NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0350-25
AALIYAH HOUSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES, INC., and AMERICAN CREDIT ACCEPTANCE (ACA),
Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________
Submitted June 15, 2026 – Decided July 13, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0031-25.
Aaliyah Houston, self-represented appellant.
Robinson Miller LLC, attorneys for respondents (Michael J. Gesualdo, of counsel and on the brief; Bradley A. Suiters, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff challenges the trial court's dismissal of her complaint with
prejudice after it found no valid basis to vacate the arbitration award arising
from a consumer credit dispute she had with defendants. She additionally claims
the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint instead of allowing her to amend
it. After careful review, we affirm. Because plaintiff did not set forth a valid
basis to vacate the arbitration award, her complaint could not proceed, and any
amendment to the complaint would have been futile.
I.
The record demonstrates plaintiff Aaliyah Houston purchased a vehicle
from defendant CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. ("CarMax"), financing the
purchase through defendant American Credit Acceptance, on November 7,
2020. Plaintiff made a $1,200 down payment, executed several documents by
hand and others electronically in the presence of a CarMax employee, and took
delivery of the vehicle. The retail installment contract included an arbitration
provision and a seven-day return policy.
In November 2022, nearly two years after purchasing her car, plaintiff
notified defendants of her intent to rescind the transaction. She subsequently
initiated arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, alleging
defendants had embezzled her down payment and forged her electronic
A-0350-25 2 signatures on four documents. As a remedy, plaintiff sought title to the vehicle
free of the remaining balance and $28,000 in damages. The arbitrator denied
defendants' motion to dismiss and instead conducted a full evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, plaintiff appeared on her own behalf, defendants appeared
through counsel, and defendants presented the testimony of a CarMax employee.
On November 25, 2024, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of
defendants on all claims. The arbitrator rejected plaintiff's embezzlement claim,
which was premised on the assertion that she did not want to pay a $1,200 down
payment. Instead, the arbitrator found plaintiff's down payment was an ordinary
component of the transaction, plaintiff had voluntarily provided the payment,
and she could have declined to proceed with the purchase. The arbitrator
likewise rejected plaintiff's forgery claim, found the testimony of the CarMax
employee credible regarding the execution of the documents, and found
plaintiff's denial of electronically signing four of the documents not credible.
The arbitrator noted the terms of the four disputed documents were also reflected
in the retail installment contract, which plaintiff admitted to signing. The
arbitrator addressed each statute cited by plaintiff—including 12 C.F.R. §
1026.23 (Regulation Z), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1348, 1033(b), 495, 29 U.S.C. §
A-0350-25 3 1109, and 15 U.S.C. § 1611—and found none of them applicable to plaintiff's
circumstances. Accordingly, the arbitrator denied all of plaintiff's claims.
Undeterred, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division, seeking to
vacate or modify the arbitration award, rescind the transaction, remove all liens
associated with the vehicle, and recover $28,000 in damages. The case was
removed to federal court but subsequently remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 1, 2025, before
the return date of the motion, plaintiff filed an amended complaint without leave
of court or defendants' consent, alleging the arbitration award demonstrated a
manifest disregard of federal law and reiterating many of the same allegations
as the original complaint.
Defendants requested the court disregard plaintiff's amended complaint
because it was filed without their consent or leave of court in violation of Rule
4:9-1, or, in the alternative, the court apply their pending motion to dismiss to
the amended complaint, arguing it was substantially similar to the original.
Plaintiff objected, acknowledged the amended complaint was procedurally
defective, and requested the court grant her leave to amend. The court heard
oral argument on August 1, 2025. Defendants contended plaintiff had received
A-0350-25 4 a full and fair arbitration hearing and had not pleaded facts supporting any
statutory grounds to vacate the award. Plaintiff argued the arbitrator had
manifestly disregarded the law and conceded her original and amended
complaints contained the same information regarding this alleged disregard.
The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice, stating it had considered both the complaint and the amended
complaint and found no appropriate basis for vacating the arbitration award
pursuant to the New Jersey Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act. It
concluded plaintiff's arguments were merits-based disagreements with the
arbitrator's findings, which are not grounds to vacate an award, and the
complaint did not set forth a claim that was not addressed by the arbitration
award. This appeal followed.
