NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3014-23
ABC BAIL BONDS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PAULA GILBERT, LATOYA WILLIAMS, and LAKEYSA GREEN,
Defendants,
and
HAROLD D. GREEN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted October 15, 2025 – Decided November 5, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. DC-004626-23.
Harold D. Green, Jr., appellant pro se. Shanna Lyn Spiro (ABC Bail Bonds, Inc.), attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Harold D. Green, Jr. appeals from the April 22, 2024 trial
court's judgment entered in favor of plaintiff ABC Bail Bonds, Inc., following a
bench trial. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, record, and applicable law,
we affirm.
I.
On October 16, 2023, plaintiff filed a breach of contract complaint against
defendant. Plaintiff later moved to amend its complaint, which defendant
opposed. The court granted plaintiff's motion to amend and thereafter entered
default, which defendant moved to vacate. On April 15, 2024, the court granted
defendant's motion, vacating default and setting a trial date.
On April 22, at trial, plaintiff offered the testimony of its representative,
Raymond Winegrad. Winegrad testified to facilitating a $300,000 bail bond
transaction for the posting of a bail, which had been set for defendant's brother
Jonathan Green. For plaintiff to issue the bail bond, Winegrad explained that it
charged a purchase fee of $30,000. On December 3, 2017, Winegrad signed a
bail bond premium receipt, memorializing that $10,000 was paid and a
remaining balance of $20,000 was due for the bond. Winegrad testified that
A-3014-23 2 defendant on the same day signed a promissory note, "reflecting the payment
plan and the balance due" for the obtained bail bond. Defendant's promissory
note also provided that he was responsible for paying the remaining $20,000
balance in monthly installments of $500, starting in January 2018.
Winegrad accounted for plaintiff's receipt of "two payments made of
$400" and a payment of "$150." He relayed no other payments were made.
During defendant's testimony, he acknowledged obtaining the bail bond
for his brother and executing the promissory note. He did not dispute that the
remaining balance under the promissory note was $19,050. He alleged the
balance was not owed because the parties entered an oral agreement, modifying
the amount owed, after plaintiff posted the bond. Defendant claimed his brother
"ended up going into federal custody for the same charge" after plaintiff paid
the bail. Defendant alleged that in 2018, he "called [plaintiff]" and spoke with
a "guy" but "did[ not] get his name." Defendant asserted the man advised
defendant there would "be . . . no charge" if his brother received a federal bail.
The man also allegedly promised that if no federal bail was provided to
defendant's brother, then plaintiff "made a free $10,000" and would not "charge
[him] for this balance." Defendant asserted the oral modification governed.
A-3014-23 3 On cross-examination, defendant could not recall the name of plaintiff's
representative with whom he discussed the oral agreement. Defendant alleged
without any explanation that the man no longer worked for plaintiff.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff and issued an oral decision. The court found defendant did not contest
executing the promissory note and "that the remaining a[mount of] $19,050 was
not paid." It found defendant breached the promissory note by "fail[ing] to pay
the $19,050" owed under the promissory note after plaintiff posted the bail bond.
The court noted "defendant's breach . . . caused a loss" to plaintiff because
"[plaintiff] did not get . . . their fee for the issuance of the bail bond." Regarding
defendant's oral modification, the court found defendant's testimony lacked
credibility because there was only the "gist of a conversation." The court
reasoned defendant failed to prove an oral modification because he provided no
information regarding: the "exact words" used in reaching an oral agreement;
who made the agreement; when it was entered; and any other relevant
circumstances. Additionally, defendant did not produce a phone call "log," "bill
showing the phone call," or other corroborating evidence.
A-3014-23 4 On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in entering the judgment
against him because it: failed to consider the oral agreement entered;
demonstrated bias, warranting its recusal; and committed procedural violations.
II.
We begin with the well-established standard of review in an appeal from
a bench trial. We "review a 'trial court's determinations, premised on the
testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with
a deferential standard.'" Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325,
336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182
(2013)). Ordinarily, "[t]he scope of [our] review of a trial court's fact -finding
function is limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169
(2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). "[W]e defer to the
trial court's credibility determinations, because it '"hears the case, sees and
observes the witnesses, and hears them testify," affording it "a better perspective
than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness."'" City Council
of Orange Twp. v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261, 272 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting
Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).
We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial
judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly
A-3014-23 5 unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017) (quoting Griepenburg v.
Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)).
