United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 20-2082
A.C., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Torrence S. Waithe; A.C.C., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Nicolas Cahuec; A.F., a minor, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Aletha Forcier; R.F., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Aletha Forcier; I.M., a minor, by his parents and guardians ad litem Jessica Thigpen and Anthony Thigpen; L.M., a minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem Jessica Thigpen and Anthony Thigpen; K.N.M.R., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Marisol Rivera Pitre; J.R.H., a minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem, Moira Hinderer and Hillary Reser; M.S., a minor, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Mark Santow; M.M.S., a minor, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Amie Tay; M.S., a minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem, Maruth Sok and Lap Meas; A.W., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Chanda Womack; J.W., a minor, by her parent and guardian ad litem, Chanda Womack; N.X., a minor, by her parents and guardians ad litem, Youa Yang and Kao Xiong,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
DANIEL J. MCKEE,* in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Rhode Island; NICHOLAS A. MATTIELLO, in his official capacity as Speaker of the Rhode Island House of Representatives; DOMINICK J. RUGGERIO, in his official capacity as President of the Rhode Island Senate; RHODE ISLAND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; COUNCIL ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION; ANGELICA INFANTE-GREEN, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Education for the State of Rhode Island,
Defendants, Appellees.
* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Governor Daniel J. McKee has been substituted for former Governor Gina M. Raimondo as the lead defendant-appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge, Kayatta, Circuit Judge, and Casper,** District Judge.
Michael A. Rebell, with whom Center for Educational Equity, Teachers College, Columbia University, Jennifer L. Wood, Rhode Island Center for Justice, Samuel D. Zurier, and Stephen Robinson, and Robinson & Clapham, were on brief, for appellants. Michael W. Field, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrea M. Shea and Keith Hoffmann, Special Assistant Attorneys General, were on brief, for appellees Daniel J. McKee, Nicholas A. Mattiello, and Domenick J. Ruggerio. Anthony F. Cottone, Chief Legal Counsel, Rhode Island Department of Education, for appellees Rhode Island Board of Education, Council on Elementary and Secondary Education, and Angélica Infante-Green. William T. Russell, Jr., David Elbaum, Jonathan T. Menitove, Nicholas L. Ingros, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP on brief for Professors Danielle Allen and Meira Levinson, amici curiae. Yahonnes Cleary, Erin J. Morgan, Alexander F. Atkins, Carly Lagrotteria, David Fu, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP on brief for National Council for the Social Studies, amicus curiae. Andrew M. Troop, Jeffrey P. Metzler, and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP on brief for National League of Women Voters, League of Women Voters of Rhode Island, and American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, amici curiae. Robert M. Kline, Kristin A. Taylor, Carlos F. Ortiz, Michael W. Weaver, Dana McSherry, Annabel Rodriguez, McDermott Will & Emery, Jose Perez, Francisca D. Fajana, Miranda Galindo, and LatinoJustice PRLDEF on brief for LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et al., amici curiae. Gilda Daniels, Jessica Alcantara, Ky'Eisha Penn, Advancement Project, Janette Louard, Anthony Ashton, Victor L. Goode, National
** Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation. Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jeremy Karpatkin, Raqiyyah Pippins, Florence Bryan, Danielle Pingue, Saul P. Morgenstern, Jonathan Green, Peter L. Schmidt, Javier Ortega, and Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP on brief for Advancement Project and NAACP, amici curiae. Nowell D. Bamberger, Leila Mgaloblishvili, Tony J. Russo, and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP on brief for Generation Citizen and Mikva Challenge, amici curiae. Yelena Konanova, Jordan W. Garman, and Selendy & Gay PLLC on brief for Professor Martha Minow, amicus curiae. Michael M. Epstein, Julie K. Waterstone, and Amicus Project at Southwestern Law School on brief for Samantha M. Dennis, et al., amici curiae. S. Elaine McChesney, Robert E. McDonnell, Elizabeth M. Bresnahan, Michael A. Hacker, and Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP on brief for Providence Youth Student Movement, et al., amici curiae. Jeffrey A. Simes, Allison R. Klein, and Goodwin Procter LLP on brief for National Association for Media Literacy Education, et al., amici curiae. Andrew J. Ceresney, Jillian L. Trezza, Amy C. Zimmerman, Erik Rubinstein, and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP on brief for The Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, et al., amici curiae.
