SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
AARON HECKER, ) Opinion issued November 7, 2023 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. SC100084 ) STATE OF MISSOURI ) ) Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY The Honorable Daren L. Adkins, Judge
Aaron Hecker appeals the circuit court’s overruling of his Rule 24.035 motion for
postconviction relief. Hecker pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree assault of a
special victim and one count of resisting arrest. In his Rule 24.035 motion, he alleged his
attorney was ineffective at both his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings in failing to
adequately address his competency to proceed. The circuit court denied relief. Because
the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding counsel was not ineffective in failing to
investigate Hecker’s competency at his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings, the
judgment is affirmed. Background
The State charged Hecker with two counts of second-degree assault of a special
victim, one count of resisting arrest, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and
one count of armed criminal action. The charges arose from an August 2017 incident in
which Hecker shot at two police officers while they were attempting to arrest him.
In March 2019, counsel entered a limited entry of appearance on Hecker’s behalf
for the limited purpose of representing him in guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. 1
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hecker pleaded guilty to a single charge of second-degree
assault of a special victim and resisting arrest, and the other charges were dismissed.
At the guilty plea hearing, the circuit court questioned Hecker with the standard
colloquy. During a portion of the questioning, he testified he had been taking Vistaril,
Haldol, and Cogentin for around two months. He had taken the prescribed amounts of
such medications within the last 48 hours. Hecker said he could not recall an instance in
which such medications caused him to exercise poor judgment. He testified nothing
about his physical or mental health made it difficult to understand or answer the court’s
questions. Hecker acknowledged he understood the rights he was giving up by entering a
guilty plea.
After questioning Hecker, counsel explained the original plea offer was given and
explained to Hecker more than three months prior. Counsel was then relieved of his
position as Hecker’s attorney. Subsequently, Hecker’s family contacted counsel to
1 Counsel previously entered his appearance for Hecker in January 2018 but withdrew in December 2018. 2 reinstitute plea negotiations. Counsel stated, “And he and I have met within the last three
weeks on a number of occasions to discuss getting the plea offer back on the table.”
Hecker and counsel “met multiple times” to discuss the plea proposal after it was offered.
The circuit court found Hecker’s guilty pleas were made freely, voluntarily, and
with knowledge of the rights he was waiving and found a factual basis for the pleas. 2
The court accepted the pleas and ordered a sentence assessment report (“SAR”). Counsel
subsequently filed a letter written to the Missouri Department of Probation and Parole
noting: “Because of Mr. Hecker’s diagnosis and mental health issues, I have instructed
Mr. Hecker to not participate in any Sentencing Assessment Report interview.” Hecker
did not participate in the SAR interview.
At Hecker’s sentencing hearing in July 2019, counsel argued Hecker had been
diagnosed with schizophrenia prior to August 2017 and medical records predating the
incident showed Hecker threatened to commit suicide on multiple occasions. Counsel
contended Hecker was attempting to commit suicide in his encounter with the police
officers. Counsel filed a sentencing memorandum contending the circuit court should
consider Hecker’s schizophrenia as mitigating evidence. 3
2 Hecker stated the factual basis for his plea to the court. He took a pistol away from the side of his head and shot it at two police officers. He knew the police officers were there to attempt to arrest him and threatened to shoot himself to prevent them from arresting him. He then fired in the direction of the police officers. 3 Included as an exhibit to the memorandum was a “Brief Assessment of Cognition” report prepared by a doctor at the Hedrick Medical Center following Hecker’s arrest. The report noted Hecker’s diagnosis of schizophrenia and his past mental health treatment. A supplement to the sentencing memorandum noted Hecker was transferred from Hedrick Medical Center to Mosaic Life Care Center for a possible 96-hour hold for mental health issues. The supplement also stated Hecker previously had been found 3 The circuit court asked Hecker if he would like to make a statement. Counsel
responded, “Mr. Hecker does not, Your Honor. Because of his mental health disease, on
my recommendation, Mr. Hecker will not make a statement.” Hecker stated, “I do have
something to say.” Counsel expounded:
I believe the Rules of Ethics provided that this decision as to whether Mr. Hecker makes a statement during sentencing rests with counsel and not with the Defendant. I accept full responsibility and it’s my decision, not Mr. Hecker’s. He suffers from schizophrenia and he will make outlandish statements if under stress.
