Abbott v. Aramark Food Services

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 10, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-01597
StatusUnknown

This text of Abbott v. Aramark Food Services (Abbott v. Aramark Food Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abbott v. Aramark Food Services, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RICHARD DELL ABBOTT,

Plaintiff, Case No. 20-CV-1597-JPS v.

ARAMARK FOOD SERVICES, ORDER CORRECTIONAL OFFICER HOSKINS, and WAUKESHA COUNTY JAIL,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Richard Dell Abbott filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Docket #1). This case was previously assigned to Magistrate Judge Stephen Dries. However, because not all parties have had the opportunity to consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the case was reassigned to a District Judge for entry of this order, which resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On October 29, 2020, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $12.83. (Docket #8). Plaintiff paid $13.00 on November 12, 2020. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. (Docket #2). He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff asserts that, on September 19, 2020, Defendant Correctional Officer Hoskins delivered his food tray. (Docket #1 at 2). Plaintiff allegedly bit down onto a small, hard object, fracturing his filling and chipping his tooth. (Id.) Plaintiff showed Hoskins the object, which Hoskins placed in a bag and identified as a “ball grinner.” (Id.) Hoskins allegedly told Plaintiff it came from the kitchen. (Id.) Plaintiff states that “someone, was negligent and careless by allowing or putting a ball grinner into the food” which caused him injury and pain. (Id. at 3). He asserts that either Hoskins or food services staff accidentally or maliciously placed the object in his food. (Id.) Plaintiff was seen by the nurse after he was injured. (Id.) 2.3 Analysis Plaintiff does not state which constitutional right was violated. However, his allegations may state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must allege that officials were deliberately indifferent to conditions of confinement that constituted an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (holding that an Eighth Amendment violation arises when prisoners are deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”). Inmates are entitled to “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. This includes sanitary and hygienic living conditions. See Myers v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 655 F. App’x 500, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2016). Allegations of unsanitary food or objects found in a prisoner’s food may state a constitutional claim. However, the claim must be more than a single incident to constitute a constitutional violation. A single incident of food poisoning or finding a foreign object in food does not constitute a violation of the constitutional rights of the prisoner affected. Evidence of frequent or regular injurious incidents of foreign objects in food, on the other hand, raises what otherwise might be merely isolated negligent behavior to the level of a constitutional violation. Green v. Atkinson, 623 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Hyder v. Perez, No. 96–40003, 1996 WL 255243, at *1 (5th Cir. April 29, 1996) (unpublished) (per curiam); George v. King, 837 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1988)). See also Brown v.

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Related

Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Green v. Atkinson
623 F.3d 278 (Fifth Circuit, 2010)
Donald S. George v. John T. King
837 F.2d 705 (Fifth Circuit, 1988)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Hyder v. Perez
85 F.3d 624 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Bernard Brown v. R. Brock
632 F. App'x 744 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
Jason Myers v. Indiana Department of Correcti
655 F. App'x 500 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Gregory Robinson v. Carl Danberg
673 F. App'x 205 (Third Circuit, 2016)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Abbott v. Aramark Food Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abbott-v-aramark-food-services-wied-2021.