Abera v. Ready Remodeling LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2381
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GEREMEW ABERA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 23 - 2381 (LLA)

READYREMODELING LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs Geremew Abera and Tigist Haylesilassie filed this action against Defendant

ReadyRemodeling LLC for failure to complete work on a home improvement contract. ECF

No. 1. The court previously denied Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment without prejudice, ECF

Nos. 10, 12, and granted Plaintiffs’ subsequent motion for reconsideration, ECF Nos. 13, 15; see

May 29, 2024 and July 15, 2024 Minute Orders. After amending their complaint, ECF No. 19,

Plaintiffs have filed a new motion for default judgment, ECF No. 24. For the reasons explained

below, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion and enter judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against

ReadyRemodeling on Count I of the amended complaint in the amount of $92,000.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November 2022, Plaintiffs entered into a contract with ReadyRemodeling to perform

construction and renovation work at their residential property for about $180,000. ECF No. 19

¶¶ 7-8. A woman named “Kathleen,” who was not a licensed home improvement contractor or

licensed home improvement salesperson, signed the contract on ReadyRemodeling’s behalf. Id.

¶¶ 12-13. The contract required 30% of payment at signing and the remaining payment at various construction milestones. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs paid ReadyRemodeling at least $92,000, but the work

on their property was never completed. Id. ¶¶ 15, 24.

A District of Columbia municipal regulation provides: “No person shall require or accept

any payment for a home improvement contract to be undertaken in the District in advance of the

full completion of all work required to be performed under the contract, unless that person is

licensed as a home improvement contractor or as a licensed salesperson employed by a licensed

contractor.” 16 DCMR § 800.1. In August 2023, Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that their

contract with ReadyRemodeling is void under Section 800.1 because Kathleen was not a licensed

home improvement salesperson. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 16. Plaintiffs also alleged that

ReadyRemodeling had violated the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code

§ 28-3904 et seq., because it “misrepresented ‘the authority of a salesman, representative or agent

to negotiate the final terms of a transaction.’” ECF No. 1 ¶ 30 (quoting D.C. Code § 28-3904(v)).

They sought disgorgement of the amount paid to ReadyRemodeling, with interest, treble damages,

and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees, costs, and any other relief the court deems just.

See id. ¶¶ 21-26, 32.

Plaintiffs twice attempted to effect personal service of their complaint on ReadyRemodeling,

and, on both occasions, the process server was met with no response. See ECF No. 6-1. Plaintiffs

then attempted to serve ReadyRemodeling pursuant to D.C. Code § 29-104.12(d), which provides

that, “if an entity’s registered agent in the District cannot with reasonable diligence be

found . . . the Mayor shall be an agent of the entity upon whom any process against the entity may

be served.” ECF No. 6. ReadyRemodeling never appeared, and Plaintiffs moved for entry of

default. ECF No. 7. The Clerk of Court entered default on January 24, 2024. ECF No. 8.

2 In April 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a default judgment. ECF No. 10. The court

denied the motion without prejudice, finding that Plaintiffs had not properly served the

Superintendent of Corporations at the D.C. Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection

(“DLCP”), which the Mayor had designated to accept service of process. ECF No. 12, at 3-6.

Specifically, the court explained that Plaintiffs had not complied with the instructions on the

DLCP’s website or submitted proof that the Superintendent had accepted service. See id. The

following month, Plaintiffs filed a statement in response to the court’s memorandum opinion and

order, ECF No. 13, which the court construed as a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), see May 29, 2024 Minute Order. In the motion, Plaintiffs pointed

to a different set of instructions on the DLCP’s website for serving the Superintendent of

Corporations and argued that they had complied with those instructions. ECF No. 13, at 1-3. The

court thereafter instructed Plaintiffs to file a certificate of service to confirm that the Superintendent

had accepted service. See May 29, 2024 Minute Order. Plaintiffs filed the requested certificate of

service in July 2024. ECF No. 14.

Based on this new information, the court concluded in February 2025 that Plaintiffs had

fulfilled the procedural requirements for a default judgment because they had properly effected

service on ReadyRemodeling under D.C. Code § 29-104.12(d). ECF No. 15, at 6. While the court

accordingly granted Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, it again denied Plaintiffs’ motion for

default judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently state a claim for relief. See

id. The court explained that under 16 DCMR § 800.1, a contract must be “signed by either a

licensed home improvement salesperson or a ‘licensed . . . home improvement contractor,’” but

Plaintiffs had alleged only that Kathleen was not a licensed home improvement salesperson—not

that she lacked both qualifications required under the regulation. Id. at 7 (quoting 16 DCMR

3 § 800.1). In a footnote, the court noted that if they could “cure this deficiency in an amended

complaint,” Plaintiffs could seek a new default and default judgment. Id. n.2.

