Aaron Harper v. Denise Harmon

Ninth Circuit

Aaron Harper v. Denise Harmon

472 F. App'x 782

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 26, 2012

Docket08-16547

StatusUnpublished

This text of 472 F. App'x 782 (Aaron Harper v. Denise Harmon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Aaron Harper v. Denise Harmon, 472 F. App'x 782 (9th Cir. 2012).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Aaron Shaun Harper, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgement as a matter of law in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his constitutional rights arising from a prison disciplinary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Summers v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 508 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir.2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly entered judgment as a matter of law on Harper’s claim that his confinement in administrative segregation on false charges violated his due process rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation” required to create a liberty interest); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.2003) (procedural protections apply to disciplinary proceedings “only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”). Even assuming that there was a liberty interest at stake, the evidence showed that prison officials afforded Harper with all the process that he was due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant a continuance sua sponte when one of Harper’s witnesses was medically unavailable at trial, particularly where Harper did not show that he suffered prejudice. See United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion *784 the decision to grant or deny a continuance, “even where, as here, no motion for continuance was made”); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1359 & n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (setting forth factors to consider in reviewing denials of requests for continuances).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Aaron Shaun Harper, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgement as a matter of law in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his constitutional rights arising from a prison disciplinary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Summers v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 508 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir.2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly entered judgment as a matter of law on Harper’s claim that his confinement in administrative segregation on false charges violated his due process rights. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation” required to create a liberty interest); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.2003) (procedural protections apply to disciplinary proceedings “only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”). Even assuming that there was a liberty interest at stake, the evidence showed that prison officials afforded Harper with all the process that he was due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant a continuance sua sponte when one of Harper’s witnesses was medically unavailable at trial, particularly where Harper did not show that he suffered prejudice. See United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion *784 the decision to grant or deny a continuance, “even where, as here, no motion for continuance was made”); United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1359 & n. 7 (9th Cir.1985) (setting forth factors to consider in reviewing denials of requests for continuances).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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