Abbas Caka v. Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; et al.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 Case No.: 26cv1724 DMS BJW ABBAS CAKA,
12 O R D E R G R A N T I N G P E T I TION; 13 Petitioner, DENYING MOTION FOR v. EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 14 RESTRAINING ORDER AS MOOT Secretary of the Department of Homeland 15 Security; et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 Before the Court are Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, (Pet., ECF No. 19 1), and Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”), (ECF No. 20 6). Respondents filed a return, (Return, ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed a reply, (ECF No. 21 5). For the following reasons, the Court grants the Petition and denies the TRO Motion. 23 Petitioner, a Turkish citizen, entered the United States without inspection on or about 24 November 15, 2024. (Pet. 8.) The next day, a United States Border Patrol agent 25 encountered and arrested Petitioner, before transporting him to the San Diego Central 26 Processing Center. (Id.) The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 27 (“USCIS”) initiated expedited removal proceedings. (See id. at 9.) However, after a 28 USCIS supervisory asylum officer determined, on December 12, 2024, that Petitioner had 1 a credible fear of persecution or torture, USCIS vacated the expedited removal order and 2 placed Petitioner in standard removal proceedings. (Id. at 8–9.) Petitioner was charged as 3 inadmissible and, on January 13, 2025, released from custody on parole. (Id. at 9.) On 4 February 18, 2025, Petitioner timely applied for asylum and withholding of removal. (Id.) 5 His application remains pending; no final order of removal has been entered. (Id.) 6 Petitioner has complied with all the requirements of supervised release, including 7 wearing an ankle monitor, enrolling in the Alternatives to Detention supervision program, 8 and completing check-in appointments with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 9 (“ICE”) officers. (Id. at 9–10.) However, on January 30, 2026, Petitioner was arrested 10 upon appearing at his last check-in appointment. (Id. at 10.) He was arrested without a 11 notice or a hearing. (Id. at 11.) He also has no criminal history, and there exists no change 12 in circumstances since he was paroled. (Id.) 13 Following his re-detention, Petitioner requested a bond redetermination. (Id.) 14 However, the immigration judge denied Petitioner’s motion for a bond hearing on the basis 15 that the Immigration Court did not have jurisdiction to set bond. (Id. at 12.) To this day, 16 Petitioner has not received notice of the reasons for revoking his parole, an individualized 17 assessment of flight risk or dangerousness, or a hearing. (Id.) He remains detained at the 18 Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id. at 4.) 20 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 21 respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A petitioner prevails in her petition for writ 22 of habeas corpus if he shows that his custody violates the Constitution or laws of the United 23 States. Id. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 24 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 26 When determining whether Petitioner’s procedural due process rights have been 27 violated, the Court must consider: 28 1 three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 2 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 3 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 4 that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 5 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 6 First, Petitioner “invokes the most significant liberty interest there is—the interest 7 in being free from imprisonment.” Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 416 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citation modified) (citation omitted). Here, Petitioner was paroled when 9 he was re-detained and, therefore, had a liberty interest. See Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 10 3d 1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (finding the petitioner “has a private interest in remaining 11 free, which developed over the year he resided in the United States”). This factor weighs 12 in Petitioner’s favor. 13 Next, there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of this liberty interest when 14 noncitizens are re-detained without a hearing. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, 806 F. 15 Supp. 3d 1069, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing cases). Here, Petitioner contends he was re- 16 detained at a routine appointment with no notice and no individualized determination. 17 Respondents do not contest Petitioner’s allegations, beyond a generalized statement that 18 Petitioner was present in the country “without being admitted or paroled.” (Return 2.) The 19 evidence says otherwise. The Department of Homeland Security noted on Petitioner’s 20 Form I-213 that ICE agents encountered Petitioner in the lobby of its Buffalo office during 21 an in-person reporting appointment. (ECF No. 1-3, at 3.) The form also states that ICE 22 agents notified Petitioner during this encounter that he was under arrest and would be 23 detained. (Id.) Accordingly, based on this record, the Court finds Petitioner was re- 24 detained without notice or an individualized determination. Further, Petitioner sought a 25 bond hearing after being re-detained, which was denied on jurisdictional grounds. Thus, 26 Petitioner remains detained having still received no process. Accordingly, the second 27 28 1 factor—the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used— 2 weighs in favor of Petitioner. 3 On the third factor, “[t]he government may have a ‘strong interest’ in detaining 4 noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings as needed to protect the public 5 from dangerous criminal aliens, or to prevent flight and thereby increase the chance that 6 the aliens will be successfully removed.” Pablo Sequen, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (citation 7 modified) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1208 (9th Cir. 2022)). 8 However, when the Government previously decided to release a noncitizen and there is no 9 evidence of any changed circumstance that might have caused the Government to 10 reconsider that decision, its interest in re-detention is low. Doe v. Chestnut, No. 25-cv- 11 01372, 2025 WL 3295154, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (citations omitted). Here, 12 Petitioner contends that he has no criminal record and has not violated any of the conditions 13 of his supervised release. Respondents do not state otherwise and provide no evidence to 14 the contrary. “While the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws . . . it 15 must pursue that interest ‘in a manner consistent with the Constitution.’” Munoz Materano, 16 804 F. Supp. 3d at 420 (citation omitted). Thus, this factor also weighs in Petitioner’s 17 favor. Applying the Mathews balancing test, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention 18 violates his due process rights. Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court 19 ORDERS Petitioner’s immediate release.1 Because the Court is ordering Petitioner’s 20 release, Petitioner’s TRO motion is DENIED as moot. 22 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition and DENIES the TRO 23 Motion as moot.
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