RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0430-MR
AARON M. ADAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE ACTION NO. 18-CR-00604
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Aaron Adams appeals from an order of the Kenton
Circuit Court which denied his motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 30, 2018, Appellant appeared at the residence of his ex-
girlfriend and assaulted, raped, and sodomized her. He was swiftly arrested at the
scene. On May 31, 2018, a grand jury indicted Appellant on the following criminal counts: rape in the first degree,1 sodomy in the first degree,2 burglary in
the second degree,3 and assault in the fourth degree.4 On May 7, 2019, Appellant
entered a guilty plea to the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. He was later
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.5
On October 25, 2021, Appellant filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 in which he raised various allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion
without a hearing and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Appellant must show two things:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040. 2 KRS 510.070. 3 KRS 511.030. 4 KRS 508.030. 5 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the burglary charge was dismissed.
-2- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
effective assistance.” Id.
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.
Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citations omitted). “It is not enough for the
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.
Ct. at 2068. Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact
which cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
-3- unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (citations omitted).
We must also consider other issues due to Appellant’s guilty plea.
A showing that counsel’s assistance was ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual inquiry which requires consideration of “the accused’s demeanor, background and experience, and whether the
-4- record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.” While “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,” “the validity of a guilty plea is not determined by reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it is taken[.]” The trial court’s inquiry into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the court to determine whether counsel’s performance was below professional standards and “caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won” and “whether counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.” Because “[a] multitude of events occur in the course of a criminal proceeding which might influence a defendant to plead guilty or stand trial,” the trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty in a manner which gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and validity of the plea.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).
Where the trial court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, appellate review is limited to “whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” An evidentiary hearing is only required “if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.”
Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-0430-MR
AARON M. ADAMS APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE ACTION NO. 18-CR-00604
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Aaron Adams appeals from an order of the Kenton
Circuit Court which denied his motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 30, 2018, Appellant appeared at the residence of his ex-
girlfriend and assaulted, raped, and sodomized her. He was swiftly arrested at the
scene. On May 31, 2018, a grand jury indicted Appellant on the following criminal counts: rape in the first degree,1 sodomy in the first degree,2 burglary in
the second degree,3 and assault in the fourth degree.4 On May 7, 2019, Appellant
entered a guilty plea to the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. He was later
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.5
On October 25, 2021, Appellant filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 in which he raised various allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion
without a hearing and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In general, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Appellant must show two things:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.040. 2 KRS 510.070. 3 KRS 511.030. 4 KRS 508.030. 5 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the burglary charge was dismissed.
-2- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
effective assistance.” Id.
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.
Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citations omitted). “It is not enough for the
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding.” Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.
Ct. at 2068. Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact
which cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
-3- unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (citations omitted).
We must also consider other issues due to Appellant’s guilty plea.
A showing that counsel’s assistance was ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea is an inherently factual inquiry which requires consideration of “the accused’s demeanor, background and experience, and whether the
-4- record reveals that the plea was voluntarily made.” While “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,” “the validity of a guilty plea is not determined by reference to some magic incantation recited at the time it is taken[.]” The trial court’s inquiry into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel requires the court to determine whether counsel’s performance was below professional standards and “caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won” and “whether counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.” Because “[a] multitude of events occur in the course of a criminal proceeding which might influence a defendant to plead guilty or stand trial,” the trial court must evaluate whether errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s decision to plead guilty in a manner which gives the trial court reason to doubt the voluntariness and validity of the plea.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).
Where the trial court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion, appellate review is limited to “whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” An evidentiary hearing is only required “if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.”
Haley v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744, 750 (Ky. App. 2019) (citations
omitted).
ANALYSIS
While Appellant raised multiple ineffective assistance of counsel
issues before the trial court, he only argues one before this Court. Appellant
-5- claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
Appellant’s competency before allowing Appellant to enter into a guilty plea.
Appellant argues that on the night of the attack on the victim, he was under the
heavy influence of drugs and alcohol and does not remember most of what
transpired. He also alleges that he has anger issues that cause him to act out as
though a “switch has been flipped.” He also argues that he has other historical
mental health issues. Appellant claims that all of these factors should have caused
trial counsel to move to have Appellant tested for competency to stand trial.
The trial court found that trial counsel was not ineffective as to this
issue and we agree.
The prosecution of a criminal defendant who is incompetent to stand trial is a violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the competency to plead guilty and the competency to stand trial are identical. Incompetency to stand trial is defined as where, because of a mental condition, the defendant lacks the capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to participate rationally in his own defense.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ky. App. 2008) (citations
omitted). Here, the trial court and Appellant entered into a thorough plea colloquy.
The trial judge asked Appellant whether he was content with his trial counsel’s
representation, aware of the charges against him, aware of possible defenses, and
aware of possible consequences. Appellant answered all these questions in the
-6- affirmative. In addition, during the sentencing hearing, Appellant took
responsibility for his crimes and recognized the harm caused to his victim.
Furthermore, we do not believe that temporary and voluntary intoxication on the
night of the criminal activity equates with incompetency to stand trial. Nor do we
believe that anger issues and unproven, past mental health issues equate to
incompetency.
CONCLUSION
All the evidence in the record before us indicates that Appellant was
competent to stand trial and was not under the influence of debilitating mental
conditions. Appellant’s trial counsel was not acting “below professional
standards” when he failed to request a competency evaluation. An evaluation was
unnecessary based on the facts before us; therefore, the trial court did not err in
denying Appellant’s RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Aaron M. Adams, pro se Daniel Cameron Burgin, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-