24CA2218 Abrams v Khattak 02-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2218 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31323 Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge
Abrams & Associates, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Fatima Khattak,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 26, 2026
Abrams & Associates, LLC, Robert Abrams, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee
Fatima Khattak, Pro Se ¶1 Plaintiff, Fatima Khattak, appeals the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of defendant, Abrams & Associates, LLC (A&A).
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Khattak was the plaintiff in Denver District Court Case No.
22CV30058.1 Khattak entered into a contract for Abrams,
Sullenberger & Associates, LLC (AS&A), to represent her in that
case. Pursuant to the contract, if Khattak failed to pay legal fees,
AS&A was entitled to costs incurred in collecting the amounts
owed, and Khattak agreed to pay 18% per annum in interest on the
outstanding amounts.
¶3 A&A was the sole owner and member of AS&A. In April 2022,
A&A filed a statement of dissolution with the Colorado Secretary of
State dissolving AS&A. Khattak wasn’t notified of the dissolution
but continued to receive legal services from A&A. Khattak received
invoices for fees owed under the contract she had signed with
AS&A, but the invoices asked her to direct payment to A&A.
Khattak’s case proceeded to trial, and the jury found against her.
1 This case is not at issue here.
1 Before trial, Khattak paid all legal fees owed under the agreement,
even after AS&A was dissolved. After trial, though, Khattak didn’t
pay any outstanding fees. As of March 2023, Khattak owed A&A
$27,255.88 in legal fees.
¶4 A&A filed the underlying complaint in May 2023, asserting a
claim for breach of contract against Khattak for failure to pay legal
fees under the contract. In response, Khattak filed a motion to
dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), alleging that (1) there was no valid
and enforceable contract with A&A; (2) she performed her
obligations concerning the contract with AS&A; (3) the dissolution
of AS&A extinguished its existence, thereby rendering any contracts
it had entered into unenforceable; and (4) AS&A, because it was
dissolved, lacked standing. The district court denied her motion.
Khattak then filed an answer to the complaint but didn’t assert any
counterclaims.
¶5 A&A moved for judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P.
12(c). It attached invoices to the motion to support the claim that
Khattak failed to pay for legal services. Khattak responded,
claiming that there was no enforceable contract between her and
2 A&A because her contract was with the predecessor legal entity,
AS&A.
¶6 In April 2024, the court found that AS&A’s dissolution didn’t
preclude A&A’s claim for breach of contract. In the same order, the
court converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a
motion for summary judgment because A&A attached exhibits to
the motion and introduced matters outside the pleadings. The
court then ordered both parties to present all relevant evidence and
to establish any disputes of material fact on the elements of the
breach of contract claim.
¶7 Khattak submitted a response and attached documents
relating to the filing and service of the underlying complaint but
didn’t submit an affidavit or other evidence relating to the breach of
contract claim itself.
¶8 The court granted A&A summary judgment after concluding
that A&A presented evidence that Khattak failed to pay for the legal
services performed and that Khattak failed to establish the
existence of a factual dispute by attaching an affidavit or other
evidence that A&A concealed the winding-up of AS&A. Khattak
filed a motion to reconsider and attached an affidavit and other
3 exhibits to the motion. The court denied her request, however,
concluding that the evidence presented in the motion could have
been submitted in the original response to A&A’s converted motion
for summary judgment. Khattak appeals.
II. Analysis
¶9 Khattak makes multiple arguments on appeal. As we
understand her arguments, Khattak argues that (1) A&A knowingly
concealed AS&A’s dissolution and A&A’s lack of capacity to perform
under the contract; (2) the court erred by granting summary
judgment and concluding there was no genuine dispute of material
fact; and (3) the court erred by failing to consider that her “consent
to the contract was vitiated,” and therefore, summary judgment
wasn’t appropriate. While Khattak raises multiple arguments on
appeal, each of her assertions challenges the district court’s
decision to grant A&A summary judgment. We therefore confine
our review to that issue.
A. Appellate Rules
¶ 10 As an initial matter, Khattak’s pro se opening brief doesn’t
comply with the appellate rules for briefing. See C.A.R. 28. For
instance, for each issue Khattak raises, the brief contains neither a
4 statement of the applicable standard of review nor a statement of
preservation nor citations to the record. See C.A.R. 28(a)(6)(B),
(7)(B) (The appellant must provide “reasoning . . ., with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies.”).
¶ 11 The appellate rules are not technicalities; they are designed to
enable appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.
A party’s pro se status does not excuse the failure to comply with
the appellate rules. See Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners
Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (noting that while the court
may consider a party’s pro se status, pro se parties are still bound
by the rules). But we recognize that it’s challenging for a person
who is not a lawyer to represent themselves in legal proceedings.
Taking that into account, see id., we elect to address Khattak’s
arguments as best we understand them.