To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence:
[F]irst, that "[t]he parties entered into a contract containing certain terms"; second, that "plaintiff[ ] did what the contract required [it] to do"; third, that "defendant[ ] did not do what the contract required [him] to do[,]" defined as a "breach of the contract"; and fourth, that "defendant['s] breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff[ ]."
[Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) (second and seventh alterations in original) (quoting Model Jury Charge (Civil), 4.10A, "The Contract Claim—Generally" (approved May 1998)).]
"The plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry;
'when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3014-23
ABC BAIL BONDS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PAULA GILBERT, LATOYA WILLIAMS, and LAKEYSA GREEN,
Defendants,
and
HAROLD D. GREEN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted October 15, 2025 – Decided November 5, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. DC-004626-23.
Harold D. Green, Jr., appellant pro se. Shanna Lyn Spiro (ABC Bail Bonds, Inc.), attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Harold D. Green, Jr. appeals from the April 22, 2024 trial
court's judgment entered in favor of plaintiff ABC Bail Bonds, Inc., following a
bench trial. Having reviewed the parties' arguments, record, and applicable law,
we affirm.
I.
On October 16, 2023, plaintiff filed a breach of contract complaint against
defendant. Plaintiff later moved to amend its complaint, which defendant
opposed. The court granted plaintiff's motion to amend and thereafter entered
default, which defendant moved to vacate. On April 15, 2024, the court granted
defendant's motion, vacating default and setting a trial date.
On April 22, at trial, plaintiff offered the testimony of its representative,
Raymond Winegrad. Winegrad testified to facilitating a $300,000 bail bond
transaction for the posting of a bail, which had been set for defendant's brother
Jonathan Green. For plaintiff to issue the bail bond, Winegrad explained that it
charged a purchase fee of $30,000. On December 3, 2017, Winegrad signed a
bail bond premium receipt, memorializing that $10,000 was paid and a
remaining balance of $20,000 was due for the bond. Winegrad testified that
A-3014-23 2 defendant on the same day signed a promissory note, "reflecting the payment
plan and the balance due" for the obtained bail bond. Defendant's promissory
note also provided that he was responsible for paying the remaining $20,000
balance in monthly installments of $500, starting in January 2018.
Winegrad accounted for plaintiff's receipt of "two payments made of
$400" and a payment of "$150." He relayed no other payments were made.
During defendant's testimony, he acknowledged obtaining the bail bond
for his brother and executing the promissory note. He did not dispute that the
remaining balance under the promissory note was $19,050. He alleged the
balance was not owed because the parties entered an oral agreement, modifying
the amount owed, after plaintiff posted the bond. Defendant claimed his brother
"ended up going into federal custody for the same charge" after plaintiff paid
the bail. Defendant alleged that in 2018, he "called [plaintiff]" and spoke with
a "guy" but "did[ not] get his name." Defendant asserted the man advised
defendant there would "be . . . no charge" if his brother received a federal bail.
The man also allegedly promised that if no federal bail was provided to
defendant's brother, then plaintiff "made a free $10,000" and would not "charge
[him] for this balance." Defendant asserted the oral modification governed.
A-3014-23 3 On cross-examination, defendant could not recall the name of plaintiff's
representative with whom he discussed the oral agreement. Defendant alleged
without any explanation that the man no longer worked for plaintiff.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff and issued an oral decision. The court found defendant did not contest
executing the promissory note and "that the remaining a[mount of] $19,050 was
not paid." It found defendant breached the promissory note by "fail[ing] to pay
the $19,050" owed under the promissory note after plaintiff posted the bail bond.
The court noted "defendant's breach . . . caused a loss" to plaintiff because
"[plaintiff] did not get . . . their fee for the issuance of the bail bond." Regarding
defendant's oral modification, the court found defendant's testimony lacked
credibility because there was only the "gist of a conversation." The court
reasoned defendant failed to prove an oral modification because he provided no
information regarding: the "exact words" used in reaching an oral agreement;
who made the agreement; when it was entered; and any other relevant
circumstances. Additionally, defendant did not produce a phone call "log," "bill
showing the phone call," or other corroborating evidence.
A-3014-23 4 On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in entering the judgment
against him because it: failed to consider the oral agreement entered;
demonstrated bias, warranting its recusal; and committed procedural violations.
II.
We begin with the well-established standard of review in an appeal from
a bench trial. We "review a 'trial court's determinations, premised on the
testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with
a deferential standard.'" Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325,
336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182
(2013)). Ordinarily, "[t]he scope of [our] review of a trial court's fact -finding
function is limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169
(2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). "[W]e defer to the
trial court's credibility determinations, because it '"hears the case, sees and
observes the witnesses, and hears them testify," affording it "a better perspective
than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness."'" City Council
of Orange Twp. v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261, 272 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting
Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).
