A. H. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 20, 2026
• Docket: 3:22-cv-03233
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 A. H., Case No. 22-cv-03233-AMO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY 9 v. JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS SUMMER SIGLER & WEST CONTRA 10 WEST CONTRA COSTA UNIFIED COSTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS 11 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendants. 12 Re: Dkt. No. 104

13 This is a tort and discrimination case arising from a high school teacher’s sexual assault of 14 a minor student. Defendants Summer Sigler and West Contra Costa Unified School District (“the 15 District” or “WCCUSD”) move for summary judgment as to all remaining causes of action 16 asserted against them. The motion for summary judgment was heard before this Court on 17 December 18, 2025. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments 18 therein and those made at the hearing, as well as the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS 19 Defendants’ motion in part, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 20 law causes of action, and DISMISSES the remainder of the claims without prejudice to re-filing in 21 state court, for the following reasons. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff A.H. alleges she was sexually abused by one of her teachers, Jane Shetterly, while 24 a student at De Anza High School within the West Contra Costa Unified School District during 25 the 2020-2021 school year. See Third Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 60). A.H. started attending De Anza 26 High School as a freshman in August 2019, when she was 14 years old. A.H. was a student with 27 special needs and was identified as having a Specific Learning Disability which required an 1 High School, Sigler was the principal. Sigler Dep. at 19:14-18. In September 2019, Assistant 2 Principal Kim Jordan was appointed the “admin point person” for issues involving A.H. and 3 would give Principal Sigler regular updates. Sigler Dep. at 29:9-25, 44:13-18. 4 Upon starting at De Anza, A.H. began spending increasing amounts of time with Shetterly 5 before, during, and after school. A.H. Dep. at 117:5-14. Shetterly immediately took an interest in 6 A.H., asking questions about her personal life and private matters. A.H. Dep. at 118:16-119:10, 7 120:8-14, 125:2-9. Shetterly provided A.H. with her cell phone number and the two began 8 communicating regularly on their cell phones. A.H. Dep. at 125:20-126:7, 131:16-20. Shetterly 9 would also take A.H. into the teacher’s lounge and faculty restroom. A.H. Dep. at 127:17-128:9, 10 128:15-18. Principal Sigler noticed A.H. spending time in Shetterly’s room during the 2019/2020 11 school year before the pandemic. Sigler Dep. at 59:23-60:24. 12 De Anza High School’s in-person instruction ceased in March 2020 when the COVID 13 pandemic hit. Sigler Dep. at 36:20-22. During the summer following her first year at De Anza, 14 A.H. emailed Assistant Principal Jordan and told her “of course me and Shetterly, we talk on the 15 daily.” Jordan Dep. Ex. 7; Jordan Dep. at 52:17-53:7. Principal Sigler admitted this conduct 16 would be “unusual” and “outside the norm” and was something she would want to look into 17 further. Sigler Dep. at 53:9-12, 53:23-25. By September 30, 2020, Principal Sigler knew 18 Shetterly and A.H. were “very close” and spending time together. Sigler Dep. at 59:10-22, 51:25- 19 52:7. 20 As A.H. entered her second year at De Anza, Shetterly became increasingly involved in 21 her life. By fall 2020, Shetterly and A.H. spent almost every weekday together. Shetterly Dep. at 22 30:16-23. Shetterly first sexually assaulted A.H. around September 2020, following months of 23 grooming. A.H. Dep. at 79:4-10, 155:1-16; Shetterly Dep. at 31:18-22. The sexual assault 24 continued consistently from September 2020 up to the date of Shetterly’s arrest on May 30, 2021. 25 Shetterly Dep. at 31:23-32:5. 26 Between September 2020 and May 2021, Shetterly sexually assaulted A.H. on numerous 27 occasions and exchanged and requested explicit images. Shetterly Dep. at 111:4-112:16. 1 her sexual assault of A.H. A.H. Dep. at 165:5-18; Shetterly Dep. at 121:4-9. At some point 2 during the 2020/2021 school year, Shetterly began to teach from A.H.’s house and continued to do 3 so until in-person instruction resumed. A.H. Dep. at 134:9-18, 151:8-152:5. 4 By October 2020, Assistant Principal Jordan had reported to Principal Sigler concerning 5 behavior between Shetterly and A.H., and Principal Sigler acknowledged that Shetterly 6 overstepped boundaries. Sigler Dep. at 70:5-9, 70:17-23. Principal Sigler herself also noticed that 7 Shetterly was acting “inappropriately” in October 2020. Sigler Dep. at 62:10-63:1. 8 As a special needs student with an IEP, A.H. had a case manager during her time at De 9 Anza High School, Marlene Trempy. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 88:19-21. As A.H.’s case manager, 10 Trempy would write the IEP, work with the family, help determine academic goals, and remain 11 closely involved with A.H. during her time at De Anza. Sigler Dep. at 64:24-65:17. Trempy 12 testified that she started to observe Shetterly overstep boundaries in the beginning of October 2020 13 and went to Principal Sigler to report her concerns. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 126:2-4, Sigler Dep. at 14 56:22-57:6. 15 On October 20, 2020, Trempy observed Shetterly on A.H.’s Zoom camera in A.H.’s 16 bedroom. Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 134:24-135:22. Trempy raised the issue with Principal Sigler 17 “right away.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 50:18-21; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 136:1-3. Principal Sigler 18 recalled Trempy advising her that Shetterly was in A.H.’s Zoom classroom but denied being told 19 Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom at the time. Sigler Dep. at 63:8-14, 77:1-15, 77:25-78:9, 79:1-5, 20 94:9-14, 172:7-9, 213:22-25. Assistant Principal Jordan also denied being told by Trempy that 21 Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom. Jordan Dep. at 218:4-8. Principal Sigler testified that if it was 22 reported to her that Shetterly was in A.H.’s bedroom during school hours it would have triggered a 23 call to human resources (“HR”), and it could be a serious offense. Sigler Dep. at 79:6-15, 84:8-15. 24 However, Principal Sigler admitted that she was aware that Shetterly was spending time at A.H.’s 25 home and teaching classes from A.H.’s home. Sigler Dep. at 102:19-23, 213:11-21. Jordan 26 similarly knew Shetterly was spending time at A.H.’s home in October 2020, including during 27 school and teacher work hours. Jordan Vol. II at Dep. 226:10-13. 1 WCCUSD administrators held a meeting with Shetterly to discuss her conduct on October 2 23, 2020. Assistant Principal Jordan prepared a conference summary of the meeting, which 3 Principal Sigler reviewed. Jordan Dep., Ex. 20; Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9; Sigler Dep. at 4 93:5-93:12. The conference summary outlines some of Shetterly’s “inappropriate conduct” in 5 October 2020, including spending time at a student’s home during school hours. Jordan Dep., Ex. 6 20; Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9. Shetterly received several directives, including, “stop 7 spending time alone with this student at her home or in any other location.” Jordan Dep., Ex. 20; 8 Jordan Vol. I Dep. at 75:19-76:9; Sigler Dep. at 101:20-102:1. Principal Sigler did not go to HR 9 and never spoke with A.H.’s parents about Shetterly being in A.H.’s bedroom. Sigler Dep. at 10 80:19-81:9, 86:17-22. Shetterly was not disciplined as a result of her conduct and Principal Sigler 11 described the conference as a warning that she was at risk of discipline. Sigler Dep. at 105:14- 12 106:8. 13 Shetterly attended A.H.’s 16th birthday party at a rental home despite Assistant Principal 14 Jordan warning that an in-person meeting for A.H.’s 16th birthday would be problematic and a 15 “boundary thing.” Jordan Dep. Ex. 25; Jordan Dep. at 95:13-23. Shetterly used her work email to 16 send rental reservation information to A.H. Shetterly Dep. Ex. 16; Shetterly Dep. at 101:8-14. 17 A.H. thereafter told Jordan about Shetterly attending her 16th birthday party. A.H. Dep. at 18 182:10-15. Shetterly posted social media photos, some of which Principal Sigler admitted she saw 19 and which “gave [her] pause.” Sigler Dep., Ex. 33; Sigler Dep. at 195:5-197:13, 198:12-18; 20 Shetterly Dep. at 56:1-57:10. 21 By spring of 2021, WCCUSD began to transition away from remote classes. De Anza 22 reopened for in person instruction to certain students in April 2021, including A.H. Sigler Dep. at 23 38:10-39:16. After the October 23, 2020 instruction to “stop spending time with [A.H.] at her 24 home or any other location,” Trempy observed A.H. getting out of Shetterly’s car at school. 25 Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 142:25-143:2. Trempy immediately reported what she observed to 26 Principal Sigler and Assistant Principal Jordan. Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 52:12-19. 27 A.H. testified that Principal Sigler observed Shetterly and A.H. alone together walking out 1 200:22-202:19. Sigler testified that she never saw A.H. and Shetterly alone in a classroom 2 together and never saw them coming out of a storage closet. Sigler Dep. at 154:11-19. 3 In March 2021, A.H. and Shetterly visited the home of District art teacher Ruth Paesch. 4 A.H. Dep. at 159:1-20. Shetterly called A.H. “baby” during the visit, which prompted a question 5 from Paesch. A.H. Dep. at 160:7-12; 161:1-25. A.H. testified that the two shared a look, and she 6 acknowledged the nickname was “a little strange.” Id. at 161:1-25. Paesch testified that she first 7 became aware of the romantic relationship between A.H. and Shetterly only after Shetterly’s arrest 8 in May 2021. Paesch Dep. at 102:4-6; 139:21-140:13. She had no prior knowledge, suspicions, or 9 concerns that A.H. and Shetterly were engaged in an inappropriate relationship. Id. at 88:8-14; 10 100:12-22; 103:3-13; 103:25-104:9; 109:6-9; 110:11-111:19; 132:20-133:23. The only other 11 individual A.H. told about the relationship was a friend. A.H. Dep. at 162:17-25. A.H. told no 12 one else she was in a sexual relationship with Shetterly prior to Shetterly’s arrest. Id. at 163:6-14. 