RENDERED: DECEMBER 6, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals
NO. 2022-CA-0999-MR
AARON DEXTER WRIGHT APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE LISA P. JONES,1 JUDGE ACTION NO. 17-CR-00804
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.
EASTON, JUDGE: Appellant Aaron Dexter Wright (“Wright”), pro se, appeals
from an Order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his RCr2 11.42 motion without
an evidentiary hearing. Wright alleges his trial counsel was ineffective in three
1 After the entry of the Order at issue in this appeal, Judge Jones was appointed to the Court of Appeals in April 2024. 2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. ways: by failing to investigate, interview, and call at trial alleged alibi witnesses,
by failing to have a competency evaluation performed, and by failing to have DNA
testing performed to support an alternative perpetrator (“alt perp”) defense. He
also claims the Commonwealth allowed his co-defendant to commit perjury at his
trial. Upon review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After a jury trial, Wright was convicted of murder and first-degree
robbery. He was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The facts leading to Wright’s
conviction were summarized by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Wright’s direct
appeal:
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the facts are as follows: On Sunday, June 18, 2017, 58-year[]-old Jeffrey Martin was found by his son unconscious, badly beaten, and in a pool of blood on the floor of Martin’s home in Owensboro. He died a few days later from brain injuries caused by as many as 12 blunt force blows to his head. In connection with the assault, items had been stolen from Martin’s residence. Those items included Martin’s truck, wallet, prescription medicines, cigarettes, and cell phone. The assault had occurred the previous day.
Martin had met Ashley Stinnett, a 25-year-old female, at a gas station about two weeks before the assault. During the intervening days, they had been spending time together, with Martin providing drugs and alcohol to Stinnett. Stinnett was in a relationship with Wright at the time.
-2- On June 19, the police received a call concerning two individuals trespassing through yards and looking in trashcans. The police responded and, after a short chase, apprehended the individuals, Wright and Stinnett. Personal items belonging to Martin were found in their respective backpacks at the time of their arrest, including mail addressed to Martin. Martin’s truck was discovered later, and fingerprints of Martin, Stinnett, Wright, and another person were identified from the truck. A pillowcase with what appeared to be blood on it was also found in the truck, as was a glove that matched a glove found in one of the backpacks belonging to Wright and Stinnett. Martin’s son testified that he had bought the gloves for his father. A pair of pants with the DNA of an unknown individual identified in the autopsy report as “Individual A” was also found in one of the backpacks.
In August 2017 Wright and Stinnett were indicted for murder and first-degree robbery. Prior to trial Stinnett entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth in which she agreed to testify against Wright in return for a reduction in the charges against her to facilitation to murder and first-degree robbery with a corresponding sentence of ten years. Stinnett testified at trial, and the jury was informed of the favorable nature of the plea agreement.
Stinnett, as an eye-witness to the assault, was the Commonwealth’s chief witness at trial. She testified that on Saturday, June 17, she was at her apartment with Wright when she received an eviction notice, after which she did an 8-ball (one-eighth of an ounce) of methamphetamine and afterward went with Wright to Martin’s residence. When they arrived at Martin’s residence, she went inside and Wright stayed outside. Wright thereafter entered the residence because, according to Stinnett, he was upset that she did not want to leave.
-3- Stinnett testified that the assault began when Wright hit Martin twice in the face, knocking him to the ground, after which Wright began kicking and stomping Martin in the face with his foot. Stinnett stated that while this was occurring, she went into Martin’s bedroom and stole a suitcase. She stated that when she came back in the room, Martin was lying on the floor in a pool of blood “snoring.”
Stinnett testified that she and Wright then “got into an argument because of the situation that was going on.” According to Stinnett, Wright then began kicking Martin in the head again. Wright took a sheet off the bed and wiped his hands, put the sheet into Stinnett’s backpack, and then stole items off a shelf and placed them into a bag. Wright also took Martin’s wallet, a gun, cigarettes, his cell phone, and prescription medicines. They also took Martin’s keys and stole his truck.
