UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ MELVIN ACEVEDO-FELICIANO,
Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-1418-pp
OFFICER YOUNGQUIST and OFFICER ALLISON CLARK,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 3) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Melvin Acevedo-Feliciano, who previously was incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Community Reintegration Center and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 3, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 3)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 18, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $79.97. Dkt. No. 6. The court received $10 from the plaintiff
on December 11, 2024 and $81 from the plaintiff on December 18, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee as stated at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d
824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are police officers with the City of West Allis Police Department. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶4. On October 11, 2024, the
defendants allegedly arrested the plaintiff and applied handcuffs extremely tightly “to cut off circulation and leave bruising to the bone and soft tissue for several days after up until . . . October 31, 2024.” Id. at ¶7. The plaintiff opines that this was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶10-13. C. Analysis The court analyzes an arrestee’s claim for excessive force under the
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “An officer’s use of force is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A person has the right to be free from an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.”
Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The question “is whether the officer knows that he is inflicting such pain[]” because “[a]n officer cannot be expected to respond to an injury about which he is unaware.” Id. “[K]nowledge may be inferred ‘from the nature of the act itself.’” Id. (quoting Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff may proceed on an excessive force claim against the defendants in their individual capacities based on his allegations that they
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ MELVIN ACEVEDO-FELICIANO,
Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-1418-pp
OFFICER YOUNGQUIST and OFFICER ALLISON CLARK,
Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 3) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________
Plaintiff Melvin Acevedo-Feliciano, who previously was incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Community Reintegration Center and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 3, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 3)
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 18, 2024, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $79.97. Dkt. No. 6. The court received $10 from the plaintiff
on December 11, 2024 and $81 from the plaintiff on December 18, 2024. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee as stated at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d
824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are police officers with the City of West Allis Police Department. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶4. On October 11, 2024, the
defendants allegedly arrested the plaintiff and applied handcuffs extremely tightly “to cut off circulation and leave bruising to the bone and soft tissue for several days after up until . . . October 31, 2024.” Id. at ¶7. The plaintiff opines that this was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶10-13. C. Analysis The court analyzes an arrestee’s claim for excessive force under the
Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). “An officer’s use of force is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate the arrest.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A person has the right to be free from an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.”
Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The question “is whether the officer knows that he is inflicting such pain[]” because “[a]n officer cannot be expected to respond to an injury about which he is unaware.” Id. “[K]nowledge may be inferred ‘from the nature of the act itself.’” Id. (quoting Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff may proceed on an excessive force claim against the defendants in their individual capacities based on his allegations that they
applied handcuffs too tightly which caused injury to the plaintiff. III. Conclusion The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 3. The court ORDERS the U.S. Marshals Service to serve a copy of the complaint and this order on defendants Youngquist and Clark under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. §1921(a). Although
Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service, it has not made any provision for either the court or the U.S. Marshals Service to waive these fees. The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). The U.S. Marshals Service will give the plaintiff information on how to remit payment. The court is not involved in collection of the fee. The court ORDERS the defendants to file a responsive pleading to the complaint.
The court ORDERS that the plaintiff must pay the $239.22 balance of the filing fee to the Clerk of Court as he is able. The court ORDERS that the parties must not begin discovery until after the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for completing discovery and filing dispositive motions. The court ORDERS that the plaintiff must submit the original document for each filing to the court to the following address: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202 DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE’S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the case. The court advises the plaintiff that if he fails to file documents or take other required actions by the deadlines the court sets, the court may dismiss the case based on his failure to diligently pursue it. The parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. The plaintiffs failure to keep the court advised of his address may result in the court dismissing this case without further notice. The court will include a guide prepared by court staff to address common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. Entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants’ Common Questions,” this guide contains information that the plaintiff may find useful in prosecuting his case. Dated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 14th day of May, 2025. BY THE COURT:
Chief United States District Judge