Abrams v. Stuckey

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: October 21, 2014
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2014-1758
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA AUGUSTA DIVISION

LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR. and * R.C. ABRAMS, * *

Plaintiffs, * *

v. ' * CV 114-190 *

C. BRIAN STUCKEY, District Director, Farm Service Agency, United States Department Of Agriculture,

Defendant.

ORDER

Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's motion to

transfer venue, with Plaintiff's consent, to the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia (Doc. 4) . For the

reasons stated herein, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the Court on removal, following

Plaintiffs' motion for entry of a temporary restraining order

("TRO"), which was granted in the Superior Court of Burke County,

Georgia. (Doc. 1.) There, Plaintiffs sought a TRO to prevent

foreclosure on a 350-acre tract of land due to nonpayment of loans

from the Farm Service Agency and United States Department of

Agriculture ("USDA") . (Doc. 1, Ex. 1.) The motion for a TRO was

based upon a pending motion to vacate and set aside an arbitrator's

decision filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia,

which, if granted, would allegedly prevent foreclosure. (Doc. 4.) A brief background into the arbitrator's decision is helpful

to understand the underlying claims. In 1998, the District Court

for the District of Columbia certified a class of African-American

farmers who alleged that the USDA discriminated against them in

applications for farm loans and benefit programs. (Doc. 4.) That

court allowed individual claimants to resolve claims through

decisions by a third-party neutral. (Id.) Lucious Abrams, Jr.1

submitted one of these so-called "Pigford claims," which was

dismissed by the arbitrator for failure to show a prima facie case

of discrimination. (Id.) On October 14, 2008, Lucious Abrams, Jr.

filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of

Columbia alleging the dismissal of his Pigford claim violated due

process, which the court dismissed on August 24, 2009. (Id.) On

September 18, 2014, Lucious Abrams, Sr. and Sons, the partnership,

and Lucious Abrams, Jr. filed a complaint to set aside the

arbitrator's decision dismissing the Pigford claim. On October 8,

2014, the court ordered the United States to file a response by

October 24, 2014. (Id.)

1 Plaintiffs inherited the land at issue from their father, the late Lucious Abrams, Sr. ("Mr. Abrams"). Mr. Abrams, through a partnership with three of his sons, Lucious Abrams, Jr., Herbert Abrams, and R.C. Abrams operated a partnership known as Lucious Abrams, Sr. & Sons. The partnership received federal farm loans to assist in the operation of the farm's business. Five of Mr. Abrams' daughters brought an identical complaint in the Superior Court of Burke County, which was also removed to this Court. See Zennie Houston, Betty Turner, Frances Ross, Jesse Mae Abrams, and Florine Watson v. C. Brian Stuckey, No. l:14-cv-191, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ga. 2014). 2 II. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that venue in the

Southern District of Georgia is proper, as a "substantial part of

property that is the subject of the action is situated" in this

district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Even so, a district court may

transfer an action to any other district where the action may have

been brought or to any district to which all parties have consented

"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the

interest of justice[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This inquiry thus

requires a two-part analysis: (1) the Court must determine if this

action could have been brought in the alternate venue; and (2) the

Court must determine whether the convenience of parties and

witnesses, as well as the interest of justice, require transfer.

Addressing the first part, this action could have initially

been brought in the District of Columbia. See Game Controller Tech

LLC v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272-73

(S.D. Fla. 2014) ("An action might have been brought in a

transferee district if that district has subject matter

jurisdiction over the action, venue is proper, and the parties are

amenable to service of process in the transferee forum.")

Personal and subject matter jurisdiction are both proper in the

District of Columbia, as Plaintiffs have (1) consented to the

transfer and (2) sued an agency of the United States in which a

contract governs the relationship. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2);

Baragona v. Kuwait & Gulf Link Transp. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2009) ("An individual may voluntarily subject

himself to the jurisdiction of a court by appearance or may

contract in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given

court."). Additionally, venue is proper because the USDA is

headquartered in Washington, D.C. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)

(venue is proper in any district where a defendant resides).

Finally, the Court finds that the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia is a more convenient forum and that

transfer is in the interest of justice. Here, the facts and

circumstances that form the basis for the TRO presently are being

litigated in the District of Columbia. The TRO is thus

inextricably tied to the pending action in the District of

Columbia, and this Court finds transfer proper in order "to avoid

unnecessary inconvenience . . . and to conserve time, energy, and

money." Gonzalez v. Pirelli Tire LLC, No. 07-80453-CIV, 2008 WL

516847, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2008).

Accordingly, and in light of Plaintiffs' consent to transfer,

Defendant's motion to transfer venue is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk

is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia. Following transfer, the Clerk

is shall terminate all deadlines and motions, and CLOSE this case.

ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this_(Q^ ' day of October,

2014.

HONORABJlE-