24CA2223 Abrams v Star Builders 12-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2223 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV541 Honorable Jon J. Olafson, Judge
Abrams & Associates, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
v.
Star Builders, LLC, and Aaron LaPedis,
Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Fox and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 31, 2025
Resnick & Louis, P.C., Clayton D. Manceaux, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant and Cross-Appellee
Sean M. McDermott, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees and Cross- Appellants ¶1 Plaintiff, Abrams & Associates, LLC (the firm), appeals the
court’s judgment in favor of defendants, Star Builders, LLC, and
Aaron LaPedis (collectively, Star Builders), on Star Builders’
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2021, the firm and Star Builders entered into a contract for
legal services. The firm agreed to represent Star Builders in a
construction defect dispute between Star Builders and a plumbing
company in Jefferson County Case No. 22CV30823.1 Either party
could terminate the contract by written notice. The contract
provided that “if permission for withdrawal [wa]s required by the
court, the [f]irm shall apply for such permission and termination
shall coincide with the court order for withdrawal.”
¶3 Star Builders’ managing partner, LaPedis, was dissatisfied
with the firm’s work and expressed concerns with the way the firm
was handling the underlying case. On February 22, 2023, LaPedis
emailed Robert Abrams and Kyle Thompson, attorneys at the firm,
and told them to “put a hard stop on everything.” The email also
1 The litigation later involved a third-party insurance brokerage firm
as well.
1 indicated that Star Builders had a new attorney who would be
handling the case moving forward.
¶4 On February 23, the firm sent a demand letter to Star
Builders’ insurance company, which indicated that “[the firm]
continues to represent Star Builders.” The firm sent Star Builders a
copy of the demand letter on February 24 and apprised it of the
status of the underlying case. On February 26, Abrams responded
to LaPedis’s February 22 email and agreed to stop all work, told
LaPedis that new counsel could file a notice of substitution of
counsel in the case, and that the firm expected Star Builders to pay
its outstanding fees. On February 28, Abrams sent LaPedis another
email informing LaPedis that he had not heard from new counsel.
That same day, Abrams forwarded LaPedis a notice of the
propounded discovery and indicated that the “new lawyer can assist
in answering this discovery.” The next day, LaPedis asked Abrams
if he could respond to the discovery issues before transferring Star
Builders’ case to new counsel. On March 3, LaPedis called Abrams,
asking if they could “patch things up” and whether the firm could
remain on the case.
2 ¶5 On March 6, the firm filed a motion to withdraw from the
underlying case.2 The motion indicated that the firm had conferred
with Star Builders and that the motion was unopposed, but LaPedis
testified that neither Abrams nor Thompson had conferred with
him. That same day, LaPedis emailed Abrams to check in and to
ask if he was moving forward with the case.3 On March 7, Abrams
sent LaPedis a copy of the firm’s motion to withdraw. The firm filed
an amended motion to withdraw with the court on March 7, again
representing that Star Builders did not oppose withdrawal. That
2 The motion to withdraw filed in Case No. 22CV30823 was not
included in the record on appeal. Nevertheless, we take judicial notice of it. See Vento v. Colo. Nat’l Bank, 985 P.2d 48, 52 (Colo. App. 1999) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding.”). 3 The record is missing several trial exhibits detailing the parties’
communications, including this email. We admonish the firm’s counsel for failing to comply with the obligation to file all trial exhibits as part of the record despite the district court’s warning that if they weren’t included by the due date, “the certified record w[ould] be sent to the appellate court without them.” The party asserting a trial court error bears the burden of presenting a record which discloses the error. Hunter v. Colo. Mountain Jr. Coll. Dist., 804 P.2d 277, 278 (Colo. App. 1990). When the appellant has failed to provide a complete record on appeal, “it is well settled that appellate courts must presume the trial court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence.” People v. Helmstetter, 914 P.2d 474, 477 (Colo. App. 1995). We therefore presume that the missing trial court exhibits support the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
3 same day, the Jefferson County District Court granted the firm’s
original motion to withdraw.