January 11, 2022 Casper, District Judge. This appeal raises the question
of whether Rhode Island's alleged failure to provide public school
students with an adequate civics education can state a claim for
violation of the students' constitutional rights. On behalf of a
putative class of "all students attending public K-12 schools in
Rhode Island . . . who are not receiving a meaningful opportunity
to obtain the degree of education that is necessary to prepare
them to be capable voters and jurors, to exercise effectively their
right of free speech, to participate effectively and intelligently
in our open political system and to function productively as civic
participants," several students ("Appellants" or "Students")
brought an action for declaratory relief against the Governor and
various Rhode Island officials and agencies ("Rhode Island") under
the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
the Republican Guarantee Clause of Art. IV, § 4 of the U.S.
Constitution, all of which the district court dismissed.1 A.C. v.
Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 175 (D.R.I. 2020). For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
Following a district court's grant of a motion to
1 Appellants do not appeal the district court's dismissal of their Sixth and Seventh Amendment, and Jury Selection and Service Act claims.
- 4 - dismiss, we recite the facts as well-pleaded in the complaint.
Zhao v. CIEE Inc., 3 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021). Appellants live
in and attend (or will attend) public schools in Rhode Island,
spanning preschool through twelfth grade, and allege that Rhode
Island has failed to provide them with an education "adequate to
prepare them to function productively as civic participants
capable of voting, serving on a jury, understanding economic,
social and political systems sufficiently to make informed
choices, and to participate effectively in civic activities."
The Students point to several components of Rhode
Island's approach to civics education that have caused the alleged
failure. First, Rhode Island does not require any civics courses,
although some high schools in more affluent districts offer
elective civics courses, nor does the state mandate testing for
civics knowledge at the high school level or report student
performance in these subjects, unlike reading, math and science.
Due to limited time and resources, schools thus focus on these
mandatory subjects that are tested statewide. Second, Rhode
Island's current civics curriculum falls short. It has not
adopted the College, Career and Civic Life ("C3") framework for
teaching civics, which various educators and policy organizations
have endorsed. When courses do address civics concepts, the
content is not as comprehensive as the C3 framework would provide.
Moreover, current courses do not promote active classroom
- 5 - discussion of "controversial topics" and do not teach students
media literacy to navigate today's digital world. Third, Rhode
Island has neglected to update civics-related materials and access
to digital resources, and to train and hire teachers and other
personnel, including a statewide social studies specialist, in
civics education. Fourth, schools provide limited opportunities
for civic experiences, like student council, student newspapers
and field trips, and civic learning, which combines community
service with classroom discussions.
As to the effect of the lack of civics education, the
Students cite national studies reporting a lack of civic knowledge,
and a disinterest and lack of participation in civic life (e.g.,
voting and volunteering) among young Americans when compared to
previous generations. They also point to the "civic empowerment
gap" for many African American and Latino students and students
from low-income families, citing demographic analysis of the
results of civics knowledge testing done on a national sample of
eighth graders.
II.
We review the district court's grant of Rhode Island's
motion to dismiss de novo. Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th
79, 84 (1st Cir. 2021).
A.
The Students appeal the district court's conclusion that
- 6 - an adequate civics education is not a fundamental constitutional
right, which was fatal to their Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection claims.2 See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 193.
