In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-23-00144-CR
AARON ROSS EPPERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 115th District Court Marion County, Texas Trial Court No. F15097
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION
Aaron Ross Epperson pled guilty to aggravated assault of a public servant, a first-degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (Supp.). Pursuant to a plea-bargain
agreement with the State, Epperson was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision
for ten years. The terms and conditions of Epperson’s community supervision required him to,
among other things, refrain from committing another crime. The State alleged that Epperson had
committed the new offense of attempted burglary of a habitation and filed a motion to adjudicate
Epperson’s guilt. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the State’s allegation true,
adjudicated Epperson’s guilt, and sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Epperson argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that he
had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing attempted
burglary of a habitation.1 Because we find that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
decision to adjudicate Epperson’s guilt, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding that Epperson Violated a Term and Condition of His Deferred Adjudication Community Supervision
A. Evidence at the Hearing
Testimony at the hearing showed that Epperson suffered from the effects of
methamphetamine use. Alisha Smith testified that she and her husband had known Epperson for
many years and lived within a few blocks of him. Smith testified that her husband “knew the
nature of, you know, his substance abuse and really just tried to help him,” sometimes by giving
1 In companion cause number 06-23-00145-CR, Epperson appeals his conviction for evading arrest with a motor vehicle. 2 him money. Smith said she became uncomfortable with Epperson’s behavior and instructed her
husband not to allow “[Epperson] back over at the house.”
On the day of the incident, Smith was home alone. She testified that she was asleep on
the couch when she heard a noise around 9:00 a.m., woke up to her dog barking, and “saw a
shadow” in the backyard through the window blinds. When Smith investigated, she saw that
Epperson had breached the closed gates of her backyard chain-link fence and was standing at the
back door with his hand on the doorknob. According to Smith, Epperson was wearing a blue and
white glove, was carrying a “Walmart sack,” and was hiding something behind his back, which
she could not see. She testified that she asked Epperson what he was doing there and that
Epperson did not answer the question. Smith said that neither she nor her husband had given
Epperson permission to be on their property and believed that Epperson was there to break into
their house. Smith said she was in shock and called the police after Epperson abided by her
request to leave.
Benjamin Wilson, a sergeant with the Jefferson Police Department, responded to Smith’s
call with Officer David Lowrance. Wilson and Lowrance went to Epperson’s house and talked
to him while Epperson held a glove in his hand. According to Wilson, “[Epperson] seemed a
little bit nervous” and said he was at Smith’s home to check on her. Lowrance testified that
Epperson’s excuse did not explain why he had breached the backyard fence and opined that
Epperson had attempted to burglarize Smith’s home.
Epperson admitted that he had gone to Smith’s home on the day of the incident but
claimed it was to obtain help to unlock a cellphone he had purchased at Walmart. Epperson said
3 he went to the backyard instead of the front door because he “thought [he] heard [the Smiths] in
the back.” Epperson also claimed that he had knocked on the back door. When asked why he
was wearing a glove on the day of the incident, Epperson said that he liked to wear gloves and
considered them “like [his] little Michael Jackson swag.”
After Epperson testified, Smith said she had never seen Epperson wear a glove before the
incident. She also said that Epperson did not ask for help with a cellphone.
B. Standard of Review
“The decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt and revoke deferred adjudication
community supervision is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation of ordinary community
supervision.” Lawrence v. State, 420 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet.
ref’d). “We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Id. (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v.
State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). “In a revocation proceeding, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at least one of the
terms and conditions of community supervision.” Id. (citing Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871,
873–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). “The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (citing Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v.
State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). “If the State fails to meet its
burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the community supervision.” Id.
(citing Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94).
4 C. Analysis
“Proof of any one violation” by a preponderance of the evidence “is sufficient to support”
a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and adjudicate guilt. Dansby v. State,
468 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). Epperson argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his
deferred adjudication community supervision by committing a new crime. We disagree.2
A person commits the offense of burglary if, without the effective consent of the owner,
the person “enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the
public, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02. “A
person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act
amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the
offense intended.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01. “The necessary specific intent can be
proven through circumstantial evidence, and we may rely on events that took place before,
during, or after the commission of the offense.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 758 (Tex.
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In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-23-00144-CR
AARON ROSS EPPERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 115th District Court Marion County, Texas Trial Court No. F15097
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION
Aaron Ross Epperson pled guilty to aggravated assault of a public servant, a first-degree
felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (Supp.). Pursuant to a plea-bargain
agreement with the State, Epperson was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision
for ten years. The terms and conditions of Epperson’s community supervision required him to,
among other things, refrain from committing another crime. The State alleged that Epperson had
committed the new offense of attempted burglary of a habitation and filed a motion to adjudicate
Epperson’s guilt. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the State’s allegation true,
adjudicated Epperson’s guilt, and sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Epperson argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that he
had violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing attempted
burglary of a habitation.1 Because we find that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
decision to adjudicate Epperson’s guilt, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding that Epperson Violated a Term and Condition of His Deferred Adjudication Community Supervision
A. Evidence at the Hearing
Testimony at the hearing showed that Epperson suffered from the effects of
methamphetamine use. Alisha Smith testified that she and her husband had known Epperson for
many years and lived within a few blocks of him. Smith testified that her husband “knew the
nature of, you know, his substance abuse and really just tried to help him,” sometimes by giving
1 In companion cause number 06-23-00145-CR, Epperson appeals his conviction for evading arrest with a motor vehicle. 2 him money. Smith said she became uncomfortable with Epperson’s behavior and instructed her
husband not to allow “[Epperson] back over at the house.”