Stinnett testified that she did not immediately report the assault because she and Wright were “really high” on methamphetamine and she did not have a phone. After they left Martin’s residence, they went to the homes of various friends and acquaintances. Several witnesses testified that they saw one or both of them traveling by truck. Stinnett testified that she and Wright eventually abandoned Martin’s truck in a field and burned the sheet they had taken from his residence. Law enforcement officers later discovered the remnants of a burnt suitcase in the same area they had discovered Martin’s truck. During the hours after the murder, Stinnett also told two individuals the events that had occurred at Martin’s residence.
Wright did not call any witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial, but through cross-examination and argument he established a defense of denial. The jury found Wright guilty of murder and first-degree robbery, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
-4- Wright v. Commonwealth, No. 2019-SC-000142-MR, 2019 WL 4688810, at *1-2
(Ky. Sep. 26, 2019). The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Wright’s conviction.
On September 22, 2021, Wright filed a pro se motion to vacate or
correct his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42, accompanied by a memorandum, a
motion for appointment of counsel, and a motion for evidentiary hearing. In his
motion, he made essentially the same allegations as in this appeal. The circuit
court entered an Order denying his motions on February 8, 2022, without an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standards which measure ineffective assistance of counsel are set
out in the United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). First, the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Second, the defendant must show that counsel’s
deficiency prejudiced the defense by depriving the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable. Id.
“Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below
professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would
probably have won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992).
-5- The critical issue is not whether counsel made errors but whether counsel was so
thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable victory.
Id. “A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel adjudged
ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70, 71
(Ky. 1997).
Strickland directs that a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy. Id.
A trial court’s denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky. App. 2014).
“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “An RCr 11.42 motion is limited to the
issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Teague, supra, at
633.
-6- ANALYSIS
Wright claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in three ways. First, he argues a failure to interview and call witnesses
who might have provided an alibi defense. Next, he argues his counsel was
ineffective by failing to request a competency hearing. Finally, he claims his
counsel should have had certain DNA evidence tested because more specific
results might have supported his alt perp defense. Additionally, Wright argues he
did not receive a fair trial because the Commonwealth allowed its main witness to
commit perjury.
To determine if an evidentiary hearing is warranted, “[o]ur review is
confined to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.”
Osborne v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Ky. App. 1998) (citing Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967)). In this case, the record
includes the jury trial.
Wright argues his counsel failed to investigate and produce alibi
witness testimony. Wright’s initial motion to the circuit court named three
individuals, but only one individual was fully named in Wright’s motion, and this
same individual is also the only person named in Wright’s brief to this Court.
Wright claims this individual would have provided an alibi, and that she would
-7- have “testified under oath that Mr. Wright was at her residence at the time of the
crime[.]”3
This statement in Wright’s brief is the only substance provided as to
what this witness might have testified. Wright did not make this statement in his
motion. Wright did not provide an affidavit from this person to confirm that she
would have testified and that what Wright said in his brief would have been her
testimony. We cannot speculate that the reason for this lack of offered evidence
may be because the witness would not have actually said what Wright hoped she
would say.
RCr 11.42(2) requires that the movant “shall state specifically the
grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the
movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to comply with this section shall
warrant a summary dismissal of the motion.” Wright’s general statement about an
alibi in his motion do not satisfy RCr 11.42’s requirement that claims be pled with
specificity.
Wright protests that because of the lack of defense witnesses, “[t]he
jury was left to accept the testimony of Stinnett or nothing at all.”4 This is entirely
inaccurate. In addition to Stinnett’s testimony, the Commonwealth called several
3 Appellant’s Brief, page 4. 4 Appellant’s Brief, page 5.
-8- independent witnesses who testified to seeing Wright and Stinnett together
throughout most of the weekend, and some witnesses saw them together in a truck
matching the one owned by the victim and stolen from him after the assault.
The testimonies of witnesses other than Stinnett laid out a general
timeline of Wright’s and Stinnett’s whereabouts from Saturday, when the assault
occurred, to Monday, when they were arrested. These testimonies mostly
corroborate Stinnett’s testimony. We cannot conclude that one potential and
nonspecific alibi witness would have created a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 42, 48 (Ky. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Wright’s next argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to request a competency evaluation. He alleges he has a condition known
as “Post-Operative Cognitive Dysfunction,” which is accompanied by symptoms
such as memory impairment and impaired performance on intellectual tasks.
Wright provides no evidence for this condition with his motion, such as any
medical record of any kind to support this assertion.
