Abuharba v. Asselmeier

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided July 19, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-00855·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MOHAMMED ABUHARBA, #Y16719 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 20-cv-855-RJD ) DR. CRAIG ASSELMEIER, AMY BURLE, ) FRANK E. LAWRENCE, LORI OAKLEY, ) and ANTHONY WILLS, ) ) Defendant.

ORDER DALY, Magistrate Judge: This matter comes before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants (Docs. 38, 39, 41, 42). Plaintiff filed Responses (Doc. 46 and 47), and Dr. Asselmeier filed a Reply (Doc. 48). As explained further, Defendants’ motions are DENIED. Background Plaintiff is an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and filed this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious dental needs at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a request for treatment on October 1, 2019 after he noticed greenish-brown build-up on his teeth and that his gums were receding. He submitted three more requests in October 2019. When Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter on August 31, 2020, he alleged that he still had not received dental treatment. Defendants filed the instant motions, contending that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his Page 1 of 8 administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff submitted a grievance at Menard on November 6, 2019, that states “[f]or several weeks now I have been submitting requests to dental to examine a dental issue I’ve been having, which is causing my gums to recede. I have not received any treatment yet, and I am still suffering from this condition” (Doc. 39-2, p. 249). Plaintiff’s counselor returned the grievance to Plaintiff with a memo from

Dr. Asselmeier, stating that “we” had not received any requests for treatment from Plaintiff and that if Plaintiff needed treatment, he should send a request (Doc. 39-2, p. 249-50). Plaintiff submitted the grievance to the grievance officer at Menard, who determined the grievance was moot because “per Dental, Dental has not received any requests from [Plaintiff] since January 2018. Offender advised to submit a request and place it in the appropriate box” (Doc. 39-2, p. 251). The warden concurred with the grievance officer’s decision on December 11, 2019 (Id.). Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the Administrative Review Board by sending the warden’s and grievance officer’s decisions along with a letter written by Plaintiff (Doc. 42, p. 11-

13). On January 6, 2020, the ARB instructed Plaintiff to “provide your original written Offender’s grievance, DOC 0046, including the counselor’s response, if applicable.” Plaintiff contends that on January 20, 2020, he mailed a copy of the original written grievance to the ARB. There is no record that the ARB received it. Defendants Burle, Lawrence, Oakley and Wills argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them because he never received a final decision from the ARB. Defendant Asselmeier makes this same argument, but also contends that 1) the regulations required Plaintiff to mail a copy of his original grievance to the ARB by January 11, 2021 (30 days after Plaintiff received the warden’s decision); 2) Plaintiff did not identify Dr. Asselmeier in the Page 2 of 8 grievance; 3) Plaintiff did not explain in the grievance that he needed to be seen in dental for “greenish-brownish build-up” on his teeth. Pavey Hearing On May 10, 2021, the Court held a hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff testified on his own behalf that he submitted multiple sick call requests in

October 2019 because of the build-up on his teeth, but never received a response. He tried to “speed the process up” by submitting the November 6, 2019 grievance to his counselor. The counselor returned the grievance to him with Dr. Asselmeier’s memo. Plaintiff sent the grievance to the grievance officer, who denied it. The Warden concurred. Plaintiff then sent the grievance to the ARB on the December 31, 2019; he acknowledges that the ARB stamped “December 30, 2019” on the grievance, so either he or the ARB confused the dates. On January 6, 2020, Defendant Amy Burle (ARB) instructed Plaintiff to submit his original grievance. Plaintiff testified that he forwarded the original grievance to Defendant Burle in a stamped envelope that was retrieved by the mail clerk on January 20, 2020. He was aware of

the regulation that allowed the ARB six months to issue a decision on his appeal, so he waited until August 2020 to file suit, giving the ARB “more than enough time.” Counsel for Dr. Asselmeier began his cross exam of Plaintiff by impeaching Plaintiff via his first-degree murder conviction and a prior disciplinary action involving Plaintiff’s alleged untruthfulness. Counsel then asked Plaintiff to agree that he [Plaintiff] failed to send the ARB all required information within 30 days of receiving the warden’s decision. Plaintiff refused to agree, testifying that the applicable regulation did not require him to send the original grievance to the ARB. Dr. Asselmeier asked Plaintiff to identify the authority he was relying upon for this conclusion, and Plaintiff testified that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Strong v. David, 297 F.3d Page 3 of 8 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002) supports his argument that his claims cannot be dismissed because he complied with all of the administrative regulations pertinent to his grievance. In response to questions from counsel for Defendants Burle, Lawrence, Oakley, and Mills, Plaintiff admitted that, when appealing other grievances to the ARB, Plaintiff submitted the original grievance. Plaintiff then explained that he did not send the original 11/6/2019 grievance with his appeal to the ARB

because the Grievance Officer’s response contained all the relevant details. Legal Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin- Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is

made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

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