II.
We "review the trial court's decision on a motion to vacate an arbitration
award de novo." Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 455 N.J.
Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018). "Private sector arbitration awards are . . .
subjected to an extraordinarily deferential standard of review." Rappaport v.
Pasternak, 260 N.J. 230, 250 (2025). "An award may not be vacated or modified
simply because a court disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the law
A-0350-25 5 or view of the facts[.]" Id. at 250-51. The grounds for vacating an award are
narrowly limited to cases where:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
[N.J.S.A.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0350-25
AALIYAH HOUSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES, INC., and AMERICAN CREDIT ACCEPTANCE (ACA),
Defendants-Respondents. ______________________________
Submitted June 15, 2026 – Decided July 13, 2026
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0031-25.
Aaliyah Houston, self-represented appellant.
Robinson Miller LLC, attorneys for respondents (Michael J. Gesualdo, of counsel and on the brief; Bradley A. Suiters, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff challenges the trial court's dismissal of her complaint with
prejudice after it found no valid basis to vacate the arbitration award arising
from a consumer credit dispute she had with defendants. She additionally claims
the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint instead of allowing her to amend
it. After careful review, we affirm. Because plaintiff did not set forth a valid
basis to vacate the arbitration award, her complaint could not proceed, and any
amendment to the complaint would have been futile.
I.
The record demonstrates plaintiff Aaliyah Houston purchased a vehicle
from defendant CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. ("CarMax"), financing the
purchase through defendant American Credit Acceptance, on November 7,
2020. Plaintiff made a $1,200 down payment, executed several documents by
hand and others electronically in the presence of a CarMax employee, and took
delivery of the vehicle. The retail installment contract included an arbitration
provision and a seven-day return policy.
In November 2022, nearly two years after purchasing her car, plaintiff
notified defendants of her intent to rescind the transaction. She subsequently
initiated arbitration before the American Arbitration Association, alleging
defendants had embezzled her down payment and forged her electronic
A-0350-25 2 signatures on four documents. As a remedy, plaintiff sought title to the vehicle
free of the remaining balance and $28,000 in damages. The arbitrator denied
defendants' motion to dismiss and instead conducted a full evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, plaintiff appeared on her own behalf, defendants appeared
through counsel, and defendants presented the testimony of a CarMax employee.
On November 25, 2024, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of
defendants on all claims. The arbitrator rejected plaintiff's embezzlement claim,
which was premised on the assertion that she did not want to pay a $1,200 down
payment. Instead, the arbitrator found plaintiff's down payment was an ordinary
component of the transaction, plaintiff had voluntarily provided the payment,
and she could have declined to proceed with the purchase. The arbitrator
likewise rejected plaintiff's forgery claim, found the testimony of the CarMax
employee credible regarding the execution of the documents, and found
plaintiff's denial of electronically signing four of the documents not credible.
The arbitrator noted the terms of the four disputed documents were also reflected
in the retail installment contract, which plaintiff admitted to signing. The
arbitrator addressed each statute cited by plaintiff—including 12 C.F.R. §
1026.23 (Regulation Z), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1348, 1033(b), 495, 29 U.S.C. §
A-0350-25 3 1109, and 15 U.S.C. § 1611—and found none of them applicable to plaintiff's
circumstances. Accordingly, the arbitrator denied all of plaintiff's claims.
Undeterred, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division, seeking to
vacate or modify the arbitration award, rescind the transaction, remove all liens
associated with the vehicle, and recover $28,000 in damages. The case was
removed to federal court but subsequently remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 1, 2025, before
the return date of the motion, plaintiff filed an amended complaint without leave
of court or defendants' consent, alleging the arbitration award demonstrated a
manifest disregard of federal law and reiterating many of the same allegations
as the original complaint.
Defendants requested the court disregard plaintiff's amended complaint
because it was filed without their consent or leave of court in violation of Rule
4:9-1, or, in the alternative, the court apply their pending motion to dismiss to
the amended complaint, arguing it was substantially similar to the original.