¶6 In June 2023, the firm filed a complaint, alleging that Star
Builders failed to pay for legal services as provided by the contract.
Star Builders filed counterclaims, alleging breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of contract. The counterclaims related to the firm’s
withdrawal in Case No. 22CV30823.
¶7 The court ultimately found that Star Builders failed to pay the
firm $3,395 for “reasonably incurred legal services.” With respect to
the counterclaims, the court found in the firm’s favor on the breach
of contract claim and in Star Builders’ favor on the breach of
fiduciary duty claim. The court concluded that the firm breached
its fiduciary duty to Star Builders when it withdrew as counsel in
Case No. 22CV30823. The court found that as Star Builders’
counsel, the firm was in a position of trust with its client and
breached its fiduciary duties to be truthful in communications with
the court and to provide its client with sufficient information to
make an informed decision about withdrawal. The court awarded
Star Builders $17,797 in damages, including exemplary damages —
which the court concluded were warranted, given its finding that
4 the firm willfully and wantonly violated multiple rules of
professional conduct and rules of civil procedure.
II. Analysis
¶8 The firm contends that the court erred by (1) denying its
motion to dismiss under section 13-20-602, C.R.S. 2025;4 (2)
concluding that no expert testimony was necessary to prove Star
Builders’ fiduciary duty claim; (3) finding that the firm made the
decision to withdraw; and (4) finding that the firm failed to comply
with its duty of candor to the tribunal. We disagree with each
contention.
A. Certificate of Review and Expert Testimony
¶9 The firm contends that the court erred by (1) denying its
motion to dismiss Star Builders’ counterclaims for failure to file a
certificate of review under section 13-20-602(4) and (2) determining
that no expert testimony was needed to establish that the firm
4 The firm’s opening brief incorrectly cites “C.R.S. § 13-22-602,”
which does not exist. The correct statute to which we will refer is section 13-20-602, C.R.S. 2025. Because the statute has not changed since this action was filed in the district court, all citations are to the 2025 statute.
5 breached its fiduciary duty. We address these arguments together
and disagree with both.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 10 After the firm filed its complaint, Star Builders filed
counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty,
alleging the following:
• After spending money on legal fees and determining the goals
of the case weren’t being met, LaPedis sent the firm an email
on February 22, 2023, asking that a “hard stop be put on the
case” and explaining that another attorney would handle the
case.
• After LaPedis sent the email, he was advised not to change
attorneys, given the imminent expert disclosure deadlines
and upcoming trial in Case No. 22CV30823.
• On February 27, the attorney who was supposed to replace
the firm notified LaPedis that he would not represent Star
Builders.
• Around March 3, LaPedis had a conversation with Abrams
where the two agreed to “patch up any differences” and work
6 together. Abrams was on vacation but told LaPedis that he
would contact him on Monday, March 6.
• Abrams did not contact LaPedis on March 6; instead, the firm
filed a motion to withdraw in Case No. 22CV30823. The
motion to withdraw indicated that Star Builders had
instructed the firm to withdraw, that the firm had conferred
with Star Builders, and that Star Builders did not oppose the
withdrawal. The motion did not mention subsequent
communications between the parties or the conversation that
LaPedis had with Abrams.
• LaPedis emailed Abrams on March 6 to “check in” based on
their prior conversation that the firm would remain on the
• On March 7, Abrams responded to LaPedis’s email, citing
LaPedis’s February 22 email ordering the firm to stop work.
Abrams also sent LaPedis a copy of the motion to withdraw.
• The firm filed an amended motion to withdraw on March 7,
but the amended motion didn’t correct the “false statement”
that Star Builders had instructed the firm to withdraw. The
7 motion also didn’t mention that LaPedis had contacted
Abrams and expected the firm to continue handling the case.
• The court granted the motion to withdraw on March 7.
• Because of the firm’s withdrawal, Star Builders had to obtain
new counsel in Case No. 22CV30823, seek a continuance,
and incur over $12,000 for substitute counsel to “get up to
speed” on the case.