We turn first to the Supreme Court's precedent regarding
the existence vel non of a fundamental right to education. Dating
back at least to Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
has characterized education as "the most important function of
state and local governments," and as the "very foundation of good
citizenship," which is "required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Ed.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)); see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-
23 (1982) (noting Court's recognition of education as a vital civic
institution for preservation of American democracy).
Nevertheless, the Court has distinguished the relative importance
of education and its role in society from the fundamental rights
inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment and looked to whether it
was "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
2 We acknowledge and thank amici curiae Professors Danielle Allen and Meira Levinson, National Council for the Social Studies, National League of Women Voters of Rhode Island, American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et al., Advancement Project and NAACP, Generation Citizen and Mikva Challenge, Professor Martha Minow, Samantha M. Dennis, et al., Providence Youth Student Movement, et al., National Association for Media Literacy Education, et al., and The Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, et al., for their respective briefs in support of Appellants.
- 7 - Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30, 33 (citations omitted) (explaining that
"the importance of a service performed by the State does not
determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental").
Conducting that analysis in Rodriguez, where Texas children
challenged the state's increasing reliance upon local property
taxes to fund its public schools, thus favoring wealthy districts,
the Court held that education in general was not so guaranteed.
Id. at 35-37. Furthermore, the Court explicitly rejected the
petitioners' argument that "education is itself a fundamental
personal right because it is essential to the effective exercise
of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the
right to vote." See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36. In so doing,
the Court recognized that the Constitution does not guarantee "the
most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id.
at 36. Thus, in the absence of an "absolute denial of . . . an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of [these] rights," the Court determined that no
fundamental right was implicated by Texas's school-funding scheme.
Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
Appellants here read Rodriguez to suggest that, if
properly alleged, we may conclude that the Constitution protects
the specific right to a civics education that prepares them to
participate effectively in these important aspects of public life
(e.g., voting or other civic participation). We read the language
- 8 - in Rodriguez, however, to reject this proposition. See id. Since
Rodriguez, the Court has not only reaffirmed its central holding,
but also clarified that the decision left open only the question,
as relevant here, of "whether a minimally adequate education is a
fundamental right . . . ." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-
86 (1986); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 466 n.1
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Papasan, the Court declined
to resolve this question directly, because it determined that the
petitioners had failed to allege that they had been "deprived of
a minimally adequate education." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. In
so doing, the Court clearly suggested that such a deprivation may
only be "possib[le]" in the case of a "radical denial of
educational opportunity," such as where "schoolchildren . . . are
not taught to read or write" or "receive no instruction on even
the educational basics." Id. at 284, 286. As the Court
explained, the petitioners' factual allegations regarding school-
funding disparities simply failed to plead such a claim.
Here, much like the petitioners in Papasan and
Rodriguez, the Students do not plausibly allege that they were
"deprived of a minimally adequate education," i.e., state action
tantamount to a "radical" or "absolute denial" of any "educational
opportunity." See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284, 286; Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 37. Instead, their complaint alleges that Rhode Island's
policies vis-à-vis civics-related curriculum is substantively
- 9 - inadequate to prepare them for meaningful civic engagement as
adults, whether through insufficient course offerings and
extracurricular activities, or that state standards do not conform
to the C3 framework that educators and policy organizations have
endorsed. But as we have discussed, the Court rejected a similar
argument in Rodriguez. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35-36
(rejecting the argument that a "nexus between speech and education"
or between the "right to vote . . . [and] the educational
foundation of the voter" creates a fundamental right to education,
generally). And the Court has never suggested that the minimum
"quantum of education" that could be constitutionally required
must necessarily include instruction in certain subject matters or
ensure certain educational outcomes (perhaps with the exception of
an opportunity for basic literacy). See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286;
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (declining to recognize a fundamental right
to education but applying heightened scrutiny to a complete "denial
of basic education" to undocumented children, noting that