In Wright’s Presentence Investigation report, mental health is
addressed. It mentions only depression with a prescription for Celexa. Wright
-9- reported no prior history of psychiatric hospitalizations. Wright did not correct any
error in this report at his sentencing to add this newly disclosed diagnosis.
Even if we accepted Wright’s unsupported claim of a mental illness,
this would not entitle Wright to relief in this case. Wright never claimed that he
was incompetent to stand trial before his motion. He also does not explain how
this diagnosis leads to his not having the “capacity to appreciate the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against one or to participate rationally in one’s
own defense.” KRS5 504.060(5).
He claims his condition led to his being unable to accurately portray
“the events that took place on that unfortunate day.”6 Inability to clearly explain
oneself to the police does not equate with incompetency to stand trial. Wright’s
behavior during the trial gives no hint that he was unable to communicate with his
counsel.
Wright seems to believe that his conviction hinged on his being
unable to explain to detectives his version of events. But there was little testimony
devoted to what Wright actually said. Most of the testimony involving Wright was
what others observed him doing and where he was and when. Wright’s conviction
did not depend upon his statements being used against him. The only testimony
5 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 6 Appellant’s Brief, page 7.
-10- that pointed to guilt that involved Wright’s own statements was from the
investigating detective who testified that Wright was unable to say exactly when he
was with certain individuals over that weekend. This could just as likely have been
a result of methamphetamine use as opposed to some other totally unsupported
reason.
Other evidence suggests no incompetency. The Kentucky Department
of Public Advocacy (“DPA”) was allowed to withdraw from its representation of
Wright for this appeal pursuant to KRS 31.110(2)(c), which means that DPA did
not believe this appeal was one which a reasonable person would prosecute.
Wright then filed his own brief as he had filed his own motion. These documents
indicate that Wright had no problem with communicating his ideas, even if he had
the assistance of someone in the prison system with his motion and brief.
In evaluating a defendant’s competency,
there are two distinct matters to be determined:
(1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. The defendant must have an ability to confer intelligently, to testify coherently, and to follow the evidence presented. It is necessary that the defendant have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.
-11- Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). First, we determine Wright’s allegations of incompetency are again
insufficient to meet the specificity requirement of RCr 11.42. Even if we consider
the claim, the record refutes any claim of incompetency.
Wright’s next argument is that his counsel failed to obtain further
DNA testing on a pair of jeans and so failed to develop an alt perp defense. There
was fairly extensive testimony, including cross-examination, of the witness who
did the forensic testing at the KSP7 laboratory. The lab tested several physical
items of evidence located both in the victim’s truck and in the backpacks carried
by Wright and Stinnett. Tested items included fingernail clippings of the victim, a
pillowcase with blood on it, and a pair of jeans. The lab also had buccal swabs of
the victim, Wright, and Stinnett, with which to make comparisons. Blood from the
pillowcase was a match to the victim. The jeans contained DNA of an unknown
male contributor, who the lab deemed “Individual A.” Wright purports there were
three other individuals who should have had their DNA tested to compare with the
DNA on the jeans. Again, Wright’s assertions fail to illustrate ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Despite Wright’s insistence to the contrary, his trial counsel did put
forward an alt perp defense. His counsel made a point to illustrate that an
7 Kentucky State Police.
-12- unknown party’s DNA was present, and that this “Individual A” may be the actual
assailant. It is unnecessary to have knowledge of the identity of Individual A to
make the claim that he is the real perpetrator of the assault. While Wright lists
three individuals who should have been tested, he gives no specific factual basis
for why he thinks those individuals should have been tested and investigated as
potential suspects for the assault.
In any event, this evidence is not as exculpatory as Wright thinks it is.
The jeans were found in a backpack, not in the victim’s home, and there was no
testimony that the jeans had blood or any other incriminating evidence on them.
We have no idea if these jeans came from the home or had been gathered from
somewhere else. It is difficult to see the evidentiary value in this one particular
item of evidence, when there was other much more substantial evidence illustrating
Wright’s guilt. Regardless, Wright’s trial counsel made the point in his closing
argument that this fourth set of DNA indicates another, unknown, person may have
been present.
We note the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed Wright’s alt perp
defense and the unidentified DNA evidence. That Court rejected the notion that
the presence of other DNA on the jeans impacted a directed verdict decision.
