SECOND DIVISION RICKMAN, P. J., GOBEIL and DAVIS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 9, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A25A1588. A & M HOSPITALITIES, LLC et al. v. ALIMCHANDANI et al.
GOBEIL, Judge.
This is the fifth appearance of this case before this Court in this protracted
dispute involving the dissolution of a partnership. See A&M Hospitalities, LLC v.
Alimchandani, 373 Ga. App. 704 (908 SE2d 741) (2024) (“Alimchandani IV”).1 In our
most recent opinion, Alimchandani IV, we reversed an order from the trial court that
directed the appointed receiver, Michael Lambros, be paid from the property that was
held in receivership. 373 Ga. App. at 711(1)(b). Upon remand, the trial court issued a
1 See also A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 351 Ga. App. 310 (828 SE2d 615) (2019) (“Alimchandani I”); A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 359 Ga. App. 271 (856 SE2d 704) (2021) (“Alimchandani II”); A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 363 Ga. App. 531 (871 SE2d 290) (2022) (“Alimchandani III”). final order in which it declined to order Lambros to pay back $2.1 million in fees paid
to him despite the fact that the orders appointing Lambros as receiver were later
voided.
JDS&J Enterprises, LP, David Motley, Jane Motley, Motmanco, Inc.,
Motmanco, LLC, JPM Advertising, Inc., and DJ Land & Development, LLC
(collectively, the “Defendants”),2 now appeal from the trial court’s final order,
arguing that the court erred when it failed to carry into full effect this Court’s ruling
in Alimchandani IV.3 For the reasons that follow, we now vacate the trial court’s
opinion and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
A detailed account of the facts and procedural history of the underlying dispute
between the parties can be found at Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 704–09. As
relevant here, Prenita Alimchandani was a minority owner of A&M Hospitalities, LLC
(“A&M”), a company created for the purpose of operating a hotel. Id at 705. In
October 2017, Alimchandani filed suit against some of the defendants, seeking the
2 A&M Hospitalities, LLC did not join the other defendants in filing an appellate brief in the instant appeal. Appellee Prenita Alimchandani has not filed a response brief. 3 We granted Lambros’s motion to intervene and he later filed a response brief. 2 judicial dissolution of A&M, and raising claims for breach of fiduciary duties and
violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, OCGA
§ 16-14-1 et seq. Id. At the same time that Alimchandani filed her complaint, she also
filed a motion for an appointment of a receiver, alleging that she would be “subjected
to immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage” if A&M was not placed in a
receivership.” Id. at 705–06.
The case proceeded to arbitration based on A&M’s Operating Agreement, after
which an arbitrator found in the defendants’ favor on all claims and awarding those
defendants damages and attorney fees. Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 706. We later
affirmed the confirmation of the arbitrator’s judgment in Alimchandani II. See
Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 708.
Alimchandani filed a second amended complaint which added the remaining
defendants and raised additional claims. Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 706–07.
Although allowed to proceed on the second amended complaint by the trial court, this
Court later declared it barred by res judicata (due to the arbitration proceedings) in
Alimchandani III. See Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 709.
3 On October 1, 2020, the Defendants filed a motion to disqualify and recuse the
trial court judge. Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 707. On November 13, 2020, the
trial court denied this motion without assigning it to another judge for consideration.
Id. After denying the Defendants’ motion to recuse,
[o]n January 26, 2021, the trial court appointed a receiver, Michael Lambros, to oversee A&M’s assets, accounts, and all other interests currently owned by A&M, including all of its subsidiaries and to turn over to him all assets, wherever located, in their entirety and unaltered, including but not limited to A&M’s hotels, properties, assets, M3 accounting software, documents, books and records, checks, certificates of deposit, financial statements, bank accounts, financial instruments, money, receivables, keys to any and all security boxes and the exact location of said security boxes, and equipment.
In the order, the trial court concluded that there is a clear and urgent need for a receiver because there is a significant risk that A&M’s corporate assets, which are 25 percent owned by the plaintiff will be dissipated, noting a prior $6 million transfer from A&M to defendants MotmanCo. and JDS&J. The [D]efendants filed a notice of appeal on January 29, 2021.
Id. at 708.