Star Builders claimed that the motion and the amended motion to
withdraw violated C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-1(2)(b), which details the
procedures that an attorney must follow before a court may allow
the attorney to withdraw from a case, and C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-
15(8), which requires moving counsel to consult with the opposing
party before filing a motion.
¶ 11 Eleven months after Star Builders filed its counterclaims, the
firm moved to dismiss them for failure to file a certificate of review
as required by section 13-20-602.5 Because Star Builders’ claims
for breach of contract and fiduciary duty alleged inadequate and
improper professional legal representation, the firm argued that a
5 The court previously denied the firm’s motion to dismiss Star
Builders’ counterclaims pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
8 certificate of review was warranted. And because one was not filed,
the counterclaims had to be dismissed. See § 13-20-602(4) (“The
failure to file a certificate of review in accordance with this section
shall result in the dismissal of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross
claim.”).
¶ 12 In response, Star Builders argued that a certificate of review
was unnecessary because expert testimony wasn’t needed to
establish that the firm had acted improperly based on “the
untruths” contained in the motion and amended motion to
withdraw.
¶ 13 The court held a hearing to resolve several motions, including
the firm’s motion to dismiss for failure to file a certificate of review.
The court ordered the parties to prepare trial briefs on the issue
and to be ready to discuss the issue at trial. At trial, Abrams
renewed the motion to dismiss, which the court denied.
¶ 14 The court noted that, based on case law, whether a certificate
of review was required hinged on whether an expert witness was
necessary “to establish the standard of care.” The court determined
that expert testimony wasn’t required “to establish the standard of
care” here because Star Builders’ claims against the firm pertained
9 to the motion and amended motion to withdraw “and whether or
not the veracity of those motions w[as] correct or incorrect.” The
court found that the standard of care “was so apparent on its face
that . . . you don’t need expert testimony” and that “the negligence
was so apparent that no certificate need[ed] to be filed.”
¶ 15 In support, the court looked to C.R.C.P. 11 and stated that it
requires an attorney to sign and confirm “that everything [] filed
[with the court] is correct”; the court also looked to Colo. RPC
3.3(a), “which says that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false
statement of material fact or law to a tribunal, or fail to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the
tribunal [by] the lawyer.”
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 16 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 16. We review the
district court’s ruling requiring or dispensing with a certificate of
review for an abuse of discretion. Woo v. Baez, 2022 COA 113,
¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when it misapplies or
misinterprets the law, or when its decision is arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair. Est. of Ford v. Eicher, 220 P.3d 939, 942
10 (Colo. App. 2008), aff’d, 250 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2011). “[T]he decision
of the trial court that a claim may proceed without the filing of a
certificate of review will not be disturbed upon appellate review
unless the plaintiff’s” reason for not filing the certificate lacked
arguable merit. Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 984
P.2d 623, 627 (Colo. 1999).
¶ 17 To prove a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must
prove that (1) the defendant was acting as a fiduciary; (2) the
defendant breached its fiduciary duty; (3) the plaintiff incurred
damages; and (4) the damages incurred were caused by the
defendant’s breach of the fiduciary duty. Graphic Directions, Inc. v.
Bush, 862 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Colo. App. 1993). “Breach of fiduciary
duty claims are in some, but not all, contexts basically negligence
claims incorporating particularized and enhanced duty of care
concepts . . . .” Martinez v. Badis, 842 P.2d 245, 251-52 (Colo.
1992). Some courts recognize a distinction between breach of
fiduciary duty claims and attorney negligence claims, seeing
“fiduciary obligations as part of a standard of conduct and
professional negligence as part of a standard of care.” Aller v. Law
Off. of Carole C. Schriefer, P.C., 140 P.3d 23, 27 (Colo. App. 2005).
11 ¶ 18 A party filing a professional negligence claim must file a
certificate of review within sixty days of the commencement of the
claim, certifying that they have “consulted a person who has
expertise in the area of the alleged negligent conduct,” and that the
person “has reviewed the known facts” and concluded that the
claim or counterclaim “does not lack substantial justification.”