B. The Court Did Not Err When It Granted Summary Judgment in A&A’s Favor
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 12 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rocky
Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 2020 CO 51, ¶ 42.
5 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c). “Our task on review ‘is to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and
whether the district court correctly applied the law.’” Stanczyk v.
Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 2020 COA 27M, ¶ 53 (quoting City of Fort
Collins v. Colo. Oil, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 9), aff’d on other grounds, 2021
CO 57.
¶ 13 The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the
lack of a triable issue. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25,
¶ 20. All doubts are resolved against the moving party, while the
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24CA2218 Abrams v Khattak 02-26-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2218 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV31323 Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge
Abrams & Associates, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee,
v.
Fatima Khattak,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 26, 2026
Abrams & Associates, LLC, Robert Abrams, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee
Fatima Khattak, Pro Se ¶1 Plaintiff, Fatima Khattak, appeals the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of defendant, Abrams & Associates, LLC (A&A).
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Khattak was the plaintiff in Denver District Court Case No.
22CV30058.1 Khattak entered into a contract for Abrams,
Sullenberger & Associates, LLC (AS&A), to represent her in that
case. Pursuant to the contract, if Khattak failed to pay legal fees,
AS&A was entitled to costs incurred in collecting the amounts
owed, and Khattak agreed to pay 18% per annum in interest on the
outstanding amounts.
¶3 A&A was the sole owner and member of AS&A. In April 2022,
A&A filed a statement of dissolution with the Colorado Secretary of
State dissolving AS&A. Khattak wasn’t notified of the dissolution
but continued to receive legal services from A&A. Khattak received
invoices for fees owed under the contract she had signed with
AS&A, but the invoices asked her to direct payment to A&A.
Khattak’s case proceeded to trial, and the jury found against her.
1 This case is not at issue here.
1 Before trial, Khattak paid all legal fees owed under the agreement,
even after AS&A was dissolved. After trial, though, Khattak didn’t
pay any outstanding fees. As of March 2023, Khattak owed A&A
$27,255.88 in legal fees.
¶4 A&A filed the underlying complaint in May 2023, asserting a
claim for breach of contract against Khattak for failure to pay legal
fees under the contract. In response, Khattak filed a motion to
dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), alleging that (1) there was no valid
and enforceable contract with A&A; (2) she performed her
obligations concerning the contract with AS&A; (3) the dissolution
of AS&A extinguished its existence, thereby rendering any contracts
it had entered into unenforceable; and (4) AS&A, because it was
dissolved, lacked standing. The district court denied her motion.
Khattak then filed an answer to the complaint but didn’t assert any
counterclaims.
¶5 A&A moved for judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P.
12(c). It attached invoices to the motion to support the claim that
Khattak failed to pay for legal services. Khattak responded,
claiming that there was no enforceable contract between her and
2 A&A because her contract was with the predecessor legal entity,
AS&A.
¶6 In April 2024, the court found that AS&A’s dissolution didn’t
preclude A&A’s claim for breach of contract. In the same order, the
court converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a
motion for summary judgment because A&A attached exhibits to
the motion and introduced matters outside the pleadings. The
court then ordered both parties to present all relevant evidence and
to establish any disputes of material fact on the elements of the
breach of contract claim.
¶7 Khattak submitted a response and attached documents
relating to the filing and service of the underlying complaint but
didn’t submit an affidavit or other evidence relating to the breach of
contract claim itself.
¶8 The court granted A&A summary judgment after concluding
that A&A presented evidence that Khattak failed to pay for the legal
services performed and that Khattak failed to establish the
existence of a factual dispute by attaching an affidavit or other
evidence that A&A concealed the winding-up of AS&A. Khattak
filed a motion to reconsider and attached an affidavit and other
3 exhibits to the motion. The court denied her request, however,
concluding that the evidence presented in the motion could have
been submitted in the original response to A&A’s converted motion
for summary judgment. Khattak appeals.
II. Analysis
¶9 Khattak makes multiple arguments on appeal. As we
understand her arguments, Khattak argues that (1) A&A knowingly
concealed AS&A’s dissolution and A&A’s lack of capacity to perform
under the contract; (2) the court erred by granting summary
judgment and concluding there was no genuine dispute of material
fact; and (3) the court erred by failing to consider that her “consent
to the contract was vitiated,” and therefore, summary judgment
wasn’t appropriate. While Khattak raises multiple arguments on
appeal, each of her assertions challenges the district court’s
decision to grant A&A summary judgment. We therefore confine
our review to that issue.
A. Appellate Rules
¶ 10 As an initial matter, Khattak’s pro se opening brief doesn’t
comply with the appellate rules for briefing. See C.A.R. 28. For
instance, for each issue Khattak raises, the brief contains neither a
4 statement of the applicable standard of review nor a statement of
preservation nor citations to the record. See C.A.R. 28(a)(6)(B),
(7)(B) (The appellant must provide “reasoning . . ., with citations to
the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant
relies.”).