The court observed that Hecker made statements during the plea hearing without trouble.
Counsel replied, “Is he competent? He’s competent. He’s competent. That’s not the
argument. I do not want the [c]ourt to take a negative or make a negative inference
against Mr. Hecker based on my advice to him and my recommendations to you. That is
all.” Hecker did not make a statement. The circuit court sentenced Hecker to 15 years on
the first count and four years on the second count with the sentences to run consecutively.
Hecker filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Rule 24.035. An
amended motion was timely filed, alleging Hecker received ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing and at his guilty plea because counsel failed to investigate his
mental health to determine if he was competent to proceed.
At the evidentiary hearing on the Rule 24.035 motion, counsel testified he never
asked the court to evaluate Hecker for his competence to proceed. Counsel was aware
incompetent to stand trial on charges in Kansas but was deemed competent in 2017 after being administered psychotropic medication.
4 Hecker was found incompetent in Kansas but had his competence restored. Counsel met
with Hecker on “multiple occasions.” He had conversations with Hecker about receiving
mental health treatment and whether Hecker was taking medications. Counsel testified:
Before I got very far into the file, one of the things I looked into was made sure I had in my file the Missouri statutes that dealt with the issue of mental competency as well as NGRI. And when I met with Mr. Hecker in the jail, I had that issue in my mind and always observed, assessed for whether or not it appeared to be Mr. Hecker understood the conversations that we were having, understood the charges that were pending against him and whether or not I believed he was capable of participating in his own defense.
Counsel believed Hecker understood the charges, the range of punishment, and the
elements of the crime. He went over template jury instructions with Hecker more than
once. Counsel spoke with Hecker twice in person about trying to regain the previously
withdrawn plea offer. During these conversations, counsel never had the impression that
Hecker did not understand the nature of what he was asking him to do.
A psychiatrist testified he had reviewed Hecker’s mental health records and
evaluated him in April 2021. The psychiatrist opined Hecker was not competent
to proceed at the time of the guilty plea and not competent to proceed when he was
sentenced. According to the psychiatrist, Hecker lacked a rational understanding
of the charges against him. Based on his review, Hecker was suffering from
delusional thinking, believing “some technologies available out there were sending
messages to him. He was also hearing voices.” Hecker was diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia with a mood component. The psychiatrist opined Hecker
would remain delusional unless treated with the appropriate antipsychotic
medications in a psychiatric setting.
5 Unlike at his guilty plea, Hecker testified in a disjointed fashion at the
postconviction hearing. When questioned whether he was honest and truthful in
filling out his plea petition, Hecker testified, “I -- I know that I was -- I wasn’t
competent -- I was following his instructions, basically. I wasn’t competent
enough to know what I was doing, what was happening, but I was following his
instructions.”
The circuit court overruled the Rule 24.035 motion. In doing so, it made the
following credibility determinations:
• “In all instances herein, the [c]ourt finds the testimony of [counsel] to be credible, and the court gives his testimony strong weight.” • “The [c]ourt finds that the testimony of Aaron Hecker not to be credible nor believable. The [d]efendant’s testimony at the hearing of this motion was not consistent with that observed during either the plea or sentencing hearing, and appeared to this Court to clearly be an act and not a form of mental illness.” • “The [c]ourt finds [the psychiatrist] to be a credible witness, however, the [c]ourt gives greater weight to the evidence of the trial transcript and [counsel] which were actual observations of the [d]efendant during the relevant periods of the plea and sentencing. The [c]ourt notes the [d]efendant did not act erratic or confused during either the plea hearing or at sentencing.”
This appeal follows. 4
Standard of Review
Appellate review of the outcome of a Rule 24.035 motion is limited to determining
whether the circuit court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rule
24.035(k). The circuit court’s findings are presumed correct. Barton v. State, 432
4 After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. 6 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Mo. banc 2014). This Court defers to the circuit court’s credibility
findings. Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. banc 2018).
