Abramowitz v. Rothschild

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Abramowitz v. Rothschild

175 A.D.2d 148, 573 N.Y.S.2d 895, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10036

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 8, 1991

StatusPublished

This text of 175 A.D.2d 148 (Abramowitz v. Rothschild) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Abramowitz v. Rothschild, 175 A.D.2d 148, 573 N.Y.S.2d 895, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10036 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991).

Pincite

Opinion

— In an action to recover damages for conversion and to impose a constructive trust upon certain bank accounts, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Huttner, J.), dated June 5, 1989, as denied that branch of his cross motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment upon the defendants’ default in complying with the terms of a stipulation of settlement.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

We find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in enforcing the terms of the stipulation as though no default had occurred. The defense counsel’s default, if any, in complying with the terms of the stipulation of settlement on behalf of his clients was based upon a good-faith interpretation of its terms. Thus, the default, if any, in complying with the terms of the stipulation may not be deemed to constitute an intentional or willful default. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.

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— In an action to recover damages for conversion and to impose a constructive trust upon certain bank accounts, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Huttner, J.), dated June 5, 1989, as denied that branch of his cross motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment upon the defendants’ default in complying with the terms of a stipulation of settlement.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

We find that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in enforcing the terms of the stipulation as though no default had occurred. The defense counsel’s default, if any, in complying with the terms of the stipulation of settlement on behalf of his clients was based upon a good-faith interpretation of its terms. Thus, the default, if any, in complying with the terms of the stipulation may not be deemed to constitute an intentional or willful default. Thompson, J. P., Kunzeman, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

175 A.D.2d 148, 573 N.Y.S.2d 895, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10036, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abramowitz-v-rothschild-nyappdiv-1991.