¶ 11 The appellate rules are not technicalities; they are designed to
enable appellate review. Cikraji v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10.
A party’s pro se status does not excuse the failure to comply with
the appellate rules. See Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners
Ass’n, 202 P.3d 564, 572 (Colo. 2009) (noting that while the court
may consider a party’s pro se status, pro se parties are still bound
by the rules). But we recognize that it’s challenging for a person
who is not a lawyer to represent themselves in legal proceedings.
Taking that into account, see id., we elect to address Khattak’s
arguments as best we understand them.
B. The Court Did Not Err When It Granted Summary Judgment in A&A’s Favor
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 12 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Rocky
Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Wagner, 2020 CO 51, ¶ 42.
5 Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.” C.R.C.P. 56(c). “Our task on review ‘is to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and
whether the district court correctly applied the law.’” Stanczyk v.
Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 2020 COA 27M, ¶ 53 (quoting City of Fort
Collins v. Colo. Oil, 2016 CO 28, ¶ 9), aff’d on other grounds, 2021
CO 57.
¶ 13 The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the
lack of a triable issue. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 2015 CO 25,
¶ 20. All doubts are resolved against the moving party, while the
nonmoving party receives “the benefit of all favorable inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts.” Id.
(quoting Tapley v. Golden Big O Tires, 676 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo.
1983)). Summary judgment is a “drastic remedy . . . that may not
be entered when differing material factual inferences can be drawn
from even undisputed evidence.” Camus v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 678, 680 (Colo. App. 2006).
6 ¶ 14 To establish a claim for breach of contract, a party must prove
the existence of a contract, the relevant terms, a breach of those
terms, and the resulting damages. Marquardt v. Perry, 200 P.3d
1126, 1129 (Colo. App. 2008). A material breach of contract by one
party excuses the other party from further performance on that
contract. Kaiser v. Mkt. Square Disc. Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636,
641 (Colo. App. 1999).
2. Analysis
¶ 15 Khattak argues that the district court erred by entering
summary judgment in A&A’s favor because there was a genuine
dispute of material fact. We disagree.
¶ 16 Khattak entered into a contract with AS&A for legal services.
A&A performed those services and represented Khattak at trial.
While A&A filed a statement to dissolve AS&A with the Colorado
Secretary of State, it continued performing legal services for
Khattak pursuant to the agreement she signed with AS&A,
including trial representation.
¶ 17 Khattak argues that her “consent to the contract was vitiated
due to [A&A’s] failure to disclose AS&A’s dissolution, winding up
process and significant changes.” However, it is undisputed that
7 Khattak paid legal fees owed under the contract prior to trial,
regardless of the entity named on the invoice letterhead. It is also
undisputed that Khattak failed to pay the legal fees after trial. In
support of its claim, A&A submitted affidavits and invoices
establishing the existence of a valid contract, performance under
that contract, and Khattak’s nonpayment of the fees required by the
agreement. Khattak provided no evidence refuting these facts.
¶ 18 In Khattak’s reply to the converted motion for summary
judgment, she asserted that A&A breached the contract, but she
didn’t submit exhibits, affidavits, or other evidence supporting her
assertion or countering the evidence that A&A presented. Although
Khattak expressed dissatisfaction that A&A didn’t inform her that it
was winding up the business, she failed to provide evidence that
disclosure of AS&A’s dissolution was required under the contract,
that A&A concealed the dissolution, or that a factual dispute
existed as to the existence of the contract or the amounts she owed
but failed to pay.
¶ 19 Although Khattak submitted an affidavit and multiple exhibits
after filing her motion for reconsideration, the court concluded that
such evidence could have been presented in response to A&A’s
8 motion. We find no basis to disturb that conclusion. See Fox v.
Alfini, 2018 CO 94, ¶ 36 (“[A] district court generally does not abuse
its discretion by refusing to consider new arguments and evidence
submitted in motions to reconsider.”).
¶ 20 On appeal, Khattak argues that A&A’s failure to disclose that
it was winding up its business precludes summary judgment and
caused her actual damages. However, Khattak again failed to
support her argument with any evidence indicating that AS&A
concealed the dissolution or the winding-up, that A&A had an
obligation to disclose the dissolution to her, or that she was injured
by these actions. The only evidence in the record shows that A&A
performed all contracted legal services for Khattak, and, regardless
of the letterhead on the invoice, she paid the required fees before
her case proceeded to trial.
¶ 21 Because Khattak didn’t present evidence demonstrating that
A&A concealed the dissolution or that AS&A’s dissolution rendered
A&A unable to perform under the contract, there was no material
factual dispute, and the district court didn’t err by granting
summary judgment.
9 III. Disposition
¶ 22 We affirm.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.