Abdallah Abdulraheem Mohammad Khater v. Attorney General United States of America

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-1277
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 25-1277 ____________

ABDALLAH ABDULRAHEEM MOHAMMAD KHATER, Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A099-301-296) Immigration Judge: Laura N. Pierro ____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 5, 2026 ____________

Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 17, 2026) ____________

OPINION * ____________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

A Jordanian national was charged with removability for violating the conditions

under which he was admitted to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). He

was ordered removed, but in the course of those proceedings, he unsuccessfully requested

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. administrative closure, a continuance on the day of the final removal hearing, and voluntary departure. Through this petition, he seeks to challenge those rulings. For the reasons

below, we will deny in part and dismiss in part the petition.

BACKGROUND

In November 2004, Abdallah Abdulraheem Mohammad Khater, a native and citizen

of Jordan, entered the United States on a V-1 nonimmigrant visa as the spouse of a lawful

permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(V). To maintain the conditions of his status of entry, Khater had to continue residing with his sponsoring spouse, and he could

work only with proper employment authorization.

Those two conditions proved to be obstacles. In 2006, he and his wife separated, and she moved to Israel with their children, two of whom were United States citizens.

Khater’s employment authorization also expired in March 2009, but he subsequently

operated a hookah lounge in Paterson, New Jersey. In March 2011, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal

proceedings against Khater for failure to maintain the conditions under which he was

admitted. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). Those proceedings lasted over a decade, due in part

to several continuances that Khater requested and received. During that time, he remarried

a U.S. citizen, and she petitioned to adjust his status to become a lawful permanent resident.

About six days before the final removal hearing on November 8, 2021, Khater learned that DHS intended to deny that adjustment-of-status application. He then requested

that DHS exercise prosecutorial discretion to discontinue the removal proceedings. And

in the Immigration Court, he moved for administrative closure during the pendency of both

his plea with DHS for prosecutorial discretion and a forthcoming petition by his U.S.-

2 citizen daughter for an adjustment of his status. DHS declined to abandon the removal proceedings, and the Immigration Judge denied his motion for administrative closure.

On the day of the final removal hearing, Khater requested a continuance to allow

him time to apply for asylum based on a fear of returning to Jordan. But see id. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (providing a one-year time period to apply for asylum, subject to

exceptions). The Immigration Judge denied that request.

At the hearing, Khater sought voluntary departure to Jordan if he were ordered removed. See id. § 1229c(b)(1). After determining that Khater had violated the conditions

on his visa, the Immigration Judge issued a final order of removal and denied Khater’s

request for voluntary departure. Through an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Khater

challenged the denials of his requests for administrative closure, a continuance on the day

of the final removal hearing, and voluntary departure. The BIA rejected those arguments

and upheld the final order of removal. Through a petition, Khater invokes the jurisdiction

of this Court to contest that order. See id. § 1252(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

Khater challenges the denial of his requests for administrative closure and for a

continuance, but those need not be adjudicated unless it is “highly probable” that they

affected the outcome of the proceedings. Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). Khater has not demonstrated that the denial of either of those motions

affected the Immigration Judge’s determination that he violated the terms of his visa status.

Without a showing of a high probability that resolution of those challenges in his favor would affect the outcome of the final order of removal, these components of his petition

are meritless.

3 Khater’s other challenge – to the denial of his request for voluntary departure – fails for a more fundamental reason. By statute, no court has jurisdiction to review such an

order: “No court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a request for an order

of voluntary departure.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f). And thus, despite his efforts to recharacterize his challenge as a due process claim, the jurisdictional bar applies to this

specific ruling (which does not implicate any constitutionally protected liberty interest),

and this portion of his petition must be dismissed. See Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that “artful labeling will not confer us with

jurisdiction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) and “[r]ecasting challenges to factual or

discretionary determinations as due process or other constitutional claims is clearly insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition in part with respect to the rulings

on administrative closure and a continuance, and we will dismiss the petition in part with

respect to the ruling on voluntary departure.