Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp.

820 F. Supp. 1519, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9758, 1993 WL 148789
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 12, 1993
DocketCiv. 1:87-cv-1931-WCO, 1:87-cv-1962-WCO, 1:87-cv-2074-WCO and 1:87-cv-2454-WCO
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 820 F. Supp. 1519 (Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., 820 F. Supp. 1519, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9758, 1993 WL 148789 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

Opinion

ORDER

O’KELLEY, Chief Judge.

From January 21,1992 to May 7,1992, this court conducted the nonjury trial of the consolidated Abrams & Wofsy, Pignatelli, Ache-car, and Pendleton cases (“the Renaissance cases”). At trial, the plaintiffs and defen *1525 dants KPMG Peat Marwick and Jerry F. Humphries (collectively “Peat Marwick”) presented evidence relevant to the Abrams & Wofsy, Pignatelli, and Pendleton plaintiffs’ claims of fraud and negligence brought pursuant to (1) section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5,17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (hereinafter “section 10(b)”); (2) the Georgia Securities Act; (3) common law fraud under Georgia law; and (4) the Georgia law of professional negligence. The court now sets forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to these claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). In doing so, the court makes the following conclusions: (1) assuming that plaintiffs’ section 10(b) claims against Peat Marwick are not time-barred, 1 these claims fail because the evidence does not show that Peat Marwick possessed the requisite scien-ter; (2) plaintiffs’ claims under the Georgia Securities Act fail because Peat Marwick did not act as a seller under the applicable version of section 10-5-12(a)(2) and no private cause of action is available under the applicable version of section 10-5-12(d); (3) plaintiffs’ common law fraud claims fail because the evidence does not show that Peat Mar-wick possessed the requisite scienter; (4) the Pignatelli and Pendleton plaintiffs’ federal and Georgia RICO claims fail because the requirement of two or more predicate acts has not been met; and (5) plaintiffs’ claims of professional negligence fail because the evidence does not show that Peat Marwick breached any duty owed to plaintiffs.

I. The Rise and Fall of Renaissance Investment Corporation

The evidence at trial showed that Renaissance Investment Corporation (“Renaissance”) was a company masterminded and run by Oliver Reid Dobbs, III. With the help of his father’s ample financial resources and his Renaissance staff, including such key figures as Stephanie Chisholm (vice-president of administration), Charles Shirley (vice-president of finance), and Tom Nelson (vice-president of construction), Dobbs acquired several residential properties in Atlanta, Georgia for the purpose of renovating them and selling them to investors. Judging from his educational background and his activities at Renaissance, as shown at trial, Dobbs appears to have been a relatively sophisticated businessman. He attended a well-regarded private high school in Atlanta, obtained bachelor’s and master’s degrees in business, and received the benefit of one year of law school. However, unfortunately for all those involved in the Renaissance litigation, he devoted his business acumen to pursuing any necessary means, including making fraudulent misrepresentations and involving other people in his scheme, to accomplish his burgeoning ambitions to develop and renovate these historic Atlanta properties.

As the evidence revealed, Dobbs was quite adept at dealing with bankers, accountants, and lawyers who assisted him in structuring the renovation projects to secure debt and equity financing through bank loans and, more significantly, through the “syndication” process. Each syndication involved (1) forming a limited partnership for a real estate project, (2) preparing an offering circular, known as a private placement memorandum (“PPM”), to induce investment in the project, (3) circulating the PPM to a limited number of prospective investors, who were generally quite wealthy and were interested in investments with significant tax benefits, and (4) admitting a limited number of investors as limited partners of the real estate limited partnership so that equity financing could be raised.

After completing a few small real estate renovation projects, Renaissance began its first syndication effort in 1984 with the Bilt-more “Executive Wing,” which was part of the historic Biltmore hotel. The Executive Wing project was acquired by a entity affili *1526 ated with Renaissance known as Atlanta Bilt-more Associates, Ltd., of which Renaissance was the general partner. Through the syndication process, Atlanta Biltmore Associates, Ltd. sold the project to an entity known as Biltmore Towers Associates, Ltd.; limited partnership interests were offered in an entity known as Executive Wing Partners, Ltd., which acquired a sixty-one percent general partnership interest in Biltmore Towers Associates, Ltd. As general partner of Executive Wing Partners, Ltd. and Atlanta Bilt-more Associates, Ltd., Renaissance was actively involved with the development of the Executive Wing project and the marketing of limited pai'tnership interests in Executive Wing Partners, Ltd.

The Executive Wing Partners, Ltd. PPM,which was dated December 23, 1984, disclosed that Dobbs Industries Construction Company (“DICC”), another affiliate of Renaissance, had undertaken the renovation work. Exh. 5012 at Bates P0018341. The PPM further disclosed that construction was anticipated to be' completed by February 28, 1985. Id. In addition, the PPM' disclosed that the project was encumbered by a $10,-000,000 “wraparound deed to secure debt,” which represents the purchase money financing of the project, executed by Atlanta Bilt-more Associates, Ltd. in favor of O.P.D.I.U.S. (“OPDI”). Id. at Bates P0018354. Last, the PPM disclosed that the proceeds of the syndication closing would be held in escrow until, among other things, DICC completed its construction work and the rehabilitation of the project was finished. Id. at Bates P0018355.

The evidence showed that substantial delays in construction occurred on the Executive Wing project, which in turn caused serious problems with OPDI and other creditors. When construction was complete and the escrow funds were released in late September, 1985, an enormous number of liens and lawsuits related to the project had accumulated. Claiming that Atlanta Biltmore Associates, Ltd. had defaulted on its obligation, OPDI brought two lawsuits against Atlanta Bilt-more Associates, Ltd. and Renaissance. By the time escrow broke, the financial condition of Renaissance and DICC had become seriously troubled because of the desperate need for fees and profits due from the Executive Wing syndication.

Despite these dire problems resulting from delays in the release of the Executive Wing escrow, Renaissance forged ahead with plans for additional real estate syndications. In the summer and fall of 1985, Dobbs and Renaissance engineered syndications for two properties known as the St. Andrews and the Granada; in each syndication, Renaissance acted as general partner. In the fall of 1985, the syndication of a property known as 696 Peachtree Street was completed, again with Renaissance as general partner.

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Bluebook (online)
820 F. Supp. 1519, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9758, 1993 WL 148789, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abrams-wofsy-v-renaissance-inv-corp-gand-1993.