Accident Insurance Co. v. Dawson

46 S.E. 51, 53 W. Va. 619, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 68
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedMay 16, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 46 S.E. 51 (Accident Insurance Co. v. Dawson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Accident Insurance Co. v. Dawson, 46 S.E. 51, 53 W. Va. 619, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 68 (W. Va. 1903).

Opinions

BRANNON, Judge:

The Virginia Accident Insurance Compaq, a Virginia, corporation, desiring to do business in this state, filed with the secretary ol state, 7 March, 1903, a copy of the certificate of its corporation, and requested the Secretary of State to issue to it a certificate of the fact as provided in section 30, chapter 54 of the Code as it appears in chapter 35, Acts of 1901, p. 108; but the secretary refused such certificate and the company asks from this Court a mandamus requiring the Secretary to issue such certificate in order that it may carry on' its corporate business in this State. The company’s petition states that it engages in the business only of insuring persons against bodily injury sustained through external, violent and accidental means only; that it issues but one form of policy; that in case of accident to. one of its assured, it is bound by its policy to pay him $7.00 per week during disability for a period not exceeding 26 weeks; that in case of death within sixteen weeks after the injury, the company would pay $60.00 to the representative of the assured; that under one policy the liability could not exceed $182.00; that its policy assumes risk for only one month at a time, and lapses in default of premium, which is one dollar per month. The return of W. M. O. Dawson, secretary of state, to,the mandamus nisi awarded by this Court presents for our consideration two reasons why the mandamus should not go; first, that petitioner is a foreign insurance company and as such must get a certificate, not from the secretary of state, under section 30, chapter 54, code, but from the Auditor under another statute> section 2, chapter 34; and second, that if tire secretary is to issue a certificate, the company had not fully com.plied with section 30, chapter 54, as it did not, in addition to filing the certificate of incorporation, also file a writing accepting the provisions of section 30 of chapter 54 of the Code, and agreeing to be governed thereby.

The case involves only the construction of our statute law pertinent to the subject. Does the certificate to enable the petitioner as a foreign corporation to do business in this state emanate from the secretary of state under section 30, chapter 54, Code, or from the auditor under section 2, chapter 34, Code 1899? That depends on the question whether an accident in[621]*621surance company is an insurance company within- tbe meaning of section 2, chapter 34. If it is then the petitioner is no-t entitled to a certificate from the secretary of state at all, but its certificate must come from the Auditor. On the other hand, if this company is not an insurance company within the meaning of section 2, chapter 34, then its certificate comes from the secretary of state, if it has fully complied with section 30, chapter 54 of the Code. Chapter 34 concerns insurance, telegraph and express companies generally by its title and by numerous detailed provisions as to terms upon which they shall operate, their taxation, service of process on them and their liability. Section 1 as found in chapter 107, Acts 1901, says that every insurance, telegraph, telephone or express company having its principal place of business in this state incorporated by Virginia before 20th June, 1863, or by this state shall be a domestic corporation; all others foreign. This provision is applicable to all insurance, telegraph, telephone and express companies. It distinguishes foreign from domestic corporations for general purposes of that chapter or any other, because there be certain provisions applicable to the one, and not to the other, and this section gives the test as to whether such a corporation is domestic or foreign for general legal purposes. It is applicable to all; but when we come to section 2, we find it limited to particular corporations, reading: “It shall not be lawful for any officer, or agent of any life, fire or marine insurance company, directly or indirectly, to take risks or issue policies of insurance within the State, without first procuring from the auditor a cirtificate as hereinafter directed.- Before obtaining such certificate, such company, its officers or agents, shall furnish the auditor with a statement under oath of the president or secretary of the company, for which he or they may act, which statement shall show:

First. The name and locality of the company,” and ten other items of the statement “which statement shall be filed in the office of the said Auditor.” Clearly this language is limited to “life, fire and marine insurance” companies. It does not include, but by implication excludes, accident insurance companies. Such its words. Do not these words mean what they import? Though only the words “life, fire or marine insurance” are used, do they have a broader meaning and include accident [622]*622insurance — any insurance company? Do they include imploy-ees5 Liability Insurance, or Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance, or Title Insurance, or Lire Stock Insurance, or Boiler or Glass Insurance? Will those words open to take in every new species of insurance that may come in the mutation of business in future? I think not. But it is so argued, virtually. Let us go back to see whether these three words, “life” “fire” “marine,” were sedately chosen. An act passed in 1867 (chapter 117) laid a tax on “all insurance companies establishing agencies or doing business in this state except life and accidental,” and required a deposit of $25,000 with the Treasurer. This favored life and accident companies by exempting them from those demands. In the code of 1868, we find section 2, chapter 34, the parent of our present section 2, chapter 34. “It shall not be lawful for any officer or agent of any foreign fire or marine insurance company, directly or indirectly, to take risks or issue policies without procuring a certificate from the Auditor as hereinafter directed.” This includes only fire and marine insurance. So did the act of 1871, chapter 107. Two Acts of 1872-3, chapter 69 and chapter 221, and Acts of 1881, chapter 38, still include in the requirement of a certificate from the auditor only fire and marine insurance; but in 1882, (chapter 85) section 2, was amended to include life insurance companies. Chapter 34, Acts 1891 again amended section 2, but did not widen it as to the character of the companies. Thus we see that the Act of 1867 required of all insurance companies a deposit, but exempted life and accident companies. The code of 1868'required of foreign insurance companies an invested capital of $200,000 in section 2, chapter 34 of foreign insurance companies, but the section only named fire and marine companies. Accident and life companies were still exempted. The acts later exempted those two until 1882, when life companies were put into the section, but accident companies were still favored as they were by the Act of 1867. The Legislature through several acts favored life and accident companies, and then saw proper to make life companies come under the requirements of section 2, but still left out accident companies. Surely it knew of accident companies. Through eight acts amending section 2 it was choice in selecting the companies it would bring under the demands of section 2. The letter- of that [623]*623section does not include accident companies;, and past acts show a purpose not to include them. Besides, there is reason for this.

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Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance v. Sims
82 S.E.2d 312 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
46 S.E. 51, 53 W. Va. 619, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/accident-insurance-co-v-dawson-wva-1903.