§ 13-20-602(1)(a), (3)(a); see Woo, ¶ 14. The purpose of section 13-
20-602 is to prevent frivolous lawsuits or baseless professional
malpractice actions. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 503 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 19 A certificate of review is only necessary, however, where the
professional negligence claim requires expert testimony to establish
a prima facie case. Giron v. Koktavy, 124 P.3d 821, 825 (Colo. App.
2005). Not all professional negligence claims require expert
testimony. Martinez, 842 P.2d at 249; cf. Kelton v. Ramsey, 961
P.2d 569, 571 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Except in the clearest cases,
expert testimony is necessary to establish the standards of
acceptable professional conduct in legal malpractice cases.”).
¶ 20 The touchstone for determining whether expert testimony is
necessary is whether the testimony “will provide assistance on a
matter not within the knowledge or common experience of people of
12 ordinary intelligence.” Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Colo.
App. 1993). When the judge serves as the trier of fact and
testimony concerns matters of legal practice, the trial court is “in a
particularly appropriate position to assess whether [expert]
testimony would be helpful in its deliberations.” Id.
3. Analysis
¶ 21 The firm contends that all claims based upon alleged
professional negligence, regardless of the claim’s formal
designation, require a certificate of review. See Martinez, 842 P.2d
at 251-52. Therefore, it argues, the court erred by denying the
firm’s motion to dismiss under section 13-20-602(4), which
mandates dismissal of the counterclaims for failure to file a
certificate of review. We disagree.
¶ 22 The crux of Star Builders’ claim is not for professional
negligence based on a standard of care or malpractice; rather, its
claim is that the firm breached its fiduciary duty when it filed a
motion and an amended motion to withdraw with the court
containing the following misrepresentations: (1) the motions were
unopposed, (2) the firm informed Star Builders that it intended to
withdraw, and (3) the firm’s withdrawal could be accomplished
13 without any material adverse effects to Star Builders. In concluding
that the firm breached its fiduciary duty, the court focused on the
rules governing attorney conduct and not on the standard of care or
degree of knowledge, skill, or judgment ordinarily possessed by
attorneys in the legal field. See Aller, 140 P.3d at 28 (“We can
foresee circumstances where a breach of fiduciary duty may be
characterized as something other than professional negligence, for
example, where an attorney abuses a position of trust with the
client . . . .”).
¶ 23 For instance, the court looked to C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-
1(2)(b), which provides that an attorney’s request to withdraw may
not be granted until the motion is served on the client and other
parties, and either both the client and all counsel for the other
parties consent in writing at or after the time of the service of the
motion, or fourteen days have passed. It also pointed out that
under C.R.C.P. 11, an attorney’s signature on a pleading represents
“that to the best of [their] knowledge, information, and belief, . . .
[the pleading] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument.” Further, the court acknowledged
Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1), which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
14 knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made.” These rules govern the baseline for attorney
conduct, trustworthiness, and honesty; they have nothing to do
with knowledge, skill, or legal expertise.
¶ 24 Expert testimony wasn’t necessary to determine whether the
firm breached its fiduciary duty. The court determined that the
rules at issue “pertain[ed] to an [attorney’s] duties to a court and to
the client about filed pleadings and withdrawal [that] are
elementary, clear, and foundational for all attorneys.” And the
question here — whether the firm breached its fiduciary duty to its
client when it knowingly made false statements in its motions to
withdraw — was so obvious on its face that Star Builders’ expert
testified that the court could decide the matter without his
expertise.
¶ 25 In Giron, a division of this court determined that expert
testimony was not required to establish negligence or breach of a
fiduciary duty when an attorney failed to file a claim within the
applicable statute of limitations because the skill required to
determine whether the statute had run was within a layperson’s
15 common knowledge. Giron, 124 P.3d at 825. Like the statute of
limitations issue in Giron, the issue here is whether the firm
breached the fiduciary duty it owed Star Builders — to be truthful
to the court — when it filed its motion and amended motion to
withdraw containing false statements. Because the question was
obvious on its face and the rules governing attorney conduct and
candor are commonly understood, no expert testimony was
necessary.