13 In April 2021, Trempy observed A.H. and Shetterly “come in the building holding hands. 14 And when they saw me, they dropped their hands, but they were acting in a way that, as I said, my 15 mom tingling senses went off. It didn’t seem appropriate. It was too intimate. It was too 16 chummy. I saw no boundaries physically between those two.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 37:11-22. 17 It was clear to Trempy that there was an “inherent intimacy to their action” and it “was not just 18 teacher/student.” Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 73:18-21, 73:22-74:3; Trempy Dep Ex. 37; Trempy Vol. 19 II Dep at 176:3-12. After seeing A.H. and Shetterly holding hands, she immediately reported it to 20 Principal Sigler. Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 40:22-24. 21 On April 27, 2021, Trempy sent an email outlining some of her concerns, including the 22 lack of boundaries between Shetterly and A.H. and their ongoing relationship. Trempy Dep., Ex. 23 31; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 158:20-161:17. Trempy expressed that “admin needs to step in” and 24 felt the “ongoing relationship” “needs to be addressed.” Id. Trempy filed a CPS report on April 25 30, 2021. Trempy Dep., Ex. 2; Trempy Vol. I Dep. at 46:11-47:7; Trempy Vol. II Dep. at 166:1- 26 9, 172:23-173:4. Principal Sigler knew Trempy filed a CPS Report. Sigler Dep. at 216:5-7. 27 On May 26, 2021, school psychologist Beth Frieswyk-Masters observed A.H. and 1 an off-campus restaurant. Frieswyk-Masters Dep. Ex 24; Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 25:1-7, 96:16- 2 25; Sigler Dep. at 182:16-18. Frieswyk-Masters testified she reported what she observed to 3 Assistant Principal Jordan that same day, May 26, 2021. Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 25:16-26:17. 4 Jordan testified that Frieswyk-Masters reported what she saw to her on May 27, 2021. Jordan 5 Dep. Vol. II at 210:24-211:5. Jordan testified she instructed Frieswyk-Masters to file a CPS 6 report. Jordan Vol. II Dep. at 211:6-8. On or about May 27, 2021, Jordan reported to Principal 7 Sigler and relayed the information regarding the public, affectionate nose rubbing and arm 8 rubbing. Jordan Vol. II Dep. at 211:11-16, 214:25-215:16. Principal Sigler denies talking to 9 Frieswyk-Masters or learning information about this incident prior to Shetterly’s arrest. Sigler 10 Dep. at 168:8-169:12, 181:4-11. Principal Sigler testified that, if she knew the information 11 Frieswyk-Masters reported, she would have gone to HR. Sigler Dep. at 193:22-25. 12 On May 28, 2021, A.H.’s mother, Jamie Danberg, discovered cards from Shetterly and 13 found pictures and text messages showing A.H. had been sexually assaulted. Danberg Dep. at 14 115:12-118:13. Danberg contacted the Richmond Police Department to report what she 15 discovered. Id. Shetterly was arrested and WCCUSD was notified of the arrest on or about May 16 30, 2021. Sigler Dep. at 183:20-184:22. Shetterly was placed on paid administrative leave on 17 June 1, 2021. Sigler Dep. at 186:1-5. 18 A.H. never told Frieswyk-Masters, Assistant Principal Jordan, or Principal Sigler that 19 Shetterly was sexually assaulting her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep. 20 at 192:18-23, 196:5-11, 197:1-8. 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 Both Defendants, the District and Sigler, move for summary judgment in their favor on all 23 claims asserted against them by A.H., including claims for (1) negligence (against the District and 24 Principal Sigler); (2) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention (against the District and Sigler); 25 (3) violation of Title IX (against the District); (4) discrimination in violation of California 26 Education Code section 200 (against the District); and (5) discrimination in violation of the Bane 27 Act, California Civil Code section 52.1 (against the District and individuals). After setting forth 1 violation of Title IX. The Court then considers its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the 2 remaining state law causes of action. 3 A. Legal Standard 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 5 on a “claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 6 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 7 of law. Id. The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court 8 of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery 9 responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 10 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. 11 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is 12 “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving 13 party. Id. 14 Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively 15 demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun 16 v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving 17 party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may carry its initial burden of 18 production by submitting admissible “evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 19 party's case,” or by showing, “after suitable discovery,” that the “nonmoving party does not have 20 enough evidence of an essential element of its claim or defense to carry its ultimate burden of 21 persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105- 22 06 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25 (noting a moving party can prevail merely 23 by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 24 party’s case). 