Analysis
To be entitled to postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
“the movant must allege facts, not mere conclusions, demonstrating: (1) that counsel’s
performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably
competent attorney, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance actually prejudiced the
movant.” Booker v. State, 552 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Mo. banc 2018) (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under the first
Strickland prong, when a movant argues counsel should have investigated competence
before allowing a guilty plea to be entered, the movant “must show the existence of a
factual basis indicating a questionable mental condition that should have caused his
attorney to initiate an independent investigation of [his] mental state.” State v. Carter,
955 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo. banc 1997) (internal quotations omitted). “To satisfy the
second Strickland prong when a movant claims counsel should not have allowed the
movant to enter a guilty plea without investigating the movant’s mental condition, the
movant must show a reasonable probability [he] was not competent at the time in
question.” Washington v. State, 598 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Mo. App. 2020). “Both parts of
the Strickland test must be fulfilled; if [the movant] fails to prove either one, no relief can
be granted.” Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Mo. banc 2001).
7 I. Guilty Plea
Hecker argues the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his Rule 24.035 motion
because (1) a reasonable attorney would have evaluated him for competence to plead
guilty and (2) there is a reasonable probability Hecker was incompetent when he pleaded
guilty.
To meet the first Strickland prong, Hecker must show a factual basis indicating a
questionable mental condition that should have caused counsel to consider Hecker’s
mental condition and ability to proceed before allowing him to enter a guilty plea.
Carter, 955 S.W.2d at 555. “An accused is competent to stand trial or plead guilty if he
can rationally consult with counsel and the court and understands the proceedings against
him.” Johnson v. State, 580 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotations
omitted).
Hecker contends numerous indicia, of which counsel was aware, indicated he was
incompetent: Hecker’s schizophrenia diagnosis; Hecker previously had been found
incompetent to proceed in Kansas; Hecker had attempted suicide as a part of the
circumstances of the offenses; and, after the events underlying the offenses, Hecker was
hospitalized for a mental health emergency. But “[c]ounsel has no duty to investigate a
client’s mental condition whe[n] the client appears to have the present ability to consult
rationally with the attorney and understand the court proceedings.” Clayton, 63 S.W.3d
at 209 (emphasis added); see also Carter, 955 S.W.2d at 555 (noting “the factual basis
must call [the defendant’s] current state of mental health into question”). Hecker’s
proffered “indicia” do not alone indicate he lacked the present ability to consult rationally
8 with counsel and understand the court proceedings at the time of the guilty plea. Rather,
Hecker’s prior finding of incompetency, attempted suicide, and mental health
hospitalization all occurred years prior to his guilty plea.
At the evidentiary hearing on Hecker’s Rule 24.035 motion, counsel testified
Hecker’s past competency and diagnosis issues were known to him, and he was always
on the lookout to ensure Hecker understood the charges against him, whether he
understood the conversations they were having, and whether Hecker was capable of
participating in his own defense. Counsel testified it appeared Hecker was able to consult
with him rationally and understood the proceedings. He stated it was Hecker’s request
for counsel to re-enter the case and attempt to secure the previous plea offer. The motion
court found counsel to be credible and gave his testimony “strong weight.” “This Court
defers to the [circuit] court’s superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.”
Anderson, 564 S.W.3d at 600 (internal quotations omitted).
Further, at the guilty plea hearing, Hecker testified nothing about his physical or
mental health was causing him difficulty in understanding and answering the court’s
questions. Hecker also acknowledged he understood the rights he was giving up by
entering a guilty plea. The circuit court observed Hecker did not “act erratic or confused
during either the plea hearing or at sentencing.” In sum, all this evidence supports
Hecker had the present ability at the time of the guilty plea to consult rationally with
counsel and understand the court proceedings. Hecker fails to meet Strickland’s first
prong of demonstrating counsel’s performance did not conform to the degree of skill,
9 care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney; therefore, no relief can be
granted. The circuit court did not clearly err in concluding counsel was not ineffective.
II. Sentencing
Hecker also argues the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his Rule 24.035
motion because (1) a reasonable attorney would have had Hecker evaluated for
competence at sentencing and (2) there is a reasonable probability Hecker was
incompetent at sentencing.
As explained above, to meet the first Strickland prong, Hecker must show a
factual basis indicating a questionable mental condition that should have caused his
attorney to consider Hecker’s mental condition and ability to proceed before allowing
him to be sentenced. Washington, 598 S.W.3d at 668.