¶ 26 The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
expert testimony and a certificate of review were unnecessary, given
the record and the basis of the fiduciary duty claim. Accordingly,
we conclude that the court properly denied the firm’s motion to
dismiss Star Builders’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty under
section 13-20-602(4).
B. The Court’s Findings Are Supported by the Record
¶ 27 The firm contends that, contrary to the evidence presented at
trial, the court erroneously found that the firm made the decision to
withdraw as counsel of record and failed to comply with its duty of
candor to the court. We disagree.
16 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 28 We defer to the factual findings of the district court unless
they are clearly erroneous. Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558 (Colo.
App. 2008). “A court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only if
there is no support for them in the record.” Van Gundy v. Van
Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.
¶ 29 Additionally, as we previously mentioned, the firm failed to
include in the record several trial exhibits detailing email exchanges
between the parties. We therefore presume that the missing
evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Love v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131, ¶ 18, aff’d on other grounds,
2018 CO 20.
2. The Court Did Not Err by Finding that the Firm Made the Decision to Withdraw
¶ 30 The firm contends that Star Builders “unequivocally” directed
it to cease litigation activities in the underlying matter when
LaPedis sent his February 22 email to Abrams and Thompson
ordering the firm to “put a hard stop on everything.” In support,
the firm argues that the instruction was accompanied by multiple
accusations that the firm tried to run up costs and fees and that
17 the email named the attorney who was going to replace the firm. It
further contends that Star Builders did not submit evidence
indicating that it objected to the firm’s withdrawal.
¶ 31 The firm’s contentions are misplaced. The firm doesn’t
acknowledge LaPedis’s requests for it to continue representing Star
Builders or the work that it continued to perform after the February
22 email.
¶ 32 As the court found, the February 22 email did not ask the firm
to withdraw from representation; it just asked the firm to stop work
and provided the name of new counsel. LaPedis testified that the
other attorney declined to represent Star Builders and that because
of the impending deadlines in the underlying matter, LaPedis was
advised to work things out with the firm. He therefore called
Abrams on March 3, asking the firm to remain as counsel. Abrams
was on vacation, but LaPedis testified that the two agreed Abrams
would call on Monday, March 6. While Abrams gave conflicting
testimony, the court found that his testimony wasn’t credible. We
defer to the court’s determinations of credibility. See In re Marriage
of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (“It is the
responsibility of the trial court as the trier of fact to determine the
18 credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency, probative effect, and
weight of the evidence.”). LaPedis also testified that he paid the
firm’s outstanding fees to induce the firm to stay on the case and
that he emailed Abrams on March 6 to “check in” to see if the firm
was moving forward with the case.
¶ 33 Likewise, several of the firm’s actions after the February 22
email are contrary to the stop work order and undermine the firm’s
argument that Star Builders terminated the relationship. For
instance, on February 24, Thompson had a phone call with
opposing counsel in Case No. 22CV30823 to negotiate a settlement
and continued to prepare a demand letter, which noted that the
firm represented Star Builders. That same day, Thompson emailed
LaPedis a copy of the demand letter, asked him to make edits, and
gave LaPedis an update on his conversation with opposing counsel.
On February 28, the firm had not received new counsel’s
information, so Abrams emailed LaPedis, copying Thompson and a
paralegal, stating, “BTW, we have not seen nor heard from new
counsel under a subst[itution] of counsel[;] . . . if we have no
[substitution] of counsel today, [withdraw] from [LaPedis’s] case per
his instructions.” The comment to withdraw if no substitution of
19 counsel was received indicates that the firm was waiting for new
counsel to enter an appearance before withdrawing. The firm
continued to work on the case and did not file a motion to withdraw
immediately following the “hard stop” email; instead, it waited
nearly two weeks before filing a motion.