25 When the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must respond with 26 specific facts, supported by admissible evidence, showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 27 56(c), (e). The asserted disputed facts must be material – the existence of only “some alleged 1 summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. “[M]ere allegation and speculation do not 2 create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.” Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 3 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendants where there 4 was “no evidence in the record from which a trier of fact could have” found for plaintiff). 5 When deciding a summary judgment motion, courts must view the evidence in the light 6 most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in their favor. 7 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011). 8 However, when a non-moving party fails to produce evidence rebutting the moving party’s 9 showing, then summary adjudication is proper. Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d at 1103 (“If the nonmoving 10 party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party 11 wins the motion for summary judgment.”). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion 12 is not to make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed 13 material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th 14 Cir. 1987). 15 B. Violation of Title IX (against WCCUSD) 16 Defendants aver that A.H.’s cause of action for gender discrimination under Title IX fails 17 on the basis that the District did not have actual knowledge of the discrimination. Title IX of the 18 Education Amendments of 1972 states:

19 No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 20 discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 21 22 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 23 A “damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has 24 authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the 25 recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and fails 26 adequately to respond.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 27 (1998). Actual notice on the part of the federal funding recipient is critical because it is the 1 the Title IX violation. Lopez v. Regents of University of California, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1122 2 (2013) (citing Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010)). 3 Moreover, to prove actionable, “Title IX plaintiffs asserting a sexual harassment theory must 4 demonstrate that the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it caused 5 a deprivation of educational opportunities or benefits.” Lopez, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1121 (citing Porto 6 v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. 7 v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). 8 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gebser set forth the standard for a plaintiff who seeks 9 damages based on a claim of discrimination under Title IX. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-78. There, 10 like here, the plaintiff brought a claim for discrimination under Title IX against a school district on 11 a theory of sexual harassment arising from a high school teacher’s grooming and sexual assault of 12 a minor plaintiff. Parents had separately complained to the school administration about the same 13 teacher’s sexually inappropriate comments to students during class, but the administration did not 14 learn of the teacher’s sexual assault of the student until after police caught him in the act. Gebser, 15 524 U.S. at 277-78. Following a lengthy discussion distinguishing a judicially-implied cause of 16 action for discrimination in education under Title IX from the congressionally-authorized cause of 17 action for discrimination in employment under Title VII, the Court held that a school district 18 receiving federal funds can be subject to a Title IX claim for damages as a result of sexual 19 harassment by one of its teachers only if an appropriate official had actual notice of the harassment 20 and the school responded with deliberate indifference. Id. at 290-91. 21 Here, Plaintiff has put forward no evidence that any DeAnza official had actual knowledge 22 of the sexual harassment of A.H. by Shetterly. A.H. testified that she never told Frieswyk-Masters 23 that Shetterly was sexually harassing her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H. 24 Dep. at 192:18-23. A.H. testified that she did not tell Assistant Principal Jordan that Shetterly was 25 sexually harassing her or that they had any type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep. at 196:5-11. 