Abington Emerson Capital, LLC v. Adkins

District Court, S.D. Ohio·Decided August 26, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-00143·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

ABINGTON EMERSON CAPITAL, LLC,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:17-cv-143 v. Judge Sarah D. Morrison Magistrate Judge Jolson L ANDASH CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Defendant XPO Global Forwarding, Inc.’s and Defendant XPO Logistics, Inc.’s (collectively, “XPO”) Motion to Permanently Seal (Doc. 379). For the following reasons, XPO’s Motion is GRANTED, and the Clerk is DIRECTED to permanently seal Document 378, as well as the attached exhibits, Documents 378-1 and 378-2. I. BACKGROUND On August 7, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff Abington Emerson Capital, LLC’s (“Abington”) Motion for Leave to File its Reply in Support of Motion in Limine No. 1 Temporarily under Seal. (Doc. 377). The Court temporarily sealed the documents and directed the parties to file any motion to permanently seal within fourteen days. (Id.). XPO timely moved to permanently seal on the basis of the common interest doctrine. (Docs. 379). XPO’s Motion is unopposed. (See id. at 1 n.2). Thus, this matter is ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARD A district court may enter a protective order during discovery on a mere showing of “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). “[V]ery different considerations apply” when a party seeks to seal documents “[a]t the adjudication stage,” which applies “when the parties place material in the court record.” Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Unlike information merely exchanged between the parties, ‘[t]he

public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.’” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). For this reason, the moving party bears a “heavy” burden of overcoming a “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to court records.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179). “[T]he seal itself must be narrowly tailored to serve that reason,” which requires the moving party to “analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305–06 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the court “that chooses to seal court records must set forth specific findings and conclusions which justify nondisclosure.” Id. at 306 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION As noted, XPO seeks to permanently seal documents that Abington cites in its reply brief in support of its first Motion in Limine. (See generally Doc. 379). XPO contends that these documents, consisting of counsel’s email communications and references to the same, are protected under the common interest doctrine. (See generally id.). By way of background, “[i]n 2017, on the precipice of this litigation, XPO’s in house and outside counsel communicated with Timothy Parlatore, former counsel for Defendant Jason Adkins.” (Id. at 1). As Abington had sued both XPO and Adkins, the two had a common interest at that time in defending against the litigation. (Id.). So XPO “initially withheld email communications” between its counsel and counsel for Defendant Adkins as privileged under the common interest doctrine. (Id. at 2). Abington subsequently moved to compel these documents, and, thereafter, numerous discovery disputes unfolded. (Id. (citing Doc. 300)). The Court encouraged the parties to work together to resolve these disputes extrajudicially, and, “[u]ltimately, Abington and XPO entered into an

omnibus resolution to dispose of several discovery motions filed by the parties, including [Abington’s] [Motion to Compel].” (Doc. 379 at 2). As part of that compromise, XPO agreed to produce to Abington the documents it previously withheld under the common interest privilege, and in exchange, Abington produced its own set of purportedly privileged documents. (Id. (citing Doc. 313)). Relevant here, as part of their deal, the parties jointly requested “an order that the production of the subject documents, as described in their Motion, does not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection in this litigation or any other state or federal litigation.” (Doc. 313). The Undersigned granted that request, and ordered, “[p]ursuant to Rule 502(d) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the production of the documents described in the Motion . . . shall not constitute a waiver of any claim of privilege or work product protection in this case or any other state or federal litigation.” (Doc. 314 at 1–2). Now, in briefing its Motion in Limine, Abington relies on a handful of email communications between XPO’s counsel and Defendant Adkins’ former counsel. (See Docs. 375, 375-1, 375-2). As noted, XPO previously withheld these documents under the common interest doctrine and later produced them as part of the parties’ compromise. In seeking to permanently seal the documents, XPO asserts they “are unquestionably privileged, as they show discussions regarding counsel’s mental impressions and litigation strategy.” (Doc. 379 at 1). It further contends that it “has a strong interest in maintaining the privileged nature of” these documents, and, because they are privileged, the “public initially had no right to view [them].” (Doc. 379 at 3). It recognizes that privilege could potentially have been waived when it produced the documents to Abington but notes that it did so only as part of its deal with XPO and “subject to this Court’s order expressly holding that the privileged nature of these documents was not waived.” (Id. (citing

Doc. 314)). XPO further avers that “publicizing documents would undermine the public interest by eroding the sanctity of the privilege, as well as discourage parties from negotiating discovery disputes for fear of later losing the privilege.” (Doc. 379 at 4). The Court finds that permanently sealing the documents at issue is appropriate here. “Courts within this [C]ircuit have found [] a compelling reason [to file documents under seal] where documents implicate the privacy rights of participants or third parties.” Munson Hardisty, LLC v. Legacy Pointe Apartments, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-547-TAV-CCS, 2017 WL 2350174, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 30, 2017) (quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915 (E.D. Tenn. 2009)). And “[d]ocuments invoking either work-product or

attorney-client privilege implicate such privacy rights, and therefore, provide grounds . . . to file the documents under seal.” Munson Hardisty, 2017 WL 2350174, at *2 (citation omitted); see also Shane Grp., 825 F.3d at 308 (alteration in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (noting that, “[i]n civil litigation, only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in confidence . . . is typically enough to overcome the presumption of access”). Upon in camera review, the Court confirms that the documents at issue fall within this narrow category and should be sealed.

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