NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHOHJAHONMIRZO ABDUMALIKOV, No. 24-7803 Agency No. Petitioner, A246-917-970 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Shohjahonmirzo Abdumalikov, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan,
seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of
an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. He also seeks review
of the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. We review the agency’s factual
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. findings and “primarily factual mixed question[s]” “for substantial evidence.”
Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the
BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion. Alcarez-Rodriguez v.
Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252, and we deny the petition.
To be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must
establish a nexus between a protected ground and the alleged persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th
Cir. 2017) (discussing the nexus standards for asylum and withholding of removal).
Petitioner’s claims are based on two protected grounds, religion and the proposed
particular social group (PSG) “Uzbeks accused of religious extremism related
charges.” Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner
failed to show the requisite nexus between either of these protected grounds and the
persecution he experienced or feared.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner’s
persecutors were motivated by his possession of a “banned book” that was “deemed
related to extremism” rather than because of his religion, the Shafi’i school of Sunni
Islam. Petitioner testified that much of the interrogation concerned how he obtained
the book, the police released him after they learned he received the book as a gift
and they were satisfied that he did not have any “radical ideas,” and the police did
2 24-7803 not contact him after his release. Petitioner never experienced any issues practicing
his religion previously, and his family in Uzbekistan has never been harmed on
account of their religion (and his grandfather, who was Shafi’i, once served as a
governor).
Petitioner observes that the police accused him of being an Islamic extremist,
interrogated him about his religious beliefs, and placed some restrictions on his
religious practice.1 But this countervailing evidence does not compel a conclusion
different from the agency’s. B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2022). The
evidence could reasonably be construed as showing that the police were concerned
with extremism rather than a particular religion. And though the authorities
prohibited Petitioner from joining public prayers, substantial record evidence
supports the agency’s conclusion that he was not entirely forbidden from practicing
his faith. Cf. Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213–17 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding
nexus with religion where authorities permanently forbade petitioner from attending
church and forced him to sign a statement relinquishing his Christian faith).
2. The agency’s conclusion that Petitioner’s PSG—“Uzbeks accused of
religion extremism related charges”—is not cognizable for lack of social distinction
1 Petitioner asserts that police interrogated him about his religious practices and beliefs and demanded to know whether he prayed in the Shafi’i way. The supporting record cites do not contain this information. Rather, the record states that the police officers accused Petitioner of being an extremist or a radical.
3 24-7803 is supported by substantial evidence. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242
(9th Cir. 2020) (stating that “whether there is evidence that a specific society
recognizes a social group [] is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence”).
Petitioner’s argument that the BIA erred by failing to explain its decision fails. The
BIA, citing the IJ’s decision, explained that it affirmed the IJ’s decision that
Petitioner failed to provide evidence that this PSG is viewed as distinct in Uzbek
society. This was sufficient. See Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557, 573
(9th Cir. 2025).
Petitioner points to evidence that he was questioned about belonging to an
extremist group, and that the Uzbek government often targets religious extremism.
But this evidence is not sufficient to compel the conclusion that the PSG is socially
distinct because it does not demonstrate that “society in general perceives, considers,
or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic [of the PSG] to be a
group.” Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1082 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). Additionally, as the agency noted, “the social group must exist
independently of the fact of persecution.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d
1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioner did not prove his claim for protection under CAT. To receive CAT
protection, “an applicant must show ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would
4 24-7803 be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Plancarte Sauceda v.
Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)).
Petitioner contends that the agency did not consider evidence of country
conditions and that the authorities searched for him after he left Uzbekistan. But the
BIA explained that, notwithstanding country conditions, future torture was
speculative because authorities released Petitioner after they determined he received
the book as a gift, and he was unbothered by authorities during the 12-day period he
remained in Uzbekistan after he was discharged from the hospital. See Zheng v.
Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting torture claim where “claims
of possible torture remain speculative”). And even if the record supports Petitioner’s
fear of arrest upon return because he defied the authorities’ directive not to leave
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHOHJAHONMIRZO ABDUMALIKOV, No. 24-7803 Agency No. Petitioner, A246-917-970 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2025 Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Shohjahonmirzo Abdumalikov, a native and citizen of Uzbekistan,
seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of his appeal of
an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection. He also seeks review
of the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. We review the agency’s factual
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. findings and “primarily factual mixed question[s]” “for substantial evidence.”
Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2025). We review the
BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion. Alcarez-Rodriguez v.
Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2023). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252, and we deny the petition.
To be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must
establish a nexus between a protected ground and the alleged persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357 (9th
Cir. 2017) (discussing the nexus standards for asylum and withholding of removal).
