Aaron Jarod Bryant v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
• Decided: May 28, 2026
• Docket: 01-25-00612-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00611-CR NO. 01-25-00612-CR ——————————— AARON JAROD BRYANT, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case Nos. 1888840, 1888841

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Aaron Jarod Bryant was convicted of unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon and tampering with physical evidence. He challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions. We affirm. Background

Officer Page was driving a patrol car with Officer Barzilla in the front

passenger seat when they stopped a Kia because one of its license plate lights was

out and the car did not come to a stop before entering an intersection.

Shortly after the officers initiated the stop, before the Kia pulled over, the

officers’ body cameras recorded Officer Page stating, “Not sure if they just ran over

something or tossed something.” After stopping the Kia, Officer Barzilla looked but

did not find any item that could have been tossed from the Kia, but Officer Page

walked further down the road and found a black and tan handgun in front of an

abandoned commercial building. Appellant was sitting in the front-passenger seat

of the Kia, and the item had been tossed out the front-passenger window. The

officers took Appellant into custody and learned that he was a convicted felon.

The State charged Appellant with two offenses: unlawful possession of a

firearm by a felon and tampering with or fabricating evidence. A jury convicted

Appellant of both offenses. Per a punishment agreement, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to two years’ confinement in prison for each offense, to run concurrently.

Analysis

In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to

support his convictions because “only Officer Page’s speculation supports the

conclusion that Aaron Bryant threw the firearm central to both [convictions].” This

2 is a challenge to the possession element of unlawful possession of a firearm and the

conceal-with-intent-to-impair-availability element of tampering with or fabricating

physical evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 37.09(a)(1), 46.04(a).

Standard of review Evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction if “any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). In

reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict without substituting our judgment for the jury’s. McPherson

v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482.

The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached to witnesses’

testimony. Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482. “The jury may reasonably infer facts from

the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all the

evidence or testimony proffered, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit.” Mottin v.

State, 634 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

The evidence is legally sufficient

Officer Page testified that on the night in question, he observed the Kia

commit traffic violations, activated his patrol car’s lights, and saw a “black and two-

toned object” “thrown out the front, passenger side window” as the Kia was pulling

over. Officer Page testified he saw a hand toss the item from the window,

3 explaining, “You could see clear as day his hand out the window and an object go

out.” After the Kia stopped, Officer Page observed Appellant sitting in the front

passenger seat of the vehicle. Officer Page then walked down the road and found a

tan and black pistol with a full magazine in the driveway of an abandoned

commercial building. He testified he did not see any dirt or dust on the gun, which

he would expect had it been lying in the driveway for an extended period. He also

did not see damage to the gun consistent with a vehicle driving over it. Officer Page

explained that he did not request the gun be fingerprinted because he “observed the

firearm get thrown from the vehicle.” In his investigation report, Officer Page

specifically stated he saw Appellant throw the gun from the Kia.

On cross-examination, Appellant’s counsel challenged the legal bases for

Officer Page’s decision to make the traffic stop.1 Officer Page admitted in his trial

testimony that he saw a hand toss the item from the Kia was inconsistent with his

statement on the body-camera recording that he was unsure whether something was

tossed from the Kia or run over by the Kia. Officer Page also agreed that, if his

police report states he saw a “tan” gun tossed from the Kia, that was inaccurate

because he saw a two-toned object.

On appeal, Appellant contends Officer Page’s “inference” that Appellant

tossed the gun from the Kia is unreasonable because of the issues raised during

1 Appellant does not challenge the legality of the stop on appeal. 4 Officer Page’s cross-examination, because it is unclear how Officer Page had a

vantage point to see Appellant toss the gun, and because the gun was not admitted

into evidence, making it unknown if the gun bears damage from being tossed from

a moving car.

Appellant was free to, and did, argue to the jury that unknowns and

inconsistencies meant Officer Page was speculating he saw Appellant toss the gun

from the Kia. Similarly, the jury was free to consider and disregard that theory and

to believe Officer Paige, who testified he saw Appellant toss a two-toned object from

the Kia, which turned out to be a pistol. As noted above, the jury is the sole judge

of a witness’s credibility and may choose which parts of testimony to believe. See

Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482; Mottin, 634 S.W.3d at 765. Although Officer Page’s

initial statement indicated that he was unsure if an object was tossed from the Kia or

run over by the car, the jury could have credited or given more weight to his trial

testimony that he saw a hand toss a two-toned object from the front passenger

window shortly after the officers initiated the traffic stop—an object that was

discovered to be a gun. See Arrellano v. State, 555 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (inconsistencies between witnesses’ pretrial

statements and their testimony did not render evidence legally insufficient). This

testimony is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Appellant possessed

the gun and tossed it out of the window with the intent to impair the gun’s availability

5 as evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 1.07(39) (providing possession means “actual

care, custody, control, or management”), 37.09(a)(1), 46.04(a).

Conclusion

We overrule Appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Andrew Johnson Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).