Hecker primarily relies on Washington, 598 S.W.3d at 656, and Woods v. State,
994 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. 1999), to argue counsel should have inquired as to Hecker’s
competence to be sentenced. Both cases are distinguishable from the instant case. 5
5 Hecker also asserts counsel prevented Hecker from participating in his SAR because Hecker could not rationally participate in the SAR. But, as the State argues, counsel did not state Hecker could not participate rationally; rather, counsel instructed Hecker not to participate in the SAR because of his diagnosis and mental health issues. Specifically, counsel’s letter states: “Because of Mr. Hecker’s diagnosis and mental health issues, I have instructed Mr. Hecker to not participate in any Sentencing Assessment Report interview.” “The suspicion or actual presence of some degree of mental illness or need for psychiatric treatment does not equate with incompetency to stand trial [or plead guilty].” Henderson v. State, 977 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. App. 1998). Counsel testified at the sentencing hearing: “Is he competent? He’s competent. He’s competent. That’s not the argument. I do not want the [c]ourt to take a negative or make a negative inference against Mr. Hecker based on my advice to him and my recommendations to you. That is all.” Merely instructing Hecker not to participate in the SAR does not equate to incompetency. 10 First, in Washington, the court of appeals considered whether movant had alleged
sufficient facts in the postconviction motion to warrant an evidentiary hearing on her
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate her competency. 598 S.W.3d
at 667. Movant alleged she was diagnosed with schizophrenia; was not taking her
medication at the time of her guilty plea; and, at the guilty plea hearing, she exhibited the
specific type of psychosis or delusion that doctors had reported. Id. at 668. The court of
appeals concluded:
When counsel is representing an accused diagnosed with a mental disease or defect and multiple examination reports agree medication impacts the accused’s competence and the accused is not on medication at the time of the plea and the accused exhibits the same delusions and psychoses as appear in the examination reports, there is a factual basis indicating a questionable mental condition ….
Id. Similarly, Hecker argues his schizophrenia diagnosis, medication, and counsel’s
statement at the sentencing hearing that Hecker “suffers from schizophrenia and will
make outlandish statements if under stress” constitute a factual basis indicating he had a
questionable mental condition such that counsel should have investigated his
competence. But, unlike in Washington, Hecker was taking his prescribed medications
and did not exhibit delusions or psychoses at the sentencing hearing. Further, although
counsel advised Hecker not to make a statement, counsel immediately following
explained: “Is he competent? He’s competent. He’s competent. That’s not the argument.
I do not want the [c]ourt to take a negative or make a negative inference against
Mr. Hecker based on my advice to him and my recommendations to you. That is all.”
Washington is factually distinguishable from the instant case.
11 Second, in Woods, the court of appeals found, despite the defendant’s long history
of mental illness, there was nothing at the time of the guilty plea to indicate to counsel,
the prosecutor, or the plea court that the defendant was incompetent to proceed. 994
S.W.2d at 37-38. The court of appeals held counsel should have ordered a mental exam
prior to sentencing, however, because after the guilty plea but prior to sentencing the
defendant attempted suicide. Id. at 38-39. Unlike in Woods, Hecker’s threatened suicide
attempts occurred years before his guilty plea and sentencing proceedings. Hecker does
not allege any actual change in his mental status after his guilty plea but before
sentencing. Woods is factually distinguishable from the instant case.
As explained above, counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that, at all times,
he was “on the lookout” for whether Hecker understood the charges against him and the
nature of the proceedings and that Hecker appeared to understand such at the guilty plea
and sentencing hearings. Counsel’s testimony is supported by the circuit court’s
observations that Hecker did not “act erratic or confused during either the plea hearing or
at sentencing.” Hecker fails to meet Strickland’s first prong. The circuit court did not
clearly err in concluding counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate Hecker’s
competence at sentencing.
12 Conclusion
The circuit court did not clearly err in concluding Hecker’s attorney was not
ineffective for failing to investigate his competency at Hecker’s guilty plea and
sentencing proceedings. The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________ Mary R. Russell, Chief Justice
Russell, C.J., Powell, Fischer, Ransom, Wilson and Broniec, JJ., concur. Gooch, J., not participating.