Aaron Morgan Walker v. C. Herrera-Salazar, T. Thompson and S. Cazares

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01922
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AARON MORGAN WALKER, Case No.: 25cv1922-BJC (JLB) CDCR #T-35851, 12 ORDER DISMISSING FIRST Plaintiff, 13 AMENDED COMPLAINT vs. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) C. HERRERA-SALAZAR, 15 T. THOMPSON and S. CAZARES, 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 Plaintiff Aaron Morgan Walker is a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma 21 pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 24, 2026, 22 the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 23 (ECF No. 5.) Following an extension of time, Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended 24 Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 8.) 25 I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 26 A. Standard of Review 27 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, his FAC requires a pre- 28 Answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua 1 sponte dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma 2 pauperis which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from 3 defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 4 banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 5 (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 7 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 9 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 10 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 11 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 12 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 13 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 14 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Determining whether 15 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 16 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. 17 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 18 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 19 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 20 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 21 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quote 22 marks omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation 23 of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the 24 deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert 25 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 26 B. Allegations in the FAC 27 Plaintiff alleges in count one that on July 2, 2019, he made “oral grievances 28 concerning the conduct of” Defendant Correctional Counselor Herrera-Salazar. (ECF No. 1 8 at 3.) That same day, Herrera-Salazar authored a rules violation report (“RVR”) accusing 2 Plaintiff of possession and distribution of a controlled substance, which Plaintiff alleges 3 was fabricated by Herrera-Salazar to punish Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff complaining 4 of Herrera-Salazar’s conduct. (Id.) Plaintiff was immediately placed in the Administrative 5 Segregation Unit (“AdSeg”), where he stayed for 91 days and was subjected to restrictions 6 on visitation, telephone use, commissary, and package privileges. (Id.) “As a direct result 7 of Defendant Salazar’s retaliation, Plaintiff suffered physical attacks for refusing to 8 surrender to Salazar’s fabricated RVR that required seven sutures in the back of Plaintiff’s 9 head, years of threats of violence against Plaintiff for refusing to admit to Defendant 10 Salazar’s fabricated RVR, 26 months of court proceedings that unlawfully extended 11 Plaintiff’s liberty interest by two years (still pending in court).” (Id.) 12 Plaintiff alleges in count two that Defendant Lieutenant Thompson, the Senior 13 Hearing Officer at the hearing on the RVR, prevented Plaintiff from “using the prison log 14 record to prove” that Herrera-Salazar “lied about where he claimed to be assigned to work” 15 on July 2, 2019, “lied about who was actually assigned and present during his contact with” 16 Plaintiff that day, and “lied about the chain of events that occurred on” that day. (Id. at 5.) 17 “Every critical question Plaintiff was asking that was critically relevant to exposing the 18 criminal behavior of Defendant Salazar was blocked by Defendant T. Thompson who was 19 protecting Defendant Salazar from criminal exposure.” (Id.) On September 9, 2024, 20 Thompson found Plaintiff not guilty based on insufficient evidence. (Id.) 21 Plaintiff alleges in count three that in February 2020, Defendant Lieutenant Cazares 22 “presented the RVR to Plaintiff for Plaintiff to waive the right to postpone the disciplinary 23 hearing pending the outcome of court proceedings.” (Id. at 7.) “Upon refusing to waive 24 said rights, Defendant Cazares promised, ‘Guilty today, Guilty tomorrow, same 25 difference.’” (Id.) After Plaintiff was found not guilty, he filed a grievance against 26 Herrera-Salazar alleging he falsified reports and planted drugs on Plaintiff. (Id.) Shortly 27 after filing that grievance, Plaintiff reminded Cazares, who had since become an 28 Investigative Special Unit (“ISU”) officer, of his prior comment, and Cazares replied, “you 1 should have accepted your victory and left it alone.” (Id.) On November 29, 2024, a few 2 days after speaking to Cazares and two weeks after filing the grievance against Herrera- 3 Salazar, Plaintiff’s cell was ransacked by ISU officers. (Id.) Plaintiff was told that Cazares 4 ordered the search but was never told the reason. (Id.) His cell was searched again by ISU 5 officers on March 18, 2025. (Id.) The day after Plaintiff initiated this action in this Court, 6 ISU Officers Parkhill and Parra searched and ransacked his cell, viewed and photographed 7 the original complaint filed in this action along with other material, and destroyed his 8 typewriter. (Id. at 7-8.) On February 10, 2026, “ISU returned with Defendant Cazares 9 instructing his subordinates to go through all Plaintiff’s legal material. When questioned, 10 Defendant Cazares informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff was on Defendant Cazares targeted 11 list.” (Id. at 8.) 12 Plaintiff claims Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his First 13 Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and violated his 14 Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 2-8.) 15 C. Discussion 16 1. Due Process Claims 17 In counts one and two of the FAC Plaintiff alleges he was denied due process under 18 the Fourteenth Amendment when: (1) Defendant Herrera-Salazar filed a fabricated RVR 19 which falsely accused him of drug possession and distribution and which resulted in a 91- 20 day stay in AdSeg and (2) Defendant Thompson blocked Plaintiff from asking questions 21 at the hearing on the RVR and using the record to prove that Herrera-Salazar lied and that 22 the charge was false. (ECF No. 8 at 2-6.) 