Plaintiffs thereafter amended their complaint to add the allegation that Kathleen was not a

licensed home improvement contractor. ECF No. 16; see ECF No. 19 ¶ 13. In light of Plaintiffs’

amended complaint, the court vacated the Clerk of Court’s entry of default on the original

complaint, ECF No. 8, as moot, ECF No. 18, at 2. The court directed the Clerk of Court to send a

copy of the amended complaint to ReadyRemodeling, its registered agent, and the Superintendent

of Corporations, ECF No. 18, at 1, and it ordered ReadyRemodeling to respond to the amended

complaint by July 25, 2025, id. at 2. In August 2025, after ReadyRemodeling failed to respond to

the amended complaint, Plaintiffs again sought a default, ECF No. 20, which the Clerk of Court

granted, ECF No. 22. Plaintiffs then filed the present motion for a default judgment. ECF No. 24.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for default judgments . . . [to] safeguard

plaintiffs ‘when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive

party,’” and to protect “the diligent party . . . lest he be faced with interminable delay and

continued uncertainty as to his rights.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(quoting Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). A court may therefore “enter

default judgment [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2)] when a defendant fails to defend

its case appropriately or otherwise engages in dilatory tactics.” Peak v. District of Columbia, 236

F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372,

375 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). Default judgment is appropriate only when the defendant is “a totally

unresponsive party and its default [is] plainly willful, reflected by its failure to respond to the

summons and complaint, the entry of default, or the motion for default judgment.” Edwards v.

4 Charles Schwab Corp., No. 19-CV-3614, 2022 WL 839636, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flynn v. JMP Restoration Corp., No. 10-CV-102, 2010 WL

1687950, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2010)).

A plaintiff must complete two steps to obtain a default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.

First, the plaintiff must ask the Clerk of Court to enter default based on the defendant’s failure “to

plead or otherwise defend” itself in response to the complaint. Id. R. 55(a). Second, after the

Clerk has entered default, the plaintiff must file a motion for default judgment and provide notice

of the same to the defaulting party. Id. R. 55(b)(2). Once a plaintiff has satisfied both procedural

steps, “[t]he determination of whether default judgment is appropriate is committed to the

discretion of the trial court.” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Auxier

Drywall, LLC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008).

A “defaulting defendant is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the

complaint.” Robinson v. Ergo Sols., LLC, 4 F. Supp. 3d 171, 178 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Int’l

Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26,

30 (D.D.C. 2002)). However, “[t]he defendant’s default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled

to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief.” Denson v. DC Rest. Holdings,

Inc., No. 19-CV-1609, 2021 WL 4988994, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2008)). “Although the default establishes a

defendant’s liability, the court is required to make an independent determination of the sum to be

awarded unless the amount of damages is certain.” R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d

at 30. In ruling on a motion for a default judgment, “the court may rely on detailed affidavits or

documentary evidence to determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.” Id.

5 III. DISCUSSION

The court begins by assessing whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the procedural requirements

for a default judgment. It then considers whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief under

16 DCMR § 800.1 and determines the appropriate remedy.1

A. Service

As the court previously found, Plaintiffs properly effected service on ReadyRemodeling

under D.C. Code § 29-104.12(d), so the Clerk of Court’s January 24, 2024 entry of default was

proper. See ECF No. 15, at 6. Plaintiffs have since amended their complaint, ECF Nos. 16, 18,

19, which prompted the court to vacate the January 2024 default, ECF No. 18, at 2; see Mwani v.

Al Qaeda, 600 F. Supp. 3d 36, 53 (D.D.C. 2022) (“When an amended complaint becomes

operative, a default entered as to the prior complaint is generally deemed mooted.”). While a party

is generally required to serve all pleadings that are “filed after the original complaint,” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 5(a)(1)(B), service is not “required on a party who is in default for failing to appear” unless the

pleading “asserts a new claim for relief against such a party,” id. R. 5(a)(2); see Portillo v. Smith

Commons DC, LLC, No. 20-CV-49, 2021 WL 3287741, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2021) (explaining

that “when new parties, claims, or substantive factual changes are added to an amended complaint,

service on the defaulting party is required under Rule 5(a)”).

1 While Plaintiffs also assert a violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-3904 et seq., in their amended complaint, see ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 27-32, their motion for default judgment focuses only on the disgorgement count, see ECF No. 24. The court therefore considers Plaintiffs’ claim for default judgment only as to Count I of the amended complaint and will dismiss Count II without prejudice. See Fanning v. Big Warrior Corp., 707 F. Supp. 2d 8, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2010).