"[i]lliteracy is an enduring disability . . . [that] will handicap
the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of
his life"). Thus, as the district court aptly determined, the
right to participate in a functioning democracy is "not wholly
inaccessible without civics education." A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at
- 10 - 192-93.3
We also take judicial notice of relevant Rhode Island
law, which has since 2007 required at least some civics education
in its schools, even if it is not as comprehensive as the framework
Appellants desire, and this law was amended recently during the
pendency of this appeal to require civics proficiency, among other
changes. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-22-2 (2021) (requiring
public schools to provide civics education as part of history and
social studies curriculum, at least one student-led civics project
during middle or high school and mandating civics proficiency
beginning in 2022-23 academic year); 200-20 R.I. Code. R. § 10-
1.2.1(F) (requiring local education agencies to develop social
studies curriculum that includes "Civics & Government"
coursework), § 10-2.3.1 (requiring local education agencies to
3 The Students contend that the "central . . . issue presented by this case is the definition of the 'quantum of education' that they need to effectively exercise their constitutional rights," which they argue "can[not] totally omit" civics. In so doing, they rely upon dicta from Rodriguez and Papasan stating that the Court's decisions do not "foreclose the possibility 'that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote].'" Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36) (alterations in original). They contend that discovery and a trial are necessary to define the contours of this theoretical, yet-to-be-recognized minimum "quantum." But as we have addressed, this issue is not implicated by their claims, was not before the district court, and we need not endeavor to answer it here. We merely hold that the district court correctly determined that required curriculum prioritizing civics-based courses does not fit through the "crack" left open by the Court's precedent. See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 189-93.
- 11 - adopt graduation requirements including demonstration of
proficiency in social studies).
For these reasons, this lawsuit stands in contrast to a
case considered recently by the Sixth Circuit, upon which the
Students heavily rely, where a panel majority concluded that
students in Detroit Public Schools had plausibly alleged denial of
their fundamental right to "a basic minimum education -- meaning
one that plausibly provides access to literacy." Gary B. v.
Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2020), reh'g en banc
granted, opinion vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020).
Surveying legal and historical authority,4 the court determined
that access to literacy was a fundamental right because, in part,
it is "viewed by our society as essential for students to obtain
even a chance at political and economic opportunity." See id. at
649-52.
In that lawsuit, which now remains dismissed, the
plaintiffs specifically alleged facts describing conditions in
4 The Students here direct us to similar historical authority, namely the development of public education as commonplace at the state level, to argue that education was deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, particularly when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See Barry Friedman and Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 92 (2013); see also Brief of Professor Martha Minow, at 10-11. We need not dispute this proposition but note only that none of these historical arguments addresses whether civics education, per se, was deeply rooted in our nation's history, rather than public school education in general.
- 12 - their schools that the students were not receiving a minimally
adequate education: a significant shortage of qualified teachers,
unsanitary and dangerous conditions of school facilities (for
example, extreme heat in the summer caused students and teachers
to vomit and faint, and contaminated, undrinkable water), and a
lack of grade-appropriate materials (if any). Id. at 625-27, 661.
In other words, the Gary B. plaintiffs alleged a total deprivation
of a minimally adequate education. The Gary B. plaintiffs also
cited data that showed "a zero or near-zero percentage of subject-
matter proficiency among students at their schools," which was
alone "not enough to state a claim, because the right to a basic
minimum education cannot guarantee a specific educational
outcome," but "support[ed] the inference that Plaintiffs' schools
are woefully insufficient, especially when combined with
qualitative descriptions of their classes' literacy shortcomings."
Id. at 661.
As described above, the complaint here fails to allege
a total deprivation of a minimally adequate education (as opposed
to specific subject-matter inclusion).5 See Papasan, 748 U.S. at
5Several amici also emphasize how the gap in educational offerings between Black and Latinx students and their White peers in more affluent districts negatively impacts proficiency among these groups of students, see Brief of LatinoJustice PRLDEF, et al., at 14-16 (citing statewide data in reading and math); Brief of Advancement Project and NAACP, at 17 (citing nationwide data in civics), but these statistics still do not suggest deprivation of a minimally adequate education due to Rhode Island's allegedly - 13 - 285-86 (declining to engage in fundamental right to education
analysis when plaintiffs did not allege that they were "not taught
to read or write," or that they did not receive "instruction on
even the educational basics").
