23-7178 Acero-Angamarca v. Bondi BIA
Reid, IJ
A220 447 004/005/006/007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 25th day of March, two thousand 4 twenty-five. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 9 BETH ROBINSON, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 IVAN ALEJANDRO ACERO- 14 ANGAMARCA, GLADYS BEATRIZ 15 MUNOZ-QUINTUNA, A.M. A-M, D.G. 16 A-M, 17 Petitioners, 18 19 v. 23-7178 20 NAC 21 PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES 22 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 1
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Pamela
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1 Respondent. 2 _____________________________________ 3 4 FOR PETITIONERS: Ioan Florin Cristea, Centro Legal de 5 Inmigracion, Bay Shore, NY. 6 7 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 8 Attorney General; Sarah A. Byrd, Senior 9 Litigation Counsel; Allison Frayer, Trial 10 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 11 United States Department of Justice, 12 Washington, DC.
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 14 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 15 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 16 Petitioners Gladys Beatriz Munoz-Quintuna, her husband, Ivan Alejandro 17 Acero-Angamarca, and their two children, natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek 18 review of an August 29, 2023 decision of the BIA affirming a March 9, 2022 decision 19 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that denied asylum, withholding of removal, and 20 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 2 In re Ivan Alejandro Acero- 21 Angamarca, Gladys Beatriz Munoz-Quintuna, et al., Nos. A220 447 004/005/006/007
Bondi is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Merrick B. Garland as Respondent. Because petitioners A.M. A-M and D.G. A-M are minors, the Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
2 We refer solely to Munoz-Quintuna because the claims are based on her experiences.
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1 (B.I.A. Aug. 29, 2023), aff’g Nos. A220 447 004/005/006/007 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 2 Mar. 9, 2022). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 3 procedural history. 4 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and consider 5 only the grounds for the denial of relief relied on by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang 6 v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s 7 factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. See 8 Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 9 276, 282 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing nexus determination as a finding of fact subject 10 to substantial evidence review). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are 11 conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 12 the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). 13 Munoz-Quintuna asserted that she was and would be persecuted (and 14 tortured) by a former romantic partner, Manuel Yupa, because of her membership 15 in particular social groups of Ecuadorian women and Ecuadorian women unable 16 to leave domestic relationships. She alleged that Yupa, whom she was in a 17 relationship with while separated from her husband in 2018, drank excessively 18 and abused her mentally, emotionally, and physically by threatening to kill her,
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1 stealing from her business, hitting her several times, and yelling at her daughter. 2 We deny the petition because substantial evidence supports the agency’s 3 determination that she failed to establish a sufficient nexus to the proposed social 4 groups, and she has abandoned a dispositive basis for the denial of her CAT claim. 5 I. Asylum & Withholding of Removal 6 An asylum applicant has the burden to “establish that race, religion, 7 nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or 8 will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). In addition to this burden to establish a nexus between the 10 harm suffered or feared and the protected ground, when the asserted ground is 11 membership in a particular social group, the applicant must establish that the 12 proposed group is cognizable. See Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195–96. 13 The BIA assumed that Munoz-Quintuna’s proposed social groups were 14 cognizable but denied asylum and withholding of removal because it found that 15 she had not shown that membership in either proposed group was “one central 16 reason” why Yupa abused her. Thus, her arguments challenging the IJ’s 17 cognizability determination are not before us. See Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d at 522. 18 We address only whether the agency erred in finding that she failed to establish a
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1 nexus to either group. It did not. 2 The agency reasonably found that Yupa’s motivation to abuse Munoz- 3 Quintuna stemmed from private and personal disputes resulting from their 4 relationship, his alcohol abuse, and his desire to keep her in the relationship, not 5 because of her membership in either proposed social group or because of the 6 group’s identifying characteristics—that she was an Ecuadorian woman or that 7 she was an Ecuadorian woman unable to leave a relationship. See Matter of Pierre, 8 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 461, 463 (B.I.A. 1975) (finding that the applicant failed to show 9 that “she would be persecuted on account of . . . membership in a particular social 10 group” where the “motivation behind [her husband’s] alleged actions appear[ed] 11 to be strictly personal”). Munoz-Quintuna alleged that Yupa (1) abused her when 12 she forgot to tell him about her plans to go out with a friend, refused to give him 13 money from her business, and threatened to terminate their relationship if he did 14 not leave a gang; and (2) threatened her with physical violence to prevent her from 15 going to the police or returning to her husband, both of which she did. She also 16 testified and presented witness statements that the abuse occurred or escalated 17 when Yupa was drinking. And she testified that years after she left Yupa and 18 reconciled with her husband, he harassed and threatened her, and hit her once
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1 while she was shopping, because she had returned to her husband. On this 2 record, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Munoz- 3 Quintuna did not establish a nexus to her proposed groups because the record 4 reflects that Yupa abused her because of disputes during their relationship, his 5 alcohol abuse, and his desire to keep her in the relationship, not because she was 6 a woman or because she was unable to leave the relationship. See 8 U.S.C. 7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Matter of Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 461, 463; see also INS v. Elias- 8 Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (requiring some evidence that the persecutor is 9 motivated by the asserted protected ground). 10 II. CAT 11 A CAT applicant must show that she will “more likely than not” be tortured 12 and that such torture would be by or with the acquiescence of government 13 officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a)(1). The agency found that Munoz- 14 Quintuna did not establish either likely torture or that the government would 15 consent or acquiesce to her torture by Yupa, explaining that her fear of future harm 16 was not objectively reasonable because she left Yupa, reconciled with her husband 17 shortly thereafter, and Ecuador has laws against domestic violence and abuse. As 18 the Government points out, Munoz-Quintuna does not challenge the BIA’s finding
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1 that she did not establish likely torture, arguing only that agency erred in its 2 acquiescence finding. Accordingly, she has abandoned a dispositive basis for the 3 agency’s decision. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We 4 consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief, 5 and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes 6 abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)). 7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 8 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
9 FOR THE COURT: 10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 11 Clerk of Court