Specifically, the Court cited a case explaining that the presence of other DNA is
-13- not necessarily exculpatory.8 Bowling v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 462, 467
(Ky. 2010).
Wright’s counsel was effective in making sure the jury heard that
neither Wright’s DNA nor fingerprints were found anywhere in the victim’s
residence. He also highlighted the lack of Wright’s DNA on the bloody pillowcase
as well as the victim’s body in his closing arguments. It would not have been
necessarily helpful to Wright, as he suggests, to explain another time when his
fingerprints on the driver’s side window of the victim’s truck might have been
placed there before the theft of the truck. Wright’s explanation for these
fingerprints still shows his prior connection with the victim and Stinnett.
Wright’s final argument is that the Commonwealth allowed Stinnett to
commit perjury. While he alleges the Commonwealth knew Stinnett’s testimony
was false, he provides no facts to support that assertion. He also does not indicate
exactly which statements he believes are false. He offers Stinnett’s admitting to
being “very high” on methamphetamine prior to the assault taking place and
changing her statement to detectives as evidence of her untrustworthiness.
However, this goes only to Stinnett’s credibility, which Wright’s counsel
challenged during cross-examination. In fact, Wright’s counsel was able to elicit
8 Wright, supra, at *5.
-14- an admission from Stinnett that she asked her grandmother to lie for her soon after
her initial arrest.
We find Wright’s arguments similar to those made in Ross v.
Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. 2017). In Ross, the Appellant claimed he
was entitled to a directed verdict, as the Commonwealth’s only witness linking him
to the crime was “unworthy of belief as a matter of law and should have been
disregarded in the directed verdict analysis.” Id. at 475. Our Supreme Court then
stated:
Our review of the record compels us to agree that Tonya lacked many of the qualities commonly associated with credibility and that she modeled many of the flaws identified by Appellant. Appellant correctly cites authority which recognizes that, in exceptional circumstances, a witness’s testimony may be so improbable and implausible that it must be disregarded as having absolutely no probative value as a matter of law.
However, upon examination of those authorities, we conclude that such exceptional circumstances do not arise because a particular witness is so lacking in the objective indicators of trustworthiness as to remove from her testimony all vestiges of credibility. The exceptional circumstances, which have authorized the unusual measure advocated by Appellant, arise when the substance of the testimony, detached from the personal credibility of the witness who bears if, is so laden with doubt and implausibility that it cannot rationally be regarded as a fact capable of supporting a verdict. “It is only where the testimony is so incredible on its face as to require its rejection as a matter of law that the jury will not be permitted to consider it.” Daulton v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 141, 220 S.W.2d 109, 110
-15- (1949) (emphasis added). As the applicable cases illustrate, it is the inherent lack of probative value in the testimony itself, not the witness’s lack of credibility, that allows the court to disregard it.
Id.
“Credibility relates to the witness’s truthfulness and the weight placed
upon that witness’s testimony relative to other evidence. Assessing the credibility
of a witness and the weight given to her testimony rests within the unique province
of the jury [or finder-of-fact].” Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
It was the jury’s role to determine if they believed Stinnett’s
testimony. As previously stated, her testimony was at least somewhat corroborated
by several other independent witnesses, as well as the physical evidence that linked
Wright to the crime. Wright’s unsupported assertions of perjury do not entitle him
to relief.
Wright contends his conviction should be reversed for cumulative
error. Cumulative error is “the doctrine under which multiple errors, although
harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to
render the trial fundamentally unfair. We have found cumulative error only where
the individual errors were themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the
prejudicial. Where, as in this case, however, none of the errors individually raised
any real question of prejudice, we have declined to hold that the absence of
-16- prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds up to prejudice.” Brown v.
Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted).
Wright is only entitled to RCr 11.42 relief if he is able to demonstrate
that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency was
prejudicial. Strickland, supra. Wright is unable to establish that but for any of his
counsel’s alleged deficiencies, the jury’s verdict would probably have been
different. He can show no prejudice from his perceived shortcomings of his
attorney in the evidentiary circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
The circuit court properly denied Wright’s RCr 11.42 motion without
an evidentiary hearing. The Order of the Daviess Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Aaron Dexter Wright, pro se Russell Coleman Beattyville, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Christopher Henry Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
-17-