¶ 34 Moreover, the firm’s argument that Star Builders failed to
submit evidence that it objected to the firm’s withdrawal is
misleading. At trial, LaPedis testified that he “felt [he] had no
recourse” when he learned of the firm’s motion to withdraw and
that he “just had to accept it [and] . . . was not told that [he] could
counter it or make an objection.” And when LaPedis learned that
the court had granted the motion one day after it was filed, he
testified that he “was devastated.” The testimony supports the
court’s findings that Star Builders and LaPedis were unaware that
the firm had filed its motion to withdraw and that Star Builders did
not consent to the motion.
¶ 35 Based on our review of the record, the timeline, and the
parties’ testimony, ample evidence supports the court’s finding that
the firm made the decision to withdraw as legal counsel in the
underlying case.
20 3. The Court Did Not Err by Finding That the Firm Failed to Comply With Its Duty of Candor to the Tribunal
¶ 36 As mentioned above, Colo. RPC 3.3 (a)(1) states that “[a] lawyer
shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact
or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”
¶ 37 The original motion to withdraw indicated that the firm
“conferred with . . . its client, Star Builders, LLC, with respect to the
relief requested in this Motion. Star Builders, LLC is unopposed.”
Thompson testified that he drafted and filed the motion but did not
discuss it with LaPedis before filing it. The motion also noted that
Star Builders “hired new counsel and has instructed [the firm] to
withdraw as counsel of record.”
¶ 38 Although the parties discussed new counsel during their email
exchanges, the firm was never instructed to withdraw. Further,
Thompson testified at trial that the firm hadn’t heard from new
counsel and that new counsel had not entered an appearance when
he filed the motion to dismiss. The firm also certified that it
complied with the notice requirements by sending the motion via
21 email and standard mail. However, the court found that LaPedis
did not receive the motion before it was filed.
¶ 39 The court did not err in finding that the firm’s representations
were knowingly false because there was no conferral with Star
Builders, the firm had not been instructed to withdraw, and it did
not provide Star Builders with a copy of the motion to withdraw
until after the motion was filed.
¶ 40 Additionally, the amended motion to withdraw filed on March
7 did not correct these misrepresentations. Although the amended
motion clarified that Star Builders “informed undersigned to stop all
work and notified [the firm] of potential new counsel,” and that the
firm “informed [Star Builders] it intends to withdraw as counsel of
record,” the amended motion still indicated that the motion was
unopposed, the parties had conferred, and the firm’s withdrawal
could be accomplished without material adverse effect to Star
¶ 41 The trial court’s findings that the firm knowingly made false
representations to the Jefferson County District Court is supported
by ample evidence in the record. We therefore discern no error with
its finding that the firm violated its duty of candor.
22 III. Request for Sanctions and Attorney Fees
¶ 42 Star Builders requests sanctions under C.A.R. 38(d),6 alleging
that the firm’s appeal is a continuation of frivolous, groundless, and
vexatious proceedings. C.A.R. 38(b) grants appellate courts the
authority to award damages if an appeal is deemed frivolous. An
appeal may be deemed frivolous if there is no appealable issue
because the judgment below “was so plainly correct and the legal
authority contrary to appellant’s position is so clear that there is
really no appealable issue,” or when an “appellant’s misconduct in
arguing the appeal” justifies deeming the appeal frivolous. Castillo
v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 292 (Colo. App. 2006) (citation
omitted). Here, while we disagree with the firm’s arguments, we
don’t think the appeal is frivolous and decline to award damages.
¶ 43 Likewise, although we may impose sanctions, including
attorney fees, under C.A.R. 38(a) for failure to comply with the
appellate rules, including those pertaining to providing the trial
6 We note that there is no C.A.R. 38(d), but C.A.R. 38(b) provides
that we may award damages, including attorney’s fees, if we determine that an appeal is frivolous.
23 court record, we decline to impose sanctions even though the firm
failed to include several trial exhibits in the record.
IV. Disposition
¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BROWN concur.