On the day of the incident, Smith was home alone. She testified that she was asleep on
the couch when she heard a noise around 9:00 a.m., woke up to her dog barking, and “saw a
shadow” in the backyard through the window blinds. When Smith investigated, she saw that
Epperson had breached the closed gates of her backyard chain-link fence and was standing at the
back door with his hand on the doorknob. According to Smith, Epperson was wearing a blue and
white glove, was carrying a “Walmart sack,” and was hiding something behind his back, which
she could not see. She testified that she asked Epperson what he was doing there and that
Epperson did not answer the question. Smith said that neither she nor her husband had given
Epperson permission to be on their property and believed that Epperson was there to break into
their house. Smith said she was in shock and called the police after Epperson abided by her
request to leave.
Benjamin Wilson, a sergeant with the Jefferson Police Department, responded to Smith’s
call with Officer David Lowrance. Wilson and Lowrance went to Epperson’s house and talked
to him while Epperson held a glove in his hand. According to Wilson, “[Epperson] seemed a
little bit nervous” and said he was at Smith’s home to check on her. Lowrance testified that
Epperson’s excuse did not explain why he had breached the backyard fence and opined that
Epperson had attempted to burglarize Smith’s home.
Epperson admitted that he had gone to Smith’s home on the day of the incident but
claimed it was to obtain help to unlock a cellphone he had purchased at Walmart. Epperson said
3 he went to the backyard instead of the front door because he “thought [he] heard [the Smiths] in
the back.” Epperson also claimed that he had knocked on the back door. When asked why he
was wearing a glove on the day of the incident, Epperson said that he liked to wear gloves and
considered them “like [his] little Michael Jackson swag.”
After Epperson testified, Smith said she had never seen Epperson wear a glove before the
incident. She also said that Epperson did not ask for help with a cellphone.
B. Standard of Review
“The decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt and revoke deferred adjudication
community supervision is reviewable in the same manner as a revocation of ordinary community
supervision.” Lawrence v. State, 420 S.W.3d 329, 331 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet.
ref’d). “We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Id. (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v.
State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). “In a revocation proceeding, the State
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at least one of the
terms and conditions of community supervision.” Id. (citing Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871,
873–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). “The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (citing Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v.
State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981)). “If the State fails to meet its
burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the community supervision.” Id.
(citing Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94).
4 C. Analysis
“Proof of any one violation” by a preponderance of the evidence “is sufficient to support”
a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and adjudicate guilt. Dansby v. State,
468 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). Epperson argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his
deferred adjudication community supervision by committing a new crime. We disagree.2
A person commits the offense of burglary if, without the effective consent of the owner,
the person “enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the
public, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02. “A
person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act
amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the
offense intended.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01. “The necessary specific intent can be
proven through circumstantial evidence, and we may rely on events that took place before,
during, or after the commission of the offense.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 758 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016); see Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“In assaying the
record for evidence of intent, we look to ‘events before, during and after the commission of the
offense.’” (quoting Wygal v. State, 555 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977))).
Here, the evidence showed that Epperson was known to use methamphetamine, had
received money from Smith’s husband in the past, but was no longer welcome at the Smiths’
2 By a second point of error, Epperson also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the State’s failure-to- pay allegations in its revocation motion. Because we determine that sufficient evidence supported the finding that Epperson attempted to burglarize a habitation, we need not address Epperson’s second point. 5 home. While Smith’s husband was away, Epperson breached the Smiths’ backyard fence and
was at the backdoor without her permission. Although Epperson had not yet entered the home,
Smith said that she saw Epperson’s hand on the doorknob. Smith testified that Epperson was
wearing a glove, carrying a Walmart sack, and hiding something behind his back. When she
asked Epperson what he was doing at her home, Epperson did not answer. Even so, he told
officers that he went to check on Smith but then testified that he was there to get assistance with
a cellphone. Based on this inconsistent testimony, the trial court could have determined that
Smith lied to the officers investigating the incident, which indicated guilt. The trial court could
have also determined that Epperson was wearing a glove, not as “Michael Jackson swag” but to
hide fingerprint evidence, and that he was holding a bag to assist in carrying items he hoped to
take from the home. As a result, the placement of his hand on the doorknob was an act
amounting to more than mere preparation that tended, but failed, to effect the commission of
burglary of a habitation.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that a preponderance of the evidence
established that Epperson violated the terms and conditions of his deferred adjudication
community supervision by attempting to enter the Smiths’ home with the intent to commit theft.
As a result, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to adjudicate Epperson’s
guilt. We overrule Epperson’s points of error.
6 II. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice
Date Submitted: November 27, 2023 Date Decided: December 8, 2023
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