4 In Alimchandani III, “we concluded that the trial court erred by failing to
reassign the motion to recuse to another judge, and we remanded the case with
direction that the case be reassigned to a new judge.” Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App.
at 709. We stated that “the case was now over, with the exception of determining fees
for [Christopher] Cohilas[4] and the special master, and that all orders issued
subsequent to the order denying the [D]efendants’ motion to recuse, including the
order appointing a receiver, were void based on our conclusion that the plaintiff’s
[second amended complaint] was barred by res judicata.” Id. at 709 (quoting
Alimchandani III, 363 Ga. App. 531, 543(3) (871 SE2d 290) (2022)) (citation
modified).
On remand [from Alimchandani III], Lambros filed a motion for direction, requesting direction as to whether he should continue to act as the receiver pending the Supreme Court of Georgia’s resolution of Alimchandani’s petition for certiorari [in Alimchandani III], and the trial court entered an order directing Lambros to maintain the status quo of the receivership and act as a receiver until the court received the remittitur. The [D]efendants later moved for entry of final judgment, for Cohilas, Lambros, and Alimchandani to repay the money they received
4 In July 2018, the trial court appointed Cohilas as “receiver” in order to conduct an audit and discovery. Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 706. 5 from A&M, and for costs to be taxed against Alimchandani. The court entered a final order directing the [D]efendants to make final payments from the property held in the receivership to Cohilas and Lambros, taxing $26,984.50 in costs against Alimchandani, and directing Lambros to pay A&M bank accounts into the court registry and for 25 percent of those funds to be paid to Alimchandani. The court declined to order Cohilas and Lambros to return any funds.
Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 709.
The Defendants appealed, and in Alimchandani IV, this Court held that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order directing Lambros to maintain the status
quo as receiver in light of this Court’s holding in Alimchandani III. 373 Ga. App. at
709–11(1)(a). Additionally, because his appointment was void, we held that the court
further erred by ordering that Lambros be paid from the property that was held in the
receivership. Id. at 711(1)(b).
The Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration in Alimchandani IV,
requesting that this Court add the following sentence to our opinion: “The trial court
is instructed to order Lambros to return to A&M all funds paid from A&M to The
Lambros Firm LLC, and to order Cohilas to return to A&M all funds paid from A&M
to Watson Spence LLP for work performed after Alimchandani II.” The Defendants
6 explained that this addition would “give full effect to this Court’s compensation
rulings and leave nothing to chance that the trial court will again evade this Court.”
This Court denied the MFR, but issued a substitute opinion. The Court added the
following sentence at the end of the paragraph wherein we found that because
Lambros’s appointment was void, the trial court erred by ordering that Lambros be
paid from the property that was held in the receivership: “And in light of this
conclusion, it necessarily follows that the [D]efendants are entitled to reimbursement
of any funds that they paid to Lambros from the receivership property, and any funds
that they paid to Lambros for his receiver fees.” Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at
711(1)(b).
Upon remand, the Defendants filed a “motion for entry of judgment carrying
into full effect the ruling of the Georgia Court of Appeals regarding Michael
Lambros,” in which they sought reimbursement of the fees paid to Lambros from the
receivership property. The Defendants represented that “[a]ll that remains for [the
trial court] to do is to implement [the] decision and direction of the Court of Appeals
[in Alimchandani IV] by entering judgment ordering Lambros to reimburse to [A&M]
all the funds that it paid to Lambros, including, but not limited to his receiver fees.”
7 The Defendants sought reimbursement of approximately $2.1 million previously paid
to Lambros through his law firm, The Lambros Firm LLC.
Lambros opposed the motion, arguing that the Defendants had misconstrued
the holding of Alimchandani IV. Lambros acknowledged that this Court found that his
appointment was void, that it was error for the trial court to order that he be paid from
the property held in the receivership, and that the Defendants were entitled to
reimbursement. However, Lambros noted that Alimchandani IV was silent as to which
party was responsible for reimbursing the Defendants for the fees paid to him.
Additionally, Lambros highlighted that this Court had declined to adopt the
Defendants’ requested language in the substitute opinion ordering him to return the
money he received from the receivership property. And finally, Lambros argued that
it would be unjust and unfair to make him shoulder the entire cost of the receivership,
where he had partly used the fees paid to him to pay managers, attorneys, and other
professionals to help run A&M’s business while he performed his duties under the
assumption that he was a duly appointed receiver.
