, there are entries for tasks imprecisely titled 19 “Habeas Coordination” and “Habeas Follow up.” (Id.) Such descriptions, especially those 20 coupled with large blocks of time, are vague and render it difficult for the Court to determine 21 what the timekeeper was actually doing. Accord Santiago v. Equable Ascent Fin., Case No. C 22 11-3158 CRB, 2013 WL 3498079, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (“the work billed for unnamed 23 drafts and telephone calls with unknown parties is too vague to be reviewed”). However, the
24 1 Court is less concerned with some of the entries Respondents contend are redundant, such as 2 phone calls to Petitioner; presumably, Ms. Alexander was keeping Petitioner up to speed on her 3 lawsuit, and because Petitioner was detained at NWIPC, there was no other realistic way for Ms. 4 Alexander to timely communicate with her client.
5 The Court believes it appropriate to apply a 15 percent reduction to the vague time 6 entries. Fischer v. SJB–P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district 7 court may reduce hours to offset “poorly documented” billing); see also Zavorin v. Wamsley, 8 Case No. 2:26-cv-00173-DGE, 2026 WL 879246, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 31, 2026) (reducing 9 award by 20 percent for 0.5-hour billing increments); Harris v. Trash Man, LLC, Civil No. 12- 10 00169 HG-KSC, 2013 WL 1932715, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 2013) (reducing award by 15 11 percent for block billing), report and recommendation adopted, Civil No. 12-00169 HG-KSC, 12 2013 WL 1932710 (D. Haw. May 7, 2013); Nolan v. City of L.A., Case No. CV 03-2190 GAF 13 (AJWx), 2014 WL 12564127, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014) (imposing a 30 percent reduction 14 for entries that were vague or block-billed); Craig v. Cnty. of Orange, Case No.: SACV 17-
15 00491-CJC(KESx), 2019 WL 12378994, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2019) (reducing “trial 16 preparation” time entries by 20 percent because they were vague); Primero Garcia v. Barr, 484 17 F. Supp. 3d 750, 757 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (reducing fees for vague entries that made it difficult “for 18 the Court to assess [their] reasonableness”). Accordingly, the following time entries will be 19 reduced as follows: 20 Date Time Spent Description Hours Reduced To 21 December 15, 2025 0.1 hours File Management 0.085 hours 22 December 18, 2025 0.2 hours File Management 0.17 hours 23 December 19, 2025 2.209 hours Work on Habeas 1.878 hours
24 1 December 29, 2025 0.1 hours File Management 0.085 hours 2 December 30, 2025 0.1 hours File Management 0.085 hours 3 January 3, 2026 0.513 hours Review Case Status; 0.436 hours Consider Next Steps 4 January 5, 2026 0.189 hours Habeas Consider 0.161 hours 5 Next Steps 6 January 5, 2026 0.318 hours Work on Habeas 0.27 hours 7 January 6, 2026 0.1 hours File Management 0.085 hours 8 January 6, 2026 0.545 hours Habeas Coordination 0.463 hours 9 January 6, 2026 0.428 hours Habeas Follow up 0.364 hours 10 January 9, 2026 0.2 hours File Management 0.17 hours 11 January 12, 2026 0.1 hours File Management 0.085 hours 12
(See Dkt. No. 23-4.) 13 Additionally, it appears Ms. Alexander included various clerical tasks on her itemized 14 statement. “[P]urely clerical work or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal or 15 lawyer’s rate, regardless of who performs them.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 16 (1989). “For example, the time spent to e-file documents is routinely found to be clerical work 17 that is non-compensable under the EAJA.” Garcia v. Colvin, Case No. No. 1:11–cv–01965– 18 SKO, 2013 WL 5347494, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013). The same is true for completing the 19 form to consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. Id. at *8. The Court finds the following tasks 20 are either clerical in nature or the billing description is insufficient to determine whether they are 21 clerical tasks or otherwise reasonable: 22
23 24 1 Date Time Spent Description December 5, 2025 0.4 hours Filed Habeas Petition 2 December 9, 2025 2.0 hours Complete Service 3 December 12, 2025 0.2 hours Pro Hac Vice Filings 4 December 17, 2025 0.2 hours Emailed Consent to 5 Magistrate December 22, 2025 0.2 hours Document Preparation 6
