Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron

80 N.E. 478, 194 Mass. 208, 1907 Mass. LEXIS 943

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: February 27, 1907
• Status: Published

Opinion

Braley, J.

The plaintiff’s bill prays for injunctive relief, and the assessment of damages against the defendants who are alleged to have formed a conspiracy to compel it under penalty of a general strike of its employees to hire only union workmen in the erection of a large building then in process of construction under its contract with the Christian Science Board of Directors, one of the defendants. Upon the principal question, the master to whom the case was referred found in favor of the plaintiff, and his report was confirmed except as to the time when this defendant became a party to the conspiracy. By the modification of the single justice it was held that it did not unlawfully participate until February 21, 1906, when the board voted to request the plaintiff to cease work as they had decided to finish the building in another way. The master not only finds that this action was taken and communicated to the plaintiff, who refused compliance, but that on February 1.5, 1906, after having been informed by the defendant Cameron that a general strike was proposed if the plaintiff continued to employ one Stark, who did not belong to either of the unions, the members of the board had an interview with the plaintiff. In this interview they requested the plaintiff either to discharge Stark, or procure employment for him elsewhere, or permit them to do so, and this action is found to have been taken to avoid a general strike which they believed probable if he was permitted to remain. By the pleadings and in the report this defendant is described as a corporation known as the Christian Science Board of Directors, and there is no statement or finding that this body was representative rather than original, or that the authority of the board if treated as the corporation itself was limited by any by-law or vote. The conspiracy charged and proved was a combination to coerce the plaintiff to accede to the demands of Cameron and the organizations named as defendants, in which this defendant joined. Being a body corporate gave it no immunity from the consequences, for which it could be held liable as if it had been a natural person. White v. Apsley Rubber Co. 194 Mass. 97, and cases cited. Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 106 N. Y. 669. But while in a conspiracy at common law an overt act need neither be alleged nor proved, as the offence consists in the unlawful combination, there must be a mutual understanding whereby all the conspirators work together for a common end. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111. Commonwealth v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 224. Revere Water Co. v. Winthrop, 192 Mass. 455. The plans of the other defendants were well on foot when this defendant who had been informed of their-object intervened, and sought by its representations to persuade the plaintiff to avoid all future difficulty, by discharging an employee who had not become obnoxious to the corporation, except by reason of its pecuniary interest that there should be no unreasonable delay in the completion of its church. The master did not report the evidence, and the usual rule applies. But beyond this special finding he made no further finding as to the conduct of the members of the board before the vote was taken. It is plain that the interview with the accompanying proposals was advisory only and not intended to re-enforce or aid in the coercive measures adopted by the unions and their representatives, or to form a part of the measures of active interference which the other defendants were taking to enforce their demand. The ruling that the proposals made at this conference did not make them co-conspirators by participation therefore must be sustained.

In the general scheme of the conspiracy the breaking of the contract

* which subsequently followed was an important element, and when taken in connection with the action of the other bodies of which the board had knowledge, the concluding finding that the defendants against whom this bill is prosecuted “ conspired together to compel the plaintiff to employ only union carpenters ” and “ that in pursuance of such conspiracy they caused a breach of the existing contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant board, without any just cause or lawful provocation ” was well warranted. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. South Wales Miners’ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. [1905] A. C. 239, 250, 253.

The remaining question relates to the form and scope of the decree. An interlocutory injunction having issued under the first prayer of the bill, the plaintiff fully performed its contract, completing the work more than two months before the case appears to have been ripe for the entry of a final decree. The plaintiff is not content with a decree in which relief is confined to the unlawful acts of the defendants in connection with the contract described in its bill, but asks for a permanent injunction restraining the unions and their officers from any interference in the future if the plaintiff in the performance of other contracts chooses to employ non-union workmen. To this proposition the answer is plain. By the terms of the report under which the case is before us while it is stated that all questions of pleading are waived, it is also stated, that such decrees are to be entered on the master’s report as law and justice require. The master’s report rests upon the frame of the bill with which it must be considered, not only for the purpose of the modification, but as to the extent of the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. This issue was not presented by the pleadings, and consequently it neither has been heard and determined by the master nor by the single justice. If the pleadings are disregarded it would be equally extraordinary to enter such a decree upon the report of a master to whom this question was not referred, and upon which he has not passed. The conspiracy in which the defendants are found to. have participated was an unjustifiable wrong causing temporary damage. Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255. But while unlawful conduct has been proved in the present case, this fact raises no presumption that in the future the defendants will engage in similar wrongful acts. Hatch v. Bayley, 12 Cush. 27, 30. Phelps v. Cutler, 4 Gray, 137. Stewart v. Thomas, 15 Gray, 171. Baldwin v. Parker, 99 Mass. 79. Kline v. Baker, 106 Mass. 61. And if such a combination exists it must be pleaded and proved before appropriate relief can be granted. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 496, 497 ; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree with costs confirming the master’s report as modified, awarding execution for the damages assessed less the diminution thus caused, and the injunction heretofore issued may be made perpetual if it desires.

Ordered accordingly.

The vote of the defendant corporation was communicated to the plaintiff in a letter from the architect of the corporation, found by the master to have been its agent for the purpose. This letter contained the following sentence : “ I am instructed by the Directors of the First Church of Christ, Scientist, to inform you that it is their wish that you retire immediately from the work at the First Church of Christ, Scientist. It has been decided by them to do the remainder of the work included in your contract in a different manner, commencing at one o’clock today.”

About twelve o’clock on the same day the agent of the defendant corporation ordered the plaintiff to leave the job, and, upon its refusal to do so, this agent called the watchman employed by the directors to police the building, who forcibly, but without actual physical violence, ejected the foreman of the plaintiff from the job and escorted him to the street, and the men employed by the plaintiff followed.