23 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 24 “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 25 Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A prisoner is entitled to due process protections during a 26 disciplinary hearing where protected liberty interests are at stake. Serrano v. Francis, 345 27 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003). To show that a disciplinary proceeding implicates a 28 liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, a prisoner must show that his sentence 1 was exceeded in “an unexpected manner” or resulted in “atypical and significant hardship 2 on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 3 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). If no such liberty interest is implicated, a prisoner is granted 4 minimum due process, which requires only that the outcome be “supported by some 5 evidence in the record.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985). If a protected 6 liberty interest arises, due process requires written notice of the charges and evidence relied 7 on and the reasons for the action taken, an opportunity “to call witnesses and present 8 documentary evidence in defense when” doing so “will not be unduly hazardous to 9 institutional safety or correctional goals,” assistance at the hearing if necessary, and an 10 impartial factfinder. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974). 11 Even assuming Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a protected liberty interest was 12 implicated in the disciplinary proceedings sufficient to give rise to the requirements that he 13 be allowed to present evidence and question Herrera-Salazar, there are no factual 14 allegations that Defendant Thompson deprived Plaintiff of his procedural rights. Plaintiff 15 merely alleges Thompson prevented him for “using the prison log record to prove” that 16 Herrera-Salazar lied about where he claimed to be assigned to work, about who was 17 assigned and present during his contact with Plaintiff, and “about the chain of events.” 18 (ECF No. 8 at 5.) He alleges that “[e]very critical question Plaintiff was asking that was 19 critically relevant to exposing the criminal behavior of Defendant Salazar was blocked by 20 Defendant T. Thompson who was protecting Defendant Salazar from criminal exposure.” 21 (Id.) 22 “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that [each 23 defendant] was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. 24 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks 25 v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required 26 element of a § 1983 claim.”) Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged he was denied due 27 process at the RVR hearing. In any case, as Plaintiff was previously informed in the 28 Court’s prior dismissal order (see ECF No. 5 at 6), his acknowledgement that he was found 1 not guilty prevents him from plausibly alleging a due process violation arising from the 2 disciplinary proceedings. See Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 2015) (no due 3 process violation where procedural error was corrected through the administrative appeal 4 process); see also Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F. Supp. 1405, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Where 5 a procedural error has been corrected in the administrative process, as it was here, there 6 has been no compensable due process violation. The administrative appeal is considered 7 part of the process afforded, and any error in the process can be corrected during that 8 appeals process without necessarily subjecting prison officials to liability for procedural 9 violations at lower levels.”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Hampton, 10 No. 19cv1332-CAB (WVG), 2020 WL 3498170, *7 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2020) 11 (“[P]laintiff’s claims of due process violations arising from his first disciplinary hearing 12 are moot in light of the grant of a new hearing which resulted in a not guilty verdict.”) 13 Plaintiff was also previously informed (see ECF No. 5 at 6), that his allegation that 14 the RVR was based on false statements and planted drugs is insufficient to state a due 15 process claim because “a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be free from 16 wrongfully issued disciplinary reports.” Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. 17 Cal. 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 1999); see also e.g. Gadsden v. Gehris, No. 18 20cv0470-WQH (DEB), 2020 WL 5748094, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“The allegations of 19 the filing of false disciplinary charges by itself does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983 because federal due process protections are contained in the ensuing disciplinary 21 proceedings themselves.”) Finally, to the extent Plaintiff claims he was denied a property 22 interest in his typewriter or any personal property destroyed in the cell searches, he has 23 failed to state a due process claim. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (the 24 deprivation of property “does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of 25 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if” the state “provides a suitable 26 post-deprivation remedy.”); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) 27 (“California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property 28 deprivations.”) 1 The due process claim in the FAC is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2 §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 3 680 F.3d at 1121. 4 2. First Amendment Claims 5 Plaintiff also claims that the RVR and cell searches were retaliatory actions by 6 Herrera-Salazar and Cazares for filing a grievance against Herrera-Salazar, and that 7 Cazares has interfered with his access to the courts. (ECF No. 8 at 2-6.) “Within the prison 8 context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An 9 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) 10 that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 11 his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 12 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (2005) (footnote omitted). 13 A prisoner must also allege a retaliatory motive, that is, a causal connection between the 14 adverse action and protected conduct. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114. 15 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an adverse action was taken against him. See Hines 16 v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1997) (disciplinary charge may constitute adverse 17 action); Cejas v. Paramo, 2017 WL 1166288, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (cell search may 18 constitute adverse action “if performed with a retaliatory motive and lacking a legitimate 19 correctional goal.”) Plaintiff has not, however, set forth facts which plausibly allege any 20 Defendant acted with a retaliatory motive. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (stating a plaintiff 21 must allege adverse action was “because of” his protected conduct). Plaintiff alleges he 22 made “oral grievances concerning the conduct of” Herrera-Salazar, but without identifying 23 the nature of the grievances or whether or how Herrera-Salazar became aware of them. 24 (ECF No. 8 at 3.) He appears to contend the RVR was retaliatory based solely on the fact 25 that it was filed the same day. (Id.) Retaliation cannot be established simply by showing 26 adverse action took place after protected activity, as there must be a nexus between the 27 two. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). Timing may be 28 considered circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, but “timing alone is insufficient” 1 to support an inference that prison officials took an adverse action against a prisoner in 2 retaliation because of a prisoner’s participation in protected conduct. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 3 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995). The FAC does not contain any factual allegations that the 4 decision to file the RVR was based on Plaintiff’s protected activity but instead relies on 5 speculation. See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere speculation 6 that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient [to state a claim].”); McCollum v. 7 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that a plaintiff 8 may provide circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the protected 9 conduct plus some other evidence of retaliatory intent, such as “(1) proximity in time 10 between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) (that) the (defendant) expressed 11 opposition to the speech; (or) (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered by the 12 (defendant) for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual.”) As currently drafted, 13 the FAC contains only conclusory allegations of retaliatory intent. 14 The same deficiency exists regarding the allegation that a few days after speaking to 15 Cazares about his prior comment and two weeks after filing the grievance against Herrera- 16 Salazar, Plaintiff’s cell was ransacked by ISU officers. (ECF No. 8 at 7.) Plaintiff alleges 17 that the day after he initiated this action in this Court, his cell was searched and ransacked 18 again, his legal materials were viewed and photographed, and his typewriter was destroyed. 19 (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff merely speculates that those actions were taken in retaliation for his 20 grievance or the filing of this action based on their timing and fails to set forth any factual 21 allegations that plausibly show any actions were taken with a retaliatory motive. The 22 allegations that Cazares told him, “you should have accepted your victory and left it alone,” 23 and that Cazares told Plaintiff he was on Cazares’s “targeted list” (ECF No. 8 at 7-8), are 24 ambiguous and lack sufficient context to plausibly allege a retaliatory motive. To the 25 extent Plaintiff attempts to rely on the exhibits attached to the FAC, they are not a substitute 26 for factual allegations. See Arnold v. Hearst Magazine Media, Inc., No. 19cv1969-JAH 27 (MDD), 2020 WL 3469367, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2020) (“Exhibits attached to a 28 complaint are not a substitute for factual allegations.”) 1 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Thompson denied him access to the 2 courts by viewing his legal materials and destroying his typewriter (see ECF No. 8 at 7-8), 3 he fails to state a claim. Inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis 4 v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). A prisoner must allege facts showing actual injury 5 arising from interference with legal materials, that is, “actual prejudice with respect to 6 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to 7 present a claim.” Id. at 348. He must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 8 underlying claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). The nature and 9 description of the underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being 10 independently pursued.” Id. at 417. Plaintiff has not alleged the loss of a claim as a result 11 of Thompson viewing his legal materials or destroying his typewriter, and he has therefore 12 failed to state an access to courts claim. 13 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and access to courts claims are 14 dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. 15 Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 16 D. Leave to Amend 17 In light of his pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend in order to 18 attempt to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 19 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint 20 without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless it is absolutely 21 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal 22 quote marks omitted). 23 III. Conclusion and Orders 24 Accordingly, good cause appearing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First 25 Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant 26 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1) and GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) 27 days leave from the date of this Order in which to file a Second Amended Complaint which 28 cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must be 1 || complete by itself without reference to his original pleadings. Defendants not named and 2 claim not re-alleged in his Second Amended Complaint will be considered waived. 3 || See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 4 || 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.’’); Lacey v. 5 || Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave 6 || to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if 7 repled.”) 8 If Plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this 9 || civil action based both on Plaintiffs failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 10 || granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) & 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to 11 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 12 || F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Ifa plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity 13 fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into 14 || dismissal of the entire action.’’) 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 ||Dated: June 17, 2026 17

19 20 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10