7 (Dkt. No. 23-4.) These tasks will be deducted from the overall fee award. 8 3. Petitioner may recover some of her requested costs. 9 Finally, Respondents challenge Petitioner’s request for costs that do not fall within the 10 statutory categories for EAJA recovery. (Dkt. No. 25 at 6–7.) Specifically, they request the 11 Court deny the costs requested such as detainee phone money and commissary funds; parking 12 fees from the NWIPC; pro hac vice filing; and various postal fees. (Id.) In her reply, Petitioner 13 argues the mail and service fees were necessary under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) and 14 the phone and commissary charges “would not have been necessary absent the unlawful 15 detention challenged by this petition or if Respondents provided detained individuals with free 16 phone services and adequate supplies[.]” (Dkt. No. 26 at 6.) 17 Under the EAJA, the prevailing party may recover the “fees and other expenses” the 18 court finds are “necessary for the preparation of the party’s case[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). 19 These include costs and expenses typically billed to a client. Int’l Woodworkers of Am., AFL- 20 CIO, Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 1985). The expenses enumerated in 21 the statute are “examples, not [] an exclusive list.” Id. 22 The Court concludes the costs of phone calls between Petitioner and counsel, postage 23 costs, and the pro hac vice filing fee are appropriate because they are reasonably related to the 24 preparation of Petitioner’s case. Other district courts have granted requests under the EAJA for 1 similar costs. Donovan, 792 F.2d at 767 (upholding compensation awards for telephone calls, 2 postage, air courier expenses, and travel expenses); see also Thorne v. Saul, Case No.: 3 18cv1874-MMA (LL), 2019 WL 3974088, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (same). As for the 4 parking fee for counsel’s visit to the NWIPC, the Court can understand the need for an attorney
5 to have face-to-face conversations with a client to discuss case status, offer assurances, and 6 maintain personal rapport with the client. These intangible benefits facilitate the representation 7 of the client. 8 However, the commissary funds are not reasonably related to the preparation of 9 Petitioner’s case. Petitioner argues the commissary funds would not have been required if not 10 for Respondents’ unlawful detention of her. (Dkt. No. 26 at 6–7.) That may be true, but 11 Petitioner’s argument does not explain how these commissary funds were connected to the 12 preparation of her case, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), rather than covering various expenses she 13 incurred while she was detained.2
15 Petitioner’s motion for fees brought under the EAJA (Dkt. No. 23) is GRANTED in part 16 and DENIED in part. It is ORDERED that: 17 1. An amount of $10,247.27 SHALL be awarded to Petitioner pursuant to the EAJA, 18 which includes: 19 a. $9,126.88 in attorney fees, calculated at the statutory rate of $258.46 per hour 20 for Ms. Alexander and $129 per hour for her paralegal; 21
2 Ms. Alexander’s itemized statement of non-attorney fee costs combines phone costs and 22 commissary funds into a single entry. (See Dkt. No. 23-5 at 1.) Because the Court is permitting Petitioner to recover the costs associated with phone calls to her lawyer, but not her commissary 23 funds, it will divide the “Phone Money & Commissary” costs and allow for recovery of half the total amount of those entries, for a total of $75.92. 24 1 b. $422.55 in costs; and 2 c. $697.84 for the preparation of the motion for attorney fees, reflecting a total 3 of 2.7 hours of attorney work (see Dkt. No. 26-1 at 3), calculated at the 4 statutory rate of $258.46.
5 2. Petitioner assigned her EAJA fee award to her attorney in the fee agreement. (See 6 Dkt. No. 23-1 at 2.) Accordingly, attorney fees in the amount of $10,247.27 will be 7 paid to Ms. Alexander, subject to verification that Petitioner does not have a debt 8 which qualifies for offset against the awarded fees, pursuant to the Treasury Offset 9 Program as discussed in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). If Petitioner has no 10 such debt, then the check shall be made out to Petitioner’s attorney: Nancy Alexander 11 at Lucas & Barba LLP, 1201 SW 12th Ave., Suite 410, Portland, OR 97205. If 12 Petitioner has a debt, then the check for any remaining funds after offset of the debt 13 shall be made out to Petitioner and mailed to Petitioner’s attorney’s office. 14 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and
15 to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 16 17 Dated this 17th day of June 2026. 18 a 19 David G. Estudillo 20 United States District Judge
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