26 A.H. testified that she did not tell Principal Sigler about Shetterly’s actions or that they had any 27 type of sexual relationship. A.H. Dep. at 197:1-8. And staff testified that they did not know of 1 relationship” between A.H. and Shetterly only upon Shetterly’s arrest. Trempy Dep. at 61:22- 2 62:6. A.H. presents no countervailing evidence that any of the District’s staff learned of the 3 sexual harassment prior to Shetterly’s arrest, much less that they responded with deliberate 4 indifference. Instead, A.H. advances evidence that stops short of actual knowledge, and which 5 instead suggests that, based on the instances of boundary-crossing conduct by Shetterly, 6 Defendants had constructive knowledge about Shetterly’s sexual harassment of A.H. – 7 constructive knowledge that falls short under Title IX. See Dkt. No. 105 at 20-22. 8 Sigler and Jordan were aware of some disturbing conduct, including a relationship between 9 A.H. and Shetterly that clearly exceeded expected and appropriate student-teacher dynamics. 10 Principal Sigler had actual knowledge of multiple instances of physical contact, including 11 Shetterly’s arm around A.H.’s waist, Shetterly holding hands with A.H., Trempy Dep. at 73:11-15, 12 and “Eskimo kissing,” Frieswyk-Masters Dep. at 119:14-19. Though the principal’s observation 13 of the pair coming out of a storage closet together would be significant, it does not establish Sigler 14 actually knew Shetterly was engaged in the severe and pervasive sexual harassment of a student, 15 particularly where no one knew the nature of A.H. and Shetterly’s relationship.1 Overall, these 16 incidents do not establish actual notice that Shetterly was subjecting A.H. to severe, pervasive, or 17 objectively offensive sexual harassment. Cf. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 279 (holding that a school 18 principal’s knowledge of inappropriate teacher comments within educational setting did not 19 establish actual notice that the same teacher engaged in sexual abuse of student). A.H. does not 20 cite any authority suggesting that the complained-of conduct rises to the level of severe, pervasive, 21 or objectively offensive, and the Court cannot conclude otherwise. 22 Ultimately, Principal Sigler, Assistant Principal Jordan, and the other staff at De Anza 23 failed to protect A.H. from being groomed and sexually assaulted, but those failures do not 24 establish liability for discrimination under Title IX because A.H. cannot show that they had actual 25 1 The parties dispute whether Principal Sigler observed Shetterly and A.H. alone together walking 26 out of a storage closet in Shetterly’s classroom with her arm around A.H.’s waist. Compare A.H. Dep. at 200:22-202:19 with Sigler Dep. at 154:11-19. However, because this incident does not 27 rise to the level of “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” necessary to constitute sexual 1 knowledge and responded with deliberate indifference. Thus, the District is entitled to judgment 2 on the Title IX discrimination claim. 3 C. Declination of Supplemental Jurisdiction 4 “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 5 subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 6 jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[A] federal court should consider and weigh in each 7 case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, 8 and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court 9 involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). 10 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “[i]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are 11 eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise 12 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 13 (9th Cir. 1997). 14 Having disposed of the sole remaining federal claim in this matter, there is no longer a 15 persuasive reason for the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over A.H.’s state law claims. 16 The Court finds that the balance of factors does not weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction. Most 17 importantly, the Court finds “that principles of comity will be well-served by allowing the state 18 courts to resolve claims solely of state law” because of the potential application of statutory 19 immunities. Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 524 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Cal. Educ. Code 20 § 44808. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to deny supplemental jurisdiction over 21 A.H.’s remaining state law causes of action and dismisses those claims without prejudice to re- 22 filing in state court. 23 // 24 25 // 26 27 // 1 I. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in 3 || part and DENIED in part as MOOT. The Court DECLINES supplemental jurisdiction over A.H.’s 4 || remaining state law claims and DISMISSES the remaining claims without prejudice to re-filing in 5 state court. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 || Dated: February 20, 2026 10 : ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUI United States District Judge a 12

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