Aaron Chandra v. Stephen Smith

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 22-16739
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AARON CHANDRA, No. 22-16739

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06076-JD

v. MEMORANDUM* STEPHEN SMITH; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California James Donato, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 8, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Aaron Chandra appeals the denial of his habeas petition under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state court conviction for second-degree murder,

possession of marijuana for sale, and firearm enhancements. We review the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). district court’s denial of Chandra’s habeas petition de novo and its findings of facts

for clear error. Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2018). For the

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

1. The California Court of Appeal reasonably applied the Strickland test

to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See 466 U.S. 668, 687–94

(1984). Any alleged deficiency in Petitioner’s counsel’s performance at trial was

not prejudicial. Although Petitioner’s defense counsel could have presented

additional evidence or called witnesses related to the victim’s 2003 conviction to

further support Petitioner’s self-defense theory, the California Court of Appeal

reasonably determined that the failure to do so was not prejudicial because the

additional evidence would have minimal probative value and would be cumulative

to the evidence already presented. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). Trial counsel’s failure to

object to the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments also was not prejudicial

to Petitioner.

2. The California Court of Appeal reasonably applied the standards

illustrated in Darden for Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims. See Darden

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). As an initial matter, this Court is not

procedurally barred from reviewing Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims

because the California Court of Appeal’s decision did not rest on a clear and

2 express statement that the claims were procedurally defaulted. See Chambers v.

McDaniel, 549 F.3d 9 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).

First, the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that it was proper

for the prosecutor to question Petitioner about whether he had studied the law of

homicide and to comment on defense counsel’s strategy to delay opening

argument. See People v. Chandra, No. A138401, 2015 WL 3750001, at *5–7 (Cal.

Ct. App. June 16, 2015). The court reasoned that “[t]he prosecutor was identifying

the reliability issues of the witnesses and highlighting defense counsel’s potential

strategy for managing these credibility concerns.” Id. at *7. Accordingly, when

examining the trial as a whole, these conclusions were reasonable and sufficiently

grounded in the record. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 179 (“The prosecutors’ comments

must be evaluated in light of the defense argument that preceded it”).

Second, the California Court of Appeal properly concluded that some of the

prosecutor’s statements—such as the argument that the victim may have been

bending over or ducking at the time Petitioner shot him—were “within the bounds

of permissible argument.” See Chandra, 2015 WL 3750001, at *11; United States

v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[P]rosecutors must have

reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments, and thus can argue reasonable

inferences based on the evidence.”). Although other comments by the

prosecutor—such as the statements that Petitioner slowly raised the gun before

3 firing and that Petitioner may have shot the victim while chasing him out the

door—may not be reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial, the

California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that they did not render

Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair because (1) the prosecutor did not suggest

that there was evidence to support his statements and (2) the jury was instructed to

use only the evidence—and not the arguments—presented to render a verdict. See

Chandra, 2015 WL 3750001, at *4 n.5, 11.

Third, the California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that the

prosecutor’s alleged misstatements of law were not unduly prejudicial because the

trial court provided the jury with clear and correct instructions on relevant legal

standards. See id. at *8; Darden, 477 U.S at 182–83; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81

F.3d 891, 898 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The arguments of counsel are generally accorded

less weight by the jury than the court’s instructions . . . .”).

Finally, the California Court of Appeal also reasonably determined that the

prosecutor did not improperly call upon the jury’s passions, prejudice, or

sympathies. Considering the context in which these statements were made, the

court reasonably concluded that they would not have affected a reasonable jury’s

ability to judge the evidence fairly. See Chandra, 2015 WL 3750001, at *13;

Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 898 (a prosecutor’s closing argument “must be judged

in the context of the entire argument and the instructions”).

4 4. Because the California Court of Appeal reasonably held that

Petitioner failed to identify any prejudicial errors that would render his trial

fundamentally unfair, there were no cumulative errors that resulted in a violation of

Petitioner’s due process rights. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294

(1973); Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir. 2003).

5. This Court will not consider Petitioner’s uncertified issue on appeal

because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and he lacks a colorable

claim for relief on same. See United States v. Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1028

(9th Cir. 2018); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner

also seemingly abandons the uncertified issue in his reply brief to this Court.

PETITION DENIED.