We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial
judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly
A-3014-23 5 unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017) (quoting Griepenburg v.
Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)).
To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence:
[F]irst, that "[t]he parties entered into a contract containing certain terms"; second, that "plaintiff[ ] did what the contract required [it] to do"; third, that "defendant[ ] did not do what the contract required [him] to do[,]" defined as a "breach of the contract"; and fourth, that "defendant['s] breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff[ ]."
[Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482 (2016) (second and seventh alterations in original) (quoting Model Jury Charge (Civil), 4.10A, "The Contract Claim—Generally" (approved May 1998)).]
"The plain language of the contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry;
'when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and
unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so
would lead to an absurd result.'" Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241
N.J. 595, 616 (2020) (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).
A-3014-23 6 "'[T]he basic features of a contract' are 'offer, acceptance, consideration,
and performance by both parties.'" Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 339
(2021) (quoting Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 439 (2013)). "'A
contract arises from [an] offer and acceptance, and must be sufficiently definite
"that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with
reasonable certainty."'" Id. at 339 (quoting Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128
N.J. 427, 435 (1992)). When given for consideration, a promissory note is the
equivalent of "a contract by the obligor to pay a debt." First Union Nat'l Bank
v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 383 N.J. Super. 562, 569 (App. Div. 2006) (citation
omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 190 N.J. 342 (2007).
After formation, the contracting parties "may, by mutual assent, modify
it." County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 99 (1998). Generally,
modifications to a written contract are not required to be made in writing. A
"modification can be proved by an explicit agreement to modify, or . . . by the
actions and conduct of the parties, so long as the intention to modify is mutual
and clear." Ibid.; DeAngelis v. Rose, 320 N.J. Super. 263, 280 (App. Div. 1999).
However, an agreement to modify a contract "must be based upon new or
additional consideration." Fauver, 153 N.J. at 100. "The interpretation of a
A-3014-23 7 contract is generally subject to de novo review." Arbus, Maybruch & Goode,
LLC v. Cogen, 475 N.J. Super. 509, 515 (App. Div. 2023).
III.
We first address defendant's contention that the court committed
"substantial errors" in entering judgment for plaintiff after the trial. The record
amply supports the court's finding that plaintiff proved by a preponderance of
the evidence each element of its breach of contract claim. The court specifically
reasoned that plaintiff established defendant breached the promissory note
entered because: he had agreed to pay $20,000 to obtain the bail bond; plaintiff
posted the bond, resulting in defendant's brother's release; and defendant owed
plaintiff the $19,050 balance—after $950 had been paid. The court accurately
recognized defendant did not dispute signing the promissory note and $19,050
was the amount due. After observing the witnesses and reviewing the evidence,
the court determined defendant failed to credibly demonstrate the parties orally
modified the promissory note. The court found defendant did not provide
sufficient credible details about the alleged oral modification. The court's
specific findings contradict defendant's argument that it failed "to consider an
oral agreement between the parties" was entered. We discern no error in the
court's decision.
A-3014-23 8 We next address defendant's argument that the court displayed "bias,"
infringed on his rights, and violated procedural rules. After a detailed review of
the trial transcript, we are satisfied defendant's assertions are without merit.
During the trial, the court fairly and impartially permitted defendant to present
his defense. The court demonstrated no bias and ensured defendant's due
process rights were afforded. The record reflects that the court provided
defendant, who was self-represented, with multiple opportunities to introduce
evidence and instructed him on presenting exhibits. Further, it properly
provided him with a full opportunity to be heard, inquiring whether defendant
wanted to cross-examine plaintiff's witness and had any "last argument" or
"[a]nything else to say." Regarding defendant's assertion that the court violated
procedural rules preventing his defense, he cites no specific court action taken
nor rule violated.
Defendant also contends the court's inquiry regarding defendant's
brother's federal incarceration "was antithetical to the principles of justice." The
court's inquiry was clearly based on defendant's testimony and was neither
inappropriate nor the product of bias. Additionally, we reject defendant's
argument in his reply brief that the court's judgment should be reversed because
plaintiff committed forum shopping by filing the present complaint in Mercer
A-3014-23 9 County after earlier filed complaints were dismissed in a different county.
Defendant has offered no support for this assertion. To the extent not addressed,
defendant's remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3014-23 10