On March 5, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying the Defendants’
request “to claw back the amounts paid to former receiver [ ] Lambros for services
8 provided to the receivership estate.” Citing United Bonded Warehouse v. Jackson, 208
Ga. 552 (67 SE2d 761) (1951), the court stated that “where the appointment of a
receiver is without legal authority, improper, or inequitable, the parties at whose
instance the receiver was appointed and, not the receivership fund, are liable for the
expenses of the receivership[.]” The court explained:
As previously ruled, and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the receivership statute mandates that Mr. Lambros be paid for his services and sets the amount, but it does not provide for any mechanism for this [c]ourt to claw back compensation already paid to him as receiver. Accordingly, there is no authority allowing [the] Defendants the remedy they seek, and this [c]ourt declines to exceed its power and arrogate to itself the power of the legislature to make a new law on this point. To the extent [the] Defendants have a remedy, it is solely against [Alimchandani].
The instant appeal followed.5
5 In Alimchandani IV, this Court held that the Defendants failed to show error in regard to the trial court’s reappointment of Cohilas as an auditor, but the court erred in awarding fees to Cohilas from the property held in receivership, to the extent that the fees were for the entirety of the work Cohilas performed in this dispute. 373 Ga. App. at 711–13(2). We remanded for the trial court to determine the appropriate fees to be paid to Cohilas for the work he performed during the time he validly served as an auditor before the reversal of the order appointing him as an auditor. Id. at 713(2). On remand, the trial court ordered Alimchandani and her counsel to reimburse A&M the sum of $61,303.40 within thirty days of the entry of the court’s order. The 9 On appeal, the Defendants argue that the trial court “gravely erred” when it
failed to carry into full effect this Court’s ruling in Alimchandani IV by refusing to
order Lambros to reimburse the funds paid to him from receivership funds under
orders that were later voided. They assert that the court “manipulated” the language
in Alimchandani IV to “produce a desired outcome.”
“When any fund or property is in litigation and the rights of either or both
parties cannot otherwise be fully protected or when there is a fund or property having
no one to manage it, a receiver of the same may be appointed by the judge of the
superior court having jurisdiction thereof.” OCGA § 9-8-1. A trial court has the
discretion to grant the receiver the necessary powers to do the job that he or she has
been properly appointed to do. Nayyar v. Bhatia, 348 Ga. App. 789, 790(1) (824 SE2d
675) (2019). The court also has the authority to “regulate the compensation paid to
the receiver,” and should award “such compensation to the ... receiver or receivers
appointed thereunder as their services are reasonably worth.” OCGA §§ 9-8-10, 9-8-
13(c).
The present appeal hinges on the following language in Alimchandani IV:
Defendants do not raise any arguments pertaining to the court’s ruling with respect to Cohilas in their appellate brief. 10 Because we determined that Lambros’[s] appointment was improper, Lambros was not entitled to any compensation from the property that was held in the receivership, and thus the trial court erred by ordering for him to be compensated from this property. And in light of this conclusion, it necessarily follows that the defendants are entitled to reimbursement of any funds that they paid to Lambros from the receivership property, and any funds that they paid to Lambros for his receiver fees.
373 Ga. App. at 711(1)(b). The Defendants maintain that this Court’s directive in
Alimchandani IV was clear: Lambros is not entitled to any compensation as his
appointment was made under void orders, and Lambros is required to reimburse the
Defendants for any fees paid. They contend that the trial court’s “years-long pattern
of error and defiance” in the underlying dispute must be corrected, which has
permitted Lambros to “hang on to $2.1 million of A&M’s money for years.”
Contrary to the Defendants’ assertion, our opinion in Alimchandani IV did not
explicitly order or direct Lambros to pay back any fees he received from the
receivership property. As noted above, Alimchandani IV outlined that Lambros was
not entitled to any compensation paid from property of the receivership and A&M was
entitled “to reimbursement of any funds that they paid to Lambros from the
11 receivership property, and any funds that they paid to Lambros for his receiver fees.”
