Abel A. Ramirez v. State of Iowa
This text of Abel A. Ramirez v. State of Iowa (Abel A. Ramirez v. State of Iowa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1222 Filed October 19, 2022
ABEL A. RAMIREZ, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Kurt J. Stoebe,
Judge.
Abel Ramirez appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022). 2
SCOTT, Senior Judge.
Abel Ramirez seeks postconviction relief, claiming his conviction and
sentence for robbery in Iowa was based on the same event as his federal
conviction, which violates double jeopardy principles and, consequently, his Iowa
sentence is an illegal sentence.1 We affirm.
Ramirez concedes the Iowa Supreme Court has previously held there is
nothing to prevent dual prosecution by both the United States and the State of
Iowa. State v. Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1998) (“Under the federal
double jeopardy clause, a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state
prosecution for state criminal violations based on the same or similar elements.
This concept of ‘dual sovereignty’ is premised on the principle that the states and
federal government are each sovereign entities with the power to independently
prosecute criminal offenses created under the laws of that sovereign by employing
their own prosecutorial and adjudicative institutions for that purpose. This court
has recognized this principle for many years.” (internal citations omitted)); see also
Denezpi v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1838, 1844–45 (2022) (“Because the
sovereign source of a law is an inherent and distinctive feature of the law itself, an
offense defined by one sovereign is necessarily a different offense from that of
another sovereign.”). Ramirez asks us to revisit the Shafranek decision while
acknowledging the district court’s decision is in accordance with that precedent.
But this court is without authority to overrule Iowa Supreme Court precedent. State
1“Though we typically review challenges to illegal sentences for correction of legal errors, our standard of review for an allegation of an unconstitutional sentence is de novo.” State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 187–88 (Iowa 2018). 3
v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App.1990) (“We are not at liberty to
overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.”); see also State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d
583, 584 n.1 (Iowa 2014) (“Generally, it is the role of the supreme court to decide
if case precedent should no longer be followed.”). We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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