Plaintiff objected, acknowledged the amended complaint was procedurally
defective, and requested the court grant her leave to amend. The court heard
oral argument on August 1, 2025. Defendants contended plaintiff had received
A-0350-25 4 a full and fair arbitration hearing and had not pleaded facts supporting any
statutory grounds to vacate the award. Plaintiff argued the arbitrator had
manifestly disregarded the law and conceded her original and amended
complaints contained the same information regarding this alleged disregard.
The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint with
prejudice, stating it had considered both the complaint and the amended
complaint and found no appropriate basis for vacating the arbitration award
pursuant to the New Jersey Arbitration Act or the Federal Arbitration Act. It
concluded plaintiff's arguments were merits-based disagreements with the
arbitrator's findings, which are not grounds to vacate an award, and the
complaint did not set forth a claim that was not addressed by the arbitration
award. This appeal followed.
II.
We "review the trial court's decision on a motion to vacate an arbitration
award de novo." Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 455 N.J.
Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018). "Private sector arbitration awards are . . .
subjected to an extraordinarily deferential standard of review." Rappaport v.
Pasternak, 260 N.J. 230, 250 (2025). "An award may not be vacated or modified
simply because a court disagrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the law
A-0350-25 5 or view of the facts[.]" Id. at 250-51. The grounds for vacating an award are
narrowly limited to cases where:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator; corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15 of this act, so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding; (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;
[N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a) (footnotes omitted).]
Put differently, an arbitration award "may be vacated only for fraud, corruption,
or similar wrongdoing on the part of the arbitrators." Rappaport, 260 N.J. at 249
(quoting Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 129 N.J. 479, 548
(1992) (Wilentz, C.J., concurring)).
Plaintiff first pursued her claims in arbitration, where she received a full
evidentiary hearing, and the arbitrator ruled against her on all claims. She then
filed suit in state court, seeking to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act. After defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
A-0350-25 6 plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging the arbitrator manifestly
disregarded federal law and failed to address her objections regarding electronic
signatures and rescission rights. We conclude, as did the trial court, plaintiff
seeks to litigate the same claims that were fully addressed in arbitration. She
has not set forth any claim of fraud, corruption, or similar wrongdoing on the
part of the arbitrator. Her disagreement with the arbitrator's factual and legal
findings cannot provide a basis to vacate an arbitration award.
Additionally, plaintiff complained she was not given the opportunity to be
heard regarding the merits of her amended complaint. That assertion is belied
by the record. The trial court's ruling explicitly addressed the amended
complaint:
The criticisms and allegations in both the complaint and the amended complaint are effectively objections to or . . . arguments that seek a revision of or a review of the merits of the arbitrator's determination, neither of which are appropriate for this [c]ourt to engage in, barring some sort of basis for a modification of an arbitrator's award, which, again, is not presented by virtue of the facts pleaded in – in either the complaint or the amended pleading.
[(Emphasis added).]
In sum, even if we were to disagree with the arbitration award, which we
do not, disagreement with a decision is not a basis for vacating an arbitration
A-0350-25 7 award given the finality of an arbitration award. Whether an "arbitrator[]
commit[s] errors of law or errors of fact" is "totally irrelevant." Perini, 129 N.J.
at 519 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring). In construing the grounds for vacating an
arbitration award outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:24-9, Chief Justice Wilentz, whose
concurrence was later adopted by a majority of the Court, see Tretina Printing,
Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 358 (1994), concluded "the
only tenable conclusion from the statute itself is that errors of fact, whether gross
or ordinary, lead to neither vacation nor modification and correction. More to
the point in this case, there is no mention whatsoever of errors of law. The
statute provides no remedy whatsoever for that alleged mistake." Perini, 129
N.J. at 542 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 543 ("It is incongruous to
think that parties who want to get out of the court system, who want to avoid
litigation, somehow want their awards to be reviewed on the basis of their
conformance to New Jersey law.").
Plaintiff failed to state a claim in her complaint not otherwise subject to
arbitration according to the agreement she admitted to signing and not already
addressed at her arbitration. Her generalized protests that the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law are without basis in fact or law.
Affirmed.
A-0350-25 8