6 Here, Plaintiffs were not required to serve ReadyRemodeling with the amended complaint

because the company was already in default for failing to appear and Plaintiffs were not asserting

any new claims against it. Compare ECF No. 1 (original complaint), with ECF No. 19 (amended

complaint). Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the court directed the Clerk of Court to send

copies of the amended complaint to ReadyRemodeling, its registered agent, and the Superintendent

of Corporations. Given ReadyRemodeling’s default, the court deems Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded

allegations in the amended complaint admitted. See Robinson, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 178.

B. Liability

The District of Columbia’s municipal regulations provide that “[n]o person shall require or

accept any payment for a home improvement contract to be undertaken in the District in advance

of the full completion of all work required to be performed under the contract, unless that person

is licensed as a home improvement contractor or as a licensed salesperson employed by a licensed

contractor.” 16 DCMR § 800.1. A “home improvement contract” is “an agreement for the

performance of home improvement work in the District for a contract price of three hundred dollars

($300) or more.” Id. § 899.1. “‘Home improvement work,’ in turn, is defined as ‘the addition to

or alteration, conversion, improvement, modernization, remodeling, repair, or replacement of a

residential property, or a structure adjacent to the residential property.’” C.A. Harrison Cos. v.

Evans, 266 A.3d 979, 983 (D.C. 2022) (quoting 16 DCMR § 899.1).

The court concludes that Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations are sufficient to establish that

ReadyRemodeling violated Section 800.1. First, the parties’ agreement qualifies as a “home

improvement contract” because Plaintiffs contracted with ReadyRemodeling “for certain new

construction and renovation work” to their residential property in exchange for about $180,000.

ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 7-8; see 16 DCMR § 899.1. Moreover, the contract required payment prior to full

7 completion of work, and it was not signed on ReadyRemodeling’s behalf by a licensed home

improvement contractor or a licensed home improvement salesperson employed by a licensed

contractor. ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 12-14; see 16 DCMR § 800.1.

As previously noted, “Section 800.1 speaks in the disjunctive, requiring the contract to be

signed by either a licensed home improvement salesperson or a ‘licensed . . . home improvement

contractor.’” ECF No. 15, at 7 (quoting 16 DCMR § 800.1). Plaintiffs allege in their amended

complaint that their home improvement contract was signed by a woman named “Kathleen” who

was “not a licensed home improvement contractor or a licensed home improvement salesperson

on behalf of Ready Remodeling, LLC.” ECF No. 19 ¶¶ 12-13. In his affidavit in support of the

motion for a default judgment, Mr. Abera avers the same. ECF No. 24-1 ¶¶ 4-7 (stating that the

contract “was signed by ‘Kathleen,’” not ReadyRemodeling’s licensed home improvement

salesman). Plaintiffs have thus cured the deficiency in their original complaint by pleading that

Kathleen lacked either of the qualifications required under Section 800.1. Therefore, the home

improvement contract between Plaintiffs and ReadyRemodeling contravened Section 800.1,

rendering it “void and unenforceable.” C.A. Harrison Cos., 266 A.3d at 983 (quoting Capital

Constr. Co. v. Plaza W. Coop. Ass’n, 604 A.2d 428, 430 (D.C. 1992)).

C. Damages

After a finding of liability, the court must make an independent determination of the

appropriate sum for a default judgment based on affidavits and other supporting documentation.

R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30. Here, Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of the

$92,000 they paid to ReadyRemodeling and offer Mr. Abera’s affidavit in support of their motion.

ECF No. 24-1.

8 Disgorgement of funds paid to an unlicensed home improvement contractor is a proper

remedy for a violation of Section 800.1. See C.A. Harrison Cos., 266 A.3d at 986. Courts in the

District of Columbia have “long adhered to the policy of requiring an unlicensed home

improvement contractor to return to the homeowner payment it received for the job if the

contractor received the payment in advance of completion of the job at a time when it was

unlicensed.” Id. (quoting Remsen Partners, Ltd. v. Stephen A. Goldberg Co., 755 A.2d 412, 418

(D.C. 2000)); see Cutler v. KBR Luxury, Inc., No. 23-CV-2377, 2024 WL 2891621, at *5

(D.D.C. June 10, 2024) (“The law is well-settled that an unlicensed business performing home

improvement work and receiving progress payments violates [Section ]800.1, making that

business subject to disgorgement and to repayment of any partial payments received from the

homeowner.” (citations omitted)). Additionally, Mr. Abera’s affidavit establishes that the

appropriate amount of disgorgement is $92,000, which is what Plaintiffs paid to ReadyRemodeling

under the contract. ECF No. 24-1 ¶ 9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to a default judgment

against ReadyRemodeling in the amount of $92,000.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment, ECF

No. 24, and enter an order of disgorgement in favor of Plaintiffs and against ReadyRemodeling

LLC in the amount of $92,000. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: January 14, 2026