For these reasons, we affirm the district court's
conclusion that the students have not plausibly alleged the
deprivation of a fundamental right.6
B.
In conducting our analysis of the Students' equal
protection claim, we first consider the appropriate level of
scrutiny to apply. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17; Toledo v.
Sánchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). As a preliminary matter,
we reject the Students' argument that strict scrutiny applies,
since we concluded above that their allegations do not implicate
a fundamental right. Moreover, the Students, suing on behalf of
all public school students in Rhode Island, have not asserted that
inadequate civics curriculum. 6 We need not engage in further analysis of whether a civics education is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (articulating two-part test for recognizing fundamental rights by looking to history of asserted right). First, we determined above that Rodriguez forecloses such a conclusion. Second, we agree with Rhode Island that Appellants' historical evidence (and that of amici) focuses solely on public education in general (i.e., minimally adequate education), not civics curriculum. Even reaching such analysis, however, we adopt the district court's analysis under the Glucksberg framework. See A.C., 494 F. Supp. 3d at 193-94.
- 14 - they should be considered a suspect class. See Toledo, 454 F.3d
at 33.
The Students next argue that Plyler entitles them to
some heightened standard of review. In Plyler, the Court "struck
down under heightened scrutiny the exclusion of [undocumented]
children from a free public education offered to other resident
children as violative of equal protection." Id. (citing Plyler,
457 U.S. at 230).7 We are not persuaded that Plyler's heightened
standard of review applies here. First, the Plyler Court limited
its application of heightened review to instances where the state
"den[ies] a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children residing within its
borders." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230; see Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33
(citing Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459) (noting that since Plyler, the
Supreme Court has employed rational basis to assess policies "that
burden the educational opportunities of a non-suspect class" when
those burdens were not outright exclusions). Second, Plyler
applied heightened review to the exclusionary policy because it
denied undocumented children a "basic education." Plyler, 457
U.S. at 223. Here, the Students allege neither that they comprise
a discrete group of children (e.g., undocumented children),
7The specific test articulated in Plyler sounds in heightened rational basis review, where the exclusionary policy was not "rational unless it further[ed] some substantial goal of the State." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
- 15 - instead they represent all Rhode Island public school students,
nor that they have been outright denied access to a basic
education.
Accordingly, as there are no suspect classifications
alleged or fundamental rights implicated, our equal protection
review is "limited to a deferential, rational basis standard."
D'Angelo v. New Hampshire Sup. Ct., 740 F.3d 802, 806 (1st Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). As the same applies to our substantive
due process review, see Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-Hernández, 790
F.3d 99, 107 (1st Cir. 2015), we proceed accordingly.
C.
In reviewing state action under the "forgiving [rational
basis] standard," the state will prevail "so long as [it]
articulates some 'reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the [action].'" Donahue v. City of
Boston, 371 F.3d 7, 15–16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)); Mulero-Carrillo, 790
F.3d at 107 (applying same requirements at motion to dismiss
stage). The Students argue that the district court erred when it
dismissed their complaint under rational basis review without the
chance to present evidence, but we have previously rejected this
argument, for under rational basis review, "any plausible
justification [from the state] will suffice, and effectively ends
the analysis." Donahue, 371 F.3d at 15-16 (citations and internal
- 16 - quotation marks omitted); Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315
(explaining that rational basis does "not subject" action "to
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical data"); Toledo, 454 F.3d at
33 (dismissing equal protection claim where "rational bases for
the actions are apparent from the face of the complaint"). Rhode
Island asserts several justifications for its actions regarding
civics education. First, Rhode Island notes that the state has
not denied access to civics education, but rather that its laws
indeed require civics education in some form. Second, Rhode
Island contends that it has an interest in allowing curricular and
extracurricular decisions to be made at the local level. Third,
Rhode Island explains that to the extent it has favored certain
classes over others, like science and math, those decisions were
made to prepare students for the workforce or to comply with
federal law that mandates testing in these areas.
