A. N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States

32 Cust. Ct. 41, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1681
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedJanuary 20, 1954
DocketC. D. 1578
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 32 Cust. Ct. 41 (A. N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A. N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States, 32 Cust. Ct. 41, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1681 (cusc 1954).

Opinion

Johnson, Judge:

This action involves certain importations from Canada, which were entered at the ports of St. Albans, Vt., and Pembina, N. Dak., during the period from December 1947 to April 1949. The merchandise is described on the invoices as frozen beef lungs, frozen beef melts, and frozen beef spleens. Duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 6 cents per pound under paragraph 706 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as—

Meats, * * * frozen, * * * not specially provided for * * *.

The merchandise is claimed properly dutiable as nonenumerated raw or unmanufactured articles, under paragraph 1558, at the rate of 10 per centum ad valorem as to the items entered prior to January 1, [42]*421948, and at 5 per centum ad valorem under said paragraph, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, T. D. 51802, as to the merchandise entered after January 1, 1948.

When hearings were initially held at the ports of St. Albans and Minneapolis, Minn., it was agreed between counsel that the frozen lungs, melts, and spleens were similar in all respects to the frozen beef lungs the subject of decision in the case of W. F. Mackay Estate v. United States, 28 Cust. Ct. 73, C. D. 1391. The record in that case was incorporated with and made a part of the record herein. In view of this agreement as to similarity, we will accept the testimony as to the lungs here involved to be applicable also to the spleens and melts. The plaintiff in each case thereupon rested. However, upon motion of Government counsel, the cases were transferred to New York for further hearing of Government witnesses. When coming on for trial at the port of New York, over objection of Government counsel, all of the protests were consolidated.

The Mackay case, supra, also involved frozen beef lungs imported from Canada. In that case, however, no question was raised concerning any difference between fresh beef lungs and frozen beef lungs. The testimony concerned beef lungs, and whether or not the witnesses were referring to frozen beef lungs was not raised. Nor was it disputed that fresh beef lungs, when frozen, were other than fresh beef lungs merely frozen for preserving purposes, without any change in characteristics. However, three witnesses testified as to the use of the particular frozen beef lungs there imported. These witnesses testified without contradiction that the frozen beef lungs were used only in the manufacture of dog and other animal food and that such lungs were not edible. All of the plaintiff’s witnesses in the incorporated case were of the opinion from their experience in the meatpacking business that beef lungs were chiefly used in the manufacture of dog and animal feed and that such beef lungs were not meat but a meat byproduct. Some of the Government’s witnesses had sold beef lungs, presumably fresh beef lungs, at retail in their butcher shops, but, of course, could not testify as to the use thereof. Others had eaten beef lungs in a stew but were of the opinion that such stew only became known as a meat stew when it contained meat mixed with the beef lungs. One witness for the Government had seen lungen stew on restaurant menus but he, also, was of the opinion that beef lungs did not fall within the definition of meat. A housewife, who made lungen stew, testified for the Government that she added meat to the lungs and that the meat so added was what made it a meat stew and not the lungs. She also was of the opinion that beef lungs would not be tender enough to eat if broiled.

This court, in that case, considered the common meaning of the words “meat” and “flesh,” as found in various dictionaries and as [43]*43construed by the courts, concerning other edible portions of animals, and concluded that the term “meat,” as used in the tariff acts, includes—

* * * such portions of the animal as are habitually eaten as food, which are of everyday consumption, and which are ordinarily known as, and accepted as, a meat of commerce.

The court found that beef lungs which, of course, would include the fresh lungs as well as the frozen, were not established by the evidence to be items of everyday consumption by any substantial part of the population of this country, and interpreted paragraph 706 as not including beef lungs because it was not the intention of Congress to include within the term “meat” any article used almost exclusively in the manufacture of dog and cat food, even though a small portion was used for human consumption. The court, therefore, held that beef lungs, not habitually eaten as a meat food, were not classifiable as meat.

At the trial of this case, it appeared that the issue is identical with the Mackay case, supra. The issue again arose because the Commissioner of Customs issued instructions not to apply the ruling by this court to other shipments for the following reason:

As the Assistant Attorney General believes that evidence can be obtained to support the Government’s position in the above-mentioned case, it is proposed to retry the issue involved. [T. D. 53027.]

Counsel for the Government at the opening of the trial made a statement that the Mackay case, supra, was not appealed—

* * * because although we disagreed with certain legal principles enunciated by the court these legal principles seemed to be bound up with certain factual statements or facts in this case. The Government felt that it required time to present proof of the facts which should enable this court, in our opinion, to make a different finding.

Government counsel further moved for a continuance of the action by transfer to the ports of Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Buffalo, Detroit, St. Louis, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, Dallas, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh for the purpose of presenting testimony, which he believed necessary and essential, if he were to hope for a modification of the court's decision, and for the purpose of showing—

* * * that the use of beef lungs for human consumption is indulged in not only by people of Jewish extraction, not only by kosher users, but non-kosher users, by people of Italian, German, Hungarian, Roumanian extraction, by a major segment of practically all the peoples from southeastern Europe and that that use of beef lungs for edible purposes as food, as meat, is universal throughout the United States.

Although Government counsel admitted that such transfers would cause a definite hardship upon the importers for the reason that a final decision would not be rendered until some time in the future, [44]*44and also that he was not ready at the present time to ask transfers to a definite port, having no evidence ready to present at such ports, he acted upon the assumption and his conviction that such evidence could be there obtained.

Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the motion for the reason of the great delay in obtaining a final decision and also for the reason that such evidence would be accumulative, inasmuch as half of the Jewish population of the United States resided in New York City. Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out that the action herein had been pending for 3 years and that the Government had ample opportunity to obtain witnesses at the hearings, which were held in the Middle West, but failed to do so. Plaintiffs’ counsel furthermore conceded that the testimony obtainable in the other ports would be of the same character as that obtained in New York City.

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Bluebook (online)
32 Cust. Ct. 41, 1954 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/a-n-deringer-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1954.