373 Ga. App. at 711(1)(b). The opinion, however, is silent as to which party is
responsible for repayment of any fees paid to Lambros. The Defendants maintain that
“reimbursement” means that the recipient must repay the money paid, and if this
Court had intended for a third party, such as the plaintiff (Alimchandani) to pay back
the fees paid to Lambros, the Court would have used the word “indemnification” in
Alimchandani IV. They allege the trial court’s use of the phrase “claw back” rather
than “reimburse” was a failed attempt to “circumvent” our directive in Alimchandani
IV for Lambros to repay any fees paid.
As a starting point, “[d]ictionaries may supply the plain and ordinary meaning
of a word.” Kelley v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 364 Ga. App. 612, 617(1)(c)(i) (876 SE2d 51)
(2022). The dictionary definition of “reimburse” is “to pay back to someone” and
“to make restoration or payment of an equivalent to.”6 And the word “indemnify”
means “to secure against hurt, loss, or damage” and “to make compensation to for
6 M e r r i a m - W e b s t e r D i c t i o n a r y , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reimburse (visited Jan. 12, 2026). 12 incurred hurt, loss, or damage.”7 Contrary to the Defendants’ interpretation, the
word “reimburse” is not necessarily limited to repayment by the recipient, but could
also refer to repayment by a third party.
In its order, the trial court relied on United Bonded Warehouse to conclude that
it lacked the authority to “claw back” any compensation already paid to Lambros as
a receiver. 208 Ga. at 553(3). In that case, the Supreme Court of Georgia explained
that
where the appointment of a receiver is without legal authority, improper, or inequitable, the parties at whose instance the receiver was appointed and, not the receivership fund, are liable for the expenses of the receivership, and parties who avail themselves of the advantages of an existing receivership to preserve the property subject to their claims must contribute toward the expenses of the receivership.
Id. The Defendants counter that United Bonded Warehouse is inapplicable because the
issue of reimbursement was not at issue in that case, as no expenses were ever paid to
the receiver, and the Defendants are not seeking reimbursement from “the
impecunious Plaintiff,” Alimchandani. They also assert that it would be unjust to
7 M e r r i a m - W e b s t e r D i c t i o n a r y , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indemnify (visited Jan. 12, 2026). 13 allow Lambros to keep all the fees that have been paid. In so arguing, the Defendants
cite to Beach v. Macon Grocery, wherein the Fifth Circuit stated that “where the
receiver has been wrongfully appointed, and the order subsequently vacated, it would
be more equitable that the receiver himself should sustain the loss or expenses of the
receivership paid by him than that they should be taxed to the successful defendants.”
125 F 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1903).
In Beach, the Fifth Circuit Court reiterated that if a receiver is erroneously
appointed, and the adverse party successfully contests the appointment, the
compensation due to the receiver and his expenses incurred in the administration of
the estate “should be taxed to the parties who have applied to have the appointment
made.” Id. at F 515. In that case, which arose in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, the receiver took possession of certain cattle, horses, and hogs, and
incurred $325 in expenses for caring for and feeding the stock pending sale. Id. at F
513–14. After overturning certain orders, including the one appointing the receiver,
the district court directed the receiver to turn over the property. Id. at F 514. The
question at issue in Beach was whether the receiver could retain $325 in expenses. Id.
14 at F 514–15. The Fifth Circuit found that the receiver had no right to retain the
amount paid in expenses, explaining that the property
having been taken from the defendants against their consent under an erroneous order, which they resisted successfully in an appellate court, the only proper course is to return the property without charge of any kind against it or against the successful defendants. The defendants should be put in their former condition as nearly as possible. Instead of any sum being taxed against the defendants under such circumstances, they would be entitled in some jurisdictions to recover damages, in a proper action, for being deprived of the use of the property. The petitioners who instituted the proceedings and secured the appointment of a receiver are properly and equitably chargeable with the costs and expenses incurred by their wrongful application. In the event of their insolvency, any expenses incurred by the receiver should fall on him, and not on the defendants. He need not become receiver unless he chooses, or he may require a bond of indemnity before accepting the position. In a case, therefore, where the receiver has been wrongfully appointed, and the order subsequently vacated, it would be more equitable that the receiver himself should sustain the loss or expenses of the receivership paid by him than that they should be taxed to the successful defendants.