As to local control, the Students contend that Rhode
Island has substantial authority over education and "should
exercise this existing supervisory authority to ensure that civics
education is a high priority for all Rhode Island's schools," and
that additional oversight of local education policy with respect
to civics courses is more important than allowing school districts
to make curriculum choices. These arguments again stress
Appellants' preferred policy outcomes but fail to negate the
- 17 - proffered rationality of local control over curriculum.
Appellants do not otherwise attempt to negate Rhode Island's other
justifications, instead focusing their arguments on the need for
heightened review, which we rejected above.
The state's asserted reasons are at least "plausible,"
which satisfies the "forgiving" rational basis inquiry. Donahue,
371 F.3d at 15 (citations omitted). In particular, we note that
states, and more so schools and teachers, must grapple with limited
resources and time to educate their students, all while satisfying
multiple demands, including mandated federal standards for testing
and proficiency, which can affect their funding. We do not doubt
the importance of the civics curriculum proffered by the Students
and their amici, but we also do not doubt the importance of
reading, science and math, both for providing a basic education
and for preparing students to succeed in higher education and the
workforce.
Finally, as to the equal protection claim, we note that
the Students have also failed to tie the difference between their
schools and more affluent ones (that do provide elective civics
courses and experiences) to policies implemented or enforced by
Rhode Island to create this alleged disparity, aside from mere
mention that one district offers some optional courses. But to
state an equal protection claim, the Students must connect the
alleged disparity to a specific policy or action taken by Rhode
- 18 - Island that caused these differences. See Toledo, 454 F.3d at 33-
34. Here, they have not.
conclusion that Rhode Island's approach to civics education
satisfies rational basis review.
D.
We briefly address whether the complaint states a claim
for relief under the Guarantee and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses. As to the Guarantee Clause, we have noted that it "makes
the guarantee of a republican form of government to the states;
the bare language of the Clause does not directly confer any rights
on individuals vis-á-vis the states." Largess v. Supreme Jud. Ct.
for State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219, 224 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis
in original). Even assuming arguendo that the Students had
standing here, their Guarantee Clause claim fails on the merits.
Any such claim "is restricted to real threats to a republican form
of government." Largess, 373 F.3d at 227 (emphasis added); see
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185-86 (1992) (dismissing
state's Guarantee Clause challenge to a federal regulatory scheme
where the threats did not "pose any realistic risk of altering the
form or the method of functioning of [the state's] government,"
noting that even under the scheme, the state "retain[ed] the
ability to set their legislative agendas" and "state government
officials remain[ed] accountable to the local electorate"
- 19 - (emphasis added)). Even reading the complaint in the light most
favorable to Students, it is not plausibly alleged that Rhode
Island's failure to provide civics education here is a real threat
to its republican form of government. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause claim also fails because the clause "protects
only those privileges and immunities that are 'fundamental,'"
McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 226 (2013) (quoting Baldwin v.
Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 382, 388 (1978)), not
present here, and also applies only when a state distinguishes
among residents and nonresidents with respect to these fundamental
interests. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (collecting cases).
III.
We conclude by echoing the district court's observations
in dismissing this case, that the Students have called attention
to critical issues of declining civic engagement and inadequate
preparation for participation in civic life at a time when many
are concerned about the future of American democracy. See A.C.,
494 F. Supp. 3d at 175-76, 181, 197. Nevertheless, the weight of
precedent stands in the Students' way here, and they have not
stated any viable claim for relief.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
- 20 -