Petitioner’s claims are based on two protected grounds, religion and the proposed
particular social group (PSG) “Uzbeks accused of religious extremism related
charges.” Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioner
failed to show the requisite nexus between either of these protected grounds and the
persecution he experienced or feared.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner’s
persecutors were motivated by his possession of a “banned book” that was “deemed
related to extremism” rather than because of his religion, the Shafi’i school of Sunni
Islam. Petitioner testified that much of the interrogation concerned how he obtained
the book, the police released him after they learned he received the book as a gift
and they were satisfied that he did not have any “radical ideas,” and the police did
2 24-7803 not contact him after his release. Petitioner never experienced any issues practicing
his religion previously, and his family in Uzbekistan has never been harmed on
account of their religion (and his grandfather, who was Shafi’i, once served as a
governor).
Petitioner observes that the police accused him of being an Islamic extremist,
interrogated him about his religious beliefs, and placed some restrictions on his
religious practice.1 But this countervailing evidence does not compel a conclusion
different from the agency’s. B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2022). The
evidence could reasonably be construed as showing that the police were concerned
with extremism rather than a particular religion. And though the authorities
prohibited Petitioner from joining public prayers, substantial record evidence
supports the agency’s conclusion that he was not entirely forbidden from practicing
his faith. Cf. Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1213–17 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding
nexus with religion where authorities permanently forbade petitioner from attending
church and forced him to sign a statement relinquishing his Christian faith).
2. The agency’s conclusion that Petitioner’s PSG—“Uzbeks accused of
religion extremism related charges”—is not cognizable for lack of social distinction
1 Petitioner asserts that police interrogated him about his religious practices and beliefs and demanded to know whether he prayed in the Shafi’i way. The supporting record cites do not contain this information. Rather, the record states that the police officers accused Petitioner of being an extremist or a radical.
3 24-7803 is supported by substantial evidence. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242
(9th Cir. 2020) (stating that “whether there is evidence that a specific society
recognizes a social group [] is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence”).
Petitioner’s argument that the BIA erred by failing to explain its decision fails. The
BIA, citing the IJ’s decision, explained that it affirmed the IJ’s decision that
Petitioner failed to provide evidence that this PSG is viewed as distinct in Uzbek
society. This was sufficient. See Magana-Magana v. Bondi, 129 F.4th 557, 573
(9th Cir. 2025).
Petitioner points to evidence that he was questioned about belonging to an
extremist group, and that the Uzbek government often targets religious extremism.
But this evidence is not sufficient to compel the conclusion that the PSG is socially
distinct because it does not demonstrate that “society in general perceives, considers,
or recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic [of the PSG] to be a
group.” Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1082 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). Additionally, as the agency noted, “the social group must exist
independently of the fact of persecution.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d
1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that
Petitioner did not prove his claim for protection under CAT. To receive CAT
protection, “an applicant must show ‘it is more likely than not that he or she would
4 24-7803 be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Plancarte Sauceda v.
Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)).
Petitioner contends that the agency did not consider evidence of country
conditions and that the authorities searched for him after he left Uzbekistan. But the
BIA explained that, notwithstanding country conditions, future torture was
speculative because authorities released Petitioner after they determined he received
the book as a gift, and he was unbothered by authorities during the 12-day period he
remained in Uzbekistan after he was discharged from the hospital. See Zheng v.
Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835–36 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting torture claim where “claims
of possible torture remain speculative”). And even if the record supports Petitioner’s
fear of arrest upon return because he defied the authorities’ directive not to leave
Uzbekistan, the potential threat of prosecution upon return to a petitioner’s home
country alone is not enough. Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 981 (9th Cir. 2023)
(“Generally, prosecution and punishment for criminal activity do not constitute
torture.”).
Petitioner also argues that the BIA applied “an impermissibly heightened
standard to show intent of past torturers to torture again.” Nothing about the BIA’s
analysis suggests a heightened standard. The burden of showing likelihood of future
torture falls squarely on the petitioner. See Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 834.
Furthermore, evidence of past torture “does not alone establish or even give rise to
5 24-7803 a presumption that the applicant will suffer future torture.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v.
Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022).
4. Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s
motion to remand based on his father’s affidavit. A noncitizen seeking reopening or
remand “need only establish a prima facie case for relief.” Alcarez-Rodriguez v.
Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133,
1139 (9th Cir. 2016)).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the father’s affidavit
was insufficient to carry Petitioner’s burden of demonstrating a reasonable
likelihood of success on his claims. As to nexus, the affidavit’s discussion of the
religious restrictions placed on his family is largely repetitive of what Petitioner
earlier alleged. The affidavit also does not further define the proposed social group
or show social distinction. As for the CAT claim, the affidavit shows that the
authorities are interested Petitioner’s whereabouts and may substantiate Petitioner’s
fear of being arrested upon return, but that alone is insufficient. See Park, 72 F.4th
at 981; cf. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1218-20 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
petitioner showed sufficient likelihood of future torture in his home country where
among other things, after petitioner fled, the government closed petitioner’s father’s
business and forcibly kidnapped his two brothers).
DENIED.
6 24-7803