Id. at F 517. The receiver was therefore directed to turn over all the sale proceeds from
the seized property (including his expenses in storing the property). Id. However,
unlike the situation before us, Beach did not involve or address any compensation or
15 fees paid to the receiver for his services, as opposed to just expenses incurred in
managing the receivership property. Further, Beach is not binding on this Court.
We have found limited case law to address the question before us. Receivership
cases typically distinguish between proper and invalid or void receiverships. In Atlanta
Trust Co. v. Chapman, the U. S. Supreme Court considered a dispute where a
complainant in a mortgage foreclosure lawsuit was held personally responsible for
expenses incurred by the appointed receiver. 208 US 360, 364 (28 SCt 406, 52 LE
528) (1908). The Court reversed, rejecting the receiver’s petition to impose liability
onto the plaintiff and held that ordinarily expenses and fees of a receivership estate are
to be paid from the property or fund that is subject to the receivership. Id. at 376–78.
In a typical scenario, where the receiver has been properly appointed, if the
receivership estate has insufficient funds, a receiver is not allowed to automatically
hold the party who requested the receiver’s appointment personally liable for the
expenses and fees.8 Id. at 370–73. In atypical circumstances, cases may arise in which,
because of the special circumstances, it is equitable to require the parties, at whose
8 The Court reasoned that the person in the best position to know if the receivership is likely to have insufficient funds is the receiver him/her self. Atlantic Trust Co., 208 US at 373. 16 instance a receiver of property was appointed, to meet the expenses of the
receivership, when the fund in court is ascertained to be insufficient for that purpose.
Id. at 375. Compare Richey v. Brett, 112 Ohio. St. 582, 587–88 (148 NE 92) (1925)
(ordinarily, the expenses of a receiver are payable out of “the corpus of the property”
and parties who invoke the jurisdiction and process of a court for the appointment of
a receiver do not become personally liable for the compensation of the receiver and the
expenses in the absence of special circumstances calling for the application of
“equitable considerations”), with Wiley v. Sclafani, 943 SW2d 107, 110-11 (Tex. App.
1997) (finding that the receiver had no right to compensation arising out of a void
receivership, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ordering that appellee “pay
the receivership fees, rather than compelling payment from the receivership funds”).
In the instant case, this Court previously held that the trial court’s orders
appointing Lambros as receiver and directing him to maintain the status quo were
void, and thus the trial court erred by ordering that Lambros be paid from the property
that was held in the receivership. Alimchandani IV, 373 Ga. App. at 711(1)(b). Given
this holding, which constitutes the law of the case,9 we vacate the trial court’s order
9 “Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case 17 and remand with instructions (as specified in the following paragraph) for the trial
court to direct the plaintiff (Alimchandani), as the party who requested a receiver, to
pay the Defendants for “funds that they paid to Lambros from the receivership
property, and any funds that they paid to Lambros for his receiver fees.” Id.; see also
United Bonded Warehouse, 208 Ga. at 553(3); Richey, 112 Ohio St. at 587 (where “there
has been an irregular or unauthorized appointment of a receiver, or where a party has
received benefits from the receivership in excess of the amount required to be paid,
or where an action has unjustly been maintained without right, in all such instances
the plaintiffs in the action may be held personally responsible for deficiencies”).
On remand, the trial court should first consider whether the fees paid to
Lambros are commensurate to what his “services are reasonably worth.” OCGA § 9-
8-13(c). The court should then assess Alimchandani’s financial solvency to pay the
Defendants and “[i]n the event of [Alimchandani’s] insolvency, [whether] any
expenses incurred by [Lambros] should fall on him, and not on the [D]efendants.”
Beach, 125 F at 517. See also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Byrd, 188 Ga. 527, 533(3) (4
in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be.” Southern States Chem. v. Tampa Tank & Welding, 316 Ga. 701, 716(3) (888 SE2d 553) (2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 18 SE2d 175) (1939) (“[A]s a general rule the costs, expenses, and disbursements
incurred by a receiver whose appointment was improvidently and erroneously made
will, upon equitable principles, be charged by the court making the appointment
against the property to the extent that they have inured to its benefit.). If the trial court
needs supplemental evidence to determine the issue, it may hold a hearing.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Rickman, P. J., and Davis, J.,
concur.