Acharjee v. Riverside County Sheriff's Department

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-6480
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ASHISH ACHARJEE, No. 24-6480 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 5:23-cv-00112-HDV-MAR v. MEMORANDUM* RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; REMINGTON, Badge No. 4687, in his individual capacity; RIVERSIDE COUNTY OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY; MICHAEL HESTRIN, Cal Bar No. 200300, in his individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 21, 2026**

Before: RAWLINSON, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Plaintiff-Appellant Ashish Acharjee appeals pro se the district court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellees Riverside County Sheriff’s

Department (“the Sheriff’s Department”), Deputy Sheriff Brian Remington

(“Remington”), Riverside County Office of the District Attorney (“the District

Attorney’s Office”), and District Attorney Michael Hestrin (“Hestrin”)

(collectively, “Defendants”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm.

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Los Padres ForestWatch

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 25 F.4th 649, 654 (9th Cir. 2022). Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must decide whether there are

any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied

the relevant substantive law. Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 614 (9th

Cir. 2014).

1. Acharjee argues that a Deputy Sheriff and Hestrin committed

“documentary and procedural fraud” and “fraudulently” acted pursuant to

California Government Code Section 7282.5, which led to Acharjee’s “Extra

Judicial Abduction.” Acharjee appears to be contending that a Deputy Sheriff or

Hestrin cooperated with federal immigration authorities to facilitate Acharjee’s

detention, but Acharjee points to no evidence supporting that contention. Acharjee

fails to point to any evidence that the Deputy Sheriff or Hestrin provided

2 24-6480 information to federal immigration authorities, or, even if they did so, that those

actions were unlawful.

2. Acharjee also argues that there was evidence that the District Attorney’s

Office committed various “criminal acts, specifically and categorically, described

as felony and misdemeanor level crimes in California Penal Codes.” To the extent

Acharjee contends that the District Attorney’s Office committed fraud, his only

support for this claim is his reference to a declaration by Deputy District Attorney

Rachel Santos, which explains that an error on the date of a protective order was a

mistake, not a fraudulent act. And Acharjee points to no crimes allegedly

committed by the District Attorney’s Office, nor any evidence that would suggest

that the District Attorney’s Office committed any crimes.

3. Acharjee contends that Hestrin and other staff at the District Attorney’s

Office violated his constitutional and civil rights. But Acharjee does not identify

which constitutional or civil rights the District Attorney’s Office allegedly

violated, and we are unable to identify any ourselves. To the extent Acharjee

raised more specific claims in the district court, he does not discuss them in his

briefs on appeal, so he has forfeited those claims. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d

983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that we “will not ordinarily consider

matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in

appellant’s opening brief” (quoting Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman

3 24-6480 Loc. Union No. 20, AFL-CIO v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.

1985))); Wilcox v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Arguments

not addressed in a brief are deemed abandoned.”).

4. Acharjee also argues that Hestrin was not entitled to prosecutorial

immunity for his alleged unlawful conduct. But because Acharjee has not

identified any unlawful conduct by Hestrin, we need not decide whether he would

be entitled to prosecutorial immunity if he had engaged in some improper act.

5. Acharjee also contends that Remington is not entitled to qualified

immunity for his alleged violations. The district court did not reach the issue

whether Remington was entitled to qualified immunity, so there is no adverse

ruling on this issue for Acharjee to be appealing. See Planned Parenthood of

Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100,

1110 (9th Cir. 2020) (“In general, an appellate court does not decide issues that the

trial court did not decide.” (citation omitted)); cf. Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v.

Pac. Lumber Co., 257 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[O]rdinarily, only a party

aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right

to appeal therefrom.” (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,

333 (1980))).

6. Acharjee further argues that the magistrate judge and district court judge

exhibited “unfair and biased judgment” that favored Defendants, and “ignored all

4 24-6480 the evidence, facts[,] and arguments” he presented in the district court.

Specifically, Acharjee contends that the magistrate judge allowed Defendants’ law

firm to commit perjury, but the record provides no support for that contention.

Instead, Acharjee appears to be alleging bias based only on the fact that the

magistrate judge recommended, and the district court judge granted, summary

judgment in favor of Defendants. But “judicial rulings alone are almost never

sufficient to support a request for recusal,” Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 511, 519

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), and Acharjee has given us no reason to doubt the

magistrate judge’s or the district judge’s impartiality.

7. Acharjee also challenges the district court’s award of costs to Defendants.

But since the briefing on appeal was completed, the district court issued an order

granting Acharjee’s motion to re-tax costs and declining to award costs to

Defendants. Because there is no cost award